In February 2023, I argued that using copyrighted works for the purpose of training generative artificial intelligence (GAI) products is not fair use. My view in that post was, and remains, that because the purpose of copyright law is to promote authorship, and authorship is human as a matter of doctrine, then a purpose which replaces authorship is facially antithetical ...
When I was planning to start The Illusion of More, I contemplated a category of posts under the heading We Don’t Need This. Although abandoned, I thought it might be an editorial framework for articles about innovations that really aren’t innovative, and the low-tech invention that originally inspired the idea was the kiddie-car/shopping-cart hybrid. In case you haven’t had the ...
In my last post, I focused on the hypothetical fair use defense of generative AI under the principles articulated in the Google Books decision of 2014. In this post, I want to address another claim that has arisen—both on social media, and in comments to the Copyright Office—namely that generative AI companies should be shielded against secondary liability for copyright ...
In my last post, I discussed some of the allegations that “machine learning” (ML) with the use of copyrighted works constitutes mass infringement. Citing the class action lawsuits Andersen and Tremblay, I predicted that if the courts do not find that ML unavoidably violates the reproduction right (§106(1)), copyright law may not offer much relief to the creators of the ...
