End of the Line for Controlled Digital Lending Theory

controlled digital lending

IA asks this Court to bless the large scale copying and distribution of copyrighted books without permission from or payment to the Publishers or authors.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday affirmed that Internet Archive’s digital book lending model controlled digital lending (CDL) is not permitted by copyright law, including under the fair use exception. The outcome is a big deal and, at the same time, is not really big news. Copyright watchers grounded in what the law is (rather than what they wish it to be) were likely relieved but not surprised that the appeals court upheld a judgment, which the lower court originally issued just four days after oral arguments.

The lawsuit Hachette et al. v. Internet Archive was triggered by IA’s so-called National Emergency Library (NEL), an alleged response to the COVID shutdown whereby it arbitrarily made over one million digital books available without any kind of restriction. Because IA had no basis on which to claim it was responding to an “emergency” need, I maintain the NEL itself was a stunt designed to provoke litigation and take Brewster Kahle and friends’ copyright theories out for a ride. And as of yesterday, that ride is probably over.

Specifically, IA and a small group of academics hoped to prove that controlled digital lending is permitted by fair use. CDL is based on the theory that a library is permitted to make its own digital copy of a physical book in its collection and to loan either the digital or the physical copy to one reader at a time—and to then apply the scheme for as many physical copies as the library owns. Further, IA expanded the concept to create its Open Library by “partnering” with various libraries around the country to effectively count the physical copies on all those shelves and increase the number of readers to which the digital copies would be loaned.

The Second Circuit affirmed not only that the Open Library model is not permitted but that the CDL practice is not a fair use—even if it were limited to the physical books in IA’s possession. With the one distinction that the circuit court reversed the lower court’s finding that IA’s purpose is “commercial” under fair use factor one, IA lost resoundingly on all four fair use factors.

In short, CDL is not transformative under factor one because its purpose is no different than the legal eBook lending models offered by publishers. This finding informs factor four in that because the purpose of the use is not transformative, the CDL scheme amounts to a market substitute and is, therefore, a potential market harm. Factors two (nature of the works used) and three (amount of the works copied) barely warrant discussion. The books in suit are expressive in nature, which favors the plaintiff; and IA does not dispute that it copied and made whole books available. Copying whole works may be permissible, but only possibly if the use is transformative.

Since before this suit began, IA has claimed to be a champion for all libraries, even going so far as to assert that CDL is simply doing what all libraries do—i.e., to “buy books and loan books.” But that rhetoric, conveniently facile for the media, obfuscated the more complex truth that IA and its colleagues and supporting amici were pushing a theory with no foundation in law. CDL is a self-indulgent thought experiment for a handful of academics and activists with no skin in the game of creating literary works. And IA’s claim to be acting like any other library was simply untrue.

To those who believe the law should be different to facilitate IA’s alleged social benefit, I have considered the intent of CDL (and the alleged burden of eBook licensing) and find no evidence to support the claim that CDL fulfils an unmet need. In fact, as stated in past posts, Kahle’s dream of digitizing everything and making it all freely available is not only harmful to future authorship but is a threat to local libraries. Further, it bears repeating that the publishers in this case represent thousands of authors, while IA represents the interests of no authors.

I get why even creators are often persuaded by Internet Archive’s claims. After all, creators tend to love libraries and are instinctively wary of corporations, including publishers. But to put this in contemporary context, IA’s mass digitization and “lending” scheme, which would harm future authorship, is hardly much better than AI’s mass digitization and “training” scheme, which would also harm future authorship. (See what I did with the letters there?) Mass copying and distribution of protected works should always be viewed skeptically because the purpose is rarely transformative and non-threatening to creators. As the court states in yesterday’s judgment:

Within the framework of the Copyright Act, IA’s argument regarding the public interest is shortsighted. True, libraries and consumers may reap some short-term benefits from access to free digital books, but what are the long-term consequences? If authors and creators knew that their original works could be copied and disseminated for free, there would be little motivation to produce new works. And a dearth of creative activity would undoubtedly negatively impact the public. It is this reality that the Copyright Act seeks to avoid.

David Newhoff
David is an author, communications professional, and copyright advocate. After more than 20 years providing creative services and consulting in corporate communications, he shifted his attention to law and policy, beginning with advocacy of copyright and the value of creative professionals to America’s economy, core principles, and culture.

Enjoy this blog? Please spread the word :)