Music Making Gen AI: A Deeper Dive into Fair Use

fair use

In February 2023, I argued that using copyrighted works for the purpose of training generative artificial intelligence (GAI) products is not fair use. My view in that post was, and remains, that because the purpose of copyright law is to promote authorship, and authorship is human as a matter of doctrine, then a purpose which replaces authorship is facially antithetical to copyright’s constitutional foundation. So, because a finding of fair use, should, as a matter of law, further copyright’s purpose, the GAI developer’s defense under that exception is invalid.

That said, I assume the courts will not rule on this threshold, constitutional question at summary judgment and will instead conduct fair use analyses in the first cases that proceed to at least bench trial. After one or two outcomes, if favorable to plaintiffs, we will likely see a lot of settlements because so many of the AI cases alleging mass infringement for the purpose of machine learning (ML) present the same legal questions.

Turning to the recent lawsuits filed by record labels UMG, et al. against GAI developers Udio and Suno, both complaints anticipate the fair use responses to come and, to an extent, imply the doctrinal view articulated above. Because the two complaints are nearly identical in substance, I’ll stick to Udio because the suit is filed in the Southern District of New York (SDNY), and the Second Circuit is where nearly all—if not all—of the relevant fair use case law has been active or decided. Odds are, the court in the First Circuit, which has a comparatively thin copyright record, will follow the Second Circuit’s lead in resolving Suno.

As discussed in my first post about these cases, the defendants seem unable to present a plausible claim of non-infringement and even signaled that they have planned to argue fair use in the lawsuits they knew were coming. All the action will be focused on factor one, part one (whether the use is “transformative”) and on factor four (potential harm to the market for the works used).

To dispense with factors two and three, the nature of the work(s) used and amount of the work(s) used respectively, these clearly tilt in favor of the plaintiffs. The sound recordings used for ML are highly expressive in nature (factor two); and by all evidence and inferences presented, it seems clear that defendant copied whole works—and many of them—into the AI model (factor three). One way the use of whole works could swing back to favor the defendant would be finding that the purpose of the use under factor one is, indeed, transformative.

To get there, I believe the court would have to find transformativeness under its precedent in Google Books, but in addition to the court itself describing that decision as the outer boundary of fair use, the Supreme Court in Warhol may have at least sharpened, if not narrowed, that boundary. As a factual matter, a GAI like Udio is nothing like Google Books. The latter feeds whole books into a system for the purpose of creating a research tool, while the former feeds whole sound recordings into a system for the purpose of producing other sound recordings—several of which have been presented in evidence as substantially similar to famous sound recordings.

Considering Udio Under Fair Use

As mentioned, the focus will be on factors one and four, which is not uncommon, but these cases highlight the interplay between the two factors. Factor one asks the purpose of the use, including whether that purpose is commercial; and factor four asks whether the use threatens the market value for the work(s) used. Thus, if a court finds under factor one that a use serves a “substitutional” purpose, this suggests that the use will unavoidably cause harm to the market value of the works used under factor four. This is what the labels argue, but a product like Udio does imply new territory for a fair use consideration.

Factor one asks two interrelated questions—whether the purpose of the use is transformative, and whether that purpose is commercial in nature. Commercial use tilts away from fair use but is not determinative, and transformativeness tilts toward fair use, but is also not determinative. In fact, the Supreme Court decision in Warhol, reversed a trend whereby transformativeness too often carried the entire fair use analysis. For instance, Udio’s failure to license the works used for ML is itself a potential market harm under factor four. Thus, even if Udio’s purpose were held to be transformative, its commercial purpose would split factor one, and the rest of the fair use factors would likely still favor the plaintiffs.

But, as the complaint states, “[Udio is] far from transformative, as there is no functional purpose for Udio’s AI model to ingest the Copyrighted Recordings other than to spit out new, competing music files,” states the labels’ complaint. This is properly framed in context to what “transformative” means in copyright law. Transformativeness is not about technological novelty or even innovation that promises to “make the world better” and so on. Notwithstanding the hyperbole in many such claims by various developers, the transformative question in fair use focuses on distinction of purpose from the works used.

As the quote above indicates, Udio ingests (i.e., copies) sound recordings for the purpose of making other sound recordings. And the purpose of both sets of sound recordings is, generally and presumably, listening pleasure for consumers. Even if none of the music produced by Udio were substantially similar to any of the music that went in, the labels contend that the overall purpose is holistically substitutional for all the recordings used to create the product. Udio used the music of human artists to “make” music without human artists, which is a purpose far beyond the Google Books boundary of providing a research tool to humans, including some who will be authors of works.

In response, Udio can argue that the purpose of its product is to produce a plethora of “new” music, which may indeed threaten to replace artists, but which is no more a substitute for the works used than a Beyonce song is a substitute for a Taylor Swift song. This is a tricky moment for copyright, which protects authors’ rights by protecting the use of their property. For instance, if no song ever comes out of Udio that sounds like a copy of an existing song, or if Udio can show that the majority of songs output are “new,” it could argue that its purpose is not substitutional under factor one.

Additionally, if Udio could show that its purpose is substantially providing a tool for would-be music creators, its claim to being “transformative” would be stronger under Google Books. But based on the reported function and market objectives of both Udio and Suno—i.e., mass-market products enabling any consumer to “make music” with a few basic prompts—the “tool” claim, if it were made, seems unpersuasive.

Let me interject that tech developers and copyright antagonists often conflate the economic concept of “creative destruction” with transformativeness, arguing that “copyright stifles progress.” While I personally question whether Udio et al. necessarily represent progress as a cultural matter, even if Joe Schumpeter himself would agree that technological replacement of human music makers is “creative destruction,” that prospect anticipates the nullification of copyright law as a relic of impliedly obsolete human authorship. As such, it would seem preposterous for a court to find that an affirmative defense to infringement should be applied in a manner that would cause copyright law itself to implode.

None of this is to say, as indeed the complaint makes clear, that peaceful coexistence between human authors and GAI cannot come to pass. Where GAI may be used by the human creator to make an expressive work of her own mental conception, the AI product has a much stronger claim to promoting the progress of authorship. But in the case of these music making products, that does not appear to be the intent—either by design or business model. And so, to reprise the doctrinal assertion I advocate, the Google Books opinion itself states:

Courts thus developed the doctrine, eventually named fair use, which permits unauthorized copying in some circumstances, so as to further “copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” [Emphasis added]

On that basis, the Second Circuit should find that a use of protected works which is holistically substitutional for human authorship does not further the purpose of copyright and is, therefore, barred from presenting a valid fair use defense.


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David Newhoff
David is an author, communications professional, and copyright advocate. After more than 20 years providing creative services and consulting in corporate communications, he shifted his attention to law and policy, beginning with advocacy of copyright and the value of creative professionals to America’s economy, core principles, and culture.

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