The first copyright case decided at the U.S. Supreme Court was Wheaton v. Peters in 1834. There were six justices at the time, including the oft-quoted Joseph Story, and in a 4-2 decision, the Court made what I believe was a textual and, therefore, doctrinal error. The allegedly infringed works at issue were published reports of the Court, and there was neither disagreement nor error in finding that the opinions of the Court themselves were not a subject of protection. Instead, the important question—a philosophical debate inherited from England’s 18th century copyright battles—was whether Article I of the Constitution empowered Congress to create rights or to protect rights that naturally existed at common law.
In finding the former, the Court erred in my view because its opinion turned on misinterpreting the word securing from the intellectual property clause in Article I, which states that Congress is empowered, “To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” The Court held that securing was a word of “origination,” establishing the doctrinal principle that copyright rights are “creatures of statute.”
The precedent in Wheaton has often been highlighted by anti-copyright scholars because it limits the notion that copyright rights are in any sense natural rights. This, in turn, supports the skeptical (I would say cynical) view that copyright is a devil’s bargain with authors, begrudgingly granting a temporary “monopoly” in exchange for production and distribution of their works. But aside from the fact that the Court of 1834 stated that the longstanding question remained “by no means free from doubt,” its textual interpretation of the word securing was simply unfounded.
As I discuss briefly in my book, there are at least two strong arguments against the Court’s finding that secure was a word of origination, and the first of these is the preamble to the Constitution. When the Framers wrote “to secure the blessings of liberty,” they can only have meant that the aim of the Constitution is to protect, ensure, or maintain that liberty which had so forcefully been articulated in ink and blood as a natural right of all people. The Framers did not mean that the Constitution creates the “blessings of liberty.”
The second argument is the dictionary. Noah Webster, who happens to be both the father of American English and the father of American copyright, was widely respected as a man of letters; as an effective voice for the natural rights of authors; and as the primary force behind the copyright law revision of 1831. Nevertheless, in defining the word securing in the Wheaton case, the Court somehow failed to harmonize its interpretation with any of seven entries in the 1828 edition of Webster’s dictionary. There, all definitions of secure express variations on the idea of “protection,” and none suggests that the word means “creation.”
Why does Wheaton matter today?
By misreading the meaning of secure, the Wheaton Court overstated a utilitarian view of copyright and understated the natural, common law (i.e., human) view of copyright. Granted, this tension dates back a few centuries, if one wishes to look that far, but it isn’t necessary to wander into the tall grass of pre-American history. There is ample rationale since 1790 to hold as self-evident that what the author creates is naturally her property, but this principle can only apply to human creators.
As mentioned, copyright skeptics, many who are either funded by or ideologically aligned with Big Tech, will overstate the precedent that copyright is a “creature of statute” because they like to propose that what Congress giveth, Congress can taketh away. For instance, Wheaton animated the “copyright is broken” campaign, which insists that technological progress in the digital age demands weakening protections on creative works to foster “innovation.”
This argument has taken various forms over the years, including justifying mass piracy; proposing that Congress should roll back the duration of protection; arguing the unconstitutionality of digital rights management; advocating extreme interpretations of fair use; and inventing legal theories like “controlled digital lending” for eBooks. These efforts have largely failed while Big Tech’s credibility has also diminished over the past decade. And indeed, despite the doctrinal weight of Wheaton, the legislative, judicial, and cultural record on copyright is replete with natural rights principles.
Still, although Big Tech does not enjoy the benefit of the doubt it did circa 2012, the commotion over generative artificial intelligence (GAI) reprises the familiar theme that copyright rights allegedly stand in the way of “progress.” In fact, one of the leading astroturf organizations promoting that view calls itself the Chamber of Progress, but the consideration about GAI in the creative community and beyond should respond that “progress” which proposes to displace or diminish human value is not progress.
As new technologies emerge and enter such central aspects of our existence, it must be done responsibly and with respect for the irreplaceable artists, performers, and creatives who have shaped our history and will chart the next chapters of human experience. – Human Artistry Campaign –
Big Tech surrogates like the Chamber of Progress will repeat the assertion that GAI “democratizes” creativity, which takes a lot of chutzpah coming from an industry that has done so much widespread damage to democracy. By now, it should be obvious that when tech companies claim to “democratize” anything, this smokescreen is disguising the fact that what they are usually doing is undermining the value of individual agency—from control of one’s likeness to copyright rights to political views. In other words, democratization has been bad for democracy.
The Wheaton Court of 1834 could not have imagined that the subject of common law copyright would be relevant 190 years later in context to a technology that can generate creative works without creative people. But human artistry is not strictly about art per se. It reprises the philosophical question as to what it means to be human, and if that answer begins with thought and knowledge, then we must recognize how democracies have been hammered by epistemic crisis since the explosion of social media.
Now that GAI is accelerating and expanding the power of misinformation, the human who encounters the AI generated lie must decide whether to believe what he sees, let alone to amplify the post. This is not merely a question of critical thinking, but an existential test that guys like Peter Thiel hope we fail. As many tech critics have repeated over the last 10-15 years, the design of these technologies—and indeed the stated intent of many of its designers—is that we become its tools rather than the other way around. And GAI has the potential to fulfill that agenda by more thoroughly blurring the line between reality and illusion.
Hi David,
Regular reader here, but I have to disagree with you on this one. First, the IP clause is included among the enumerated powers of Congress That is, the framers believed the power to establish IP rights needed to be invested explicitly in Congress because they does that flow from a natural rights.
Your analysis also elides the significance of the first phrase in the IP clause: “To Promote the Progress and Useful Arts.” It’s that phrase that establishes the fundamentally instrumental quality of the IP power. Natural rights, by definition, are not instrumental. It also is clearly intended to invoke the first sentence of the Statute of Anne: “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Copies, during the Times therein mentioned,” which established the fundamentally instrumental quality of the Anglo-American conception of copyright.
Finally, the IP clause, like the Statute of Anne, stipulates that the right should extend only for a limited time. Natural rights do not expire.
Paul Sweeting
Editor
RightsTech Extra
Thanks, Paul. You are not the only person to disagree with me on this, and I accept all of those premises. Nevertheless, I maintain that copyright in particular is, and always has been, a quirky animal with natural rights-like qualities much as it has property-like qualities–and of course real property is not term-limited by statute. I accept that Wheaton is settled doctrine but not that it is a settled matter philosophically. The English courts went back and forth on the question in two landmark cases, the Wheaton court acknolwedged the tension, and Jane Ginsburg, in her paper “A Tale of Two Copyrights,” makes a persuasive case that both the English (utilitarian) and French (natural rights) theories were alive in the minds of the framers. Additionally, Lyman Patterson writes that natural rights animated the state laws enacted at the founding period–and none of this was truly harmonized until 1976 (excluding pre72 recordings).
As for the specific rationales of the framers, there is so little discussion on the matter, and the 1790 Act hews so closely to the Statute of Anne in key aspects, that it seems just as logical to conclude that the SoA was the model they knew, and it seemed like a good enough starting place. To paraphraze Elizabeth Wurtzel, it was leap of faith for the framers to imagine the U.S. producing its own cultural works at all. I’m not convinced the framers devoted a lot of energy to copyright theory at the founding period.
Thanks for reading and writing!