The Chamber of Progress launched an initiative called the “Generate and Create” campaign to “defend fair use” and “promote AI creativity.” I don’t know whether they bought this campaign used from the basement of Fight for The Future or Electronic Frontier Foundation, but the following statement is worn-out rhetoric that sounds even weaker defending AI as a mode of production than it was defending online platforms as a mode of distribution:
To combat the growing legal and policy copyright threats against generative artificial intelligence, Chamber of Progress announced a new campaign, Generate & Create, highlighting the creative benefits of generative artificial intelligence and supporting established fair use protections for AI training and output.
The pro-creator message is a remix of a remix of Lessig’s “remix culture” argument against online copyright enforcement—a narrative which begat the “we’re all creators” argument against copyright rights. Instead of YouTube enables creators to break free of “gatekeepers,” now it’s AI enabling the same emancipation, though as discussed in this post, it’s hard to fathom who the “gatekeepers” are this time.
Meanwhile, the promise to “defend fair use” is code for “we’re funded by Big Tech to tilt at windmills while we lose legal arguments.” One does not “defend fair use” the way one defends a right to read banned books or a right to reproductive healthcare in the same states that like to ban books. There is no legislative agenda to abolish or amend Section 107 of the Copyright Act. Fair use is a balancing test courts apply in certain copyright infringement cases, and on the headline question as to whether machine learning (ML) with copyrighted works is exempted by fair use, there is nothing “established” about that answer despite CoP’s implication to the contrary.
Although fair use cannot be applied generally (i.e., it is a case-by-case consideration), it is true that all the copyright infringement claims against the various AI developers arise from the same general conduct and, therefore, invite similar or identical fair use defenses. Cutting to the final chapter, if Open AI loses to New York Times and Udio loses to UMG et al. in the Second Circuit, those outcomes are likely to be controlling on the fair use question of ML. Even if any of these cases goes to the Supreme Court, the likelihood of a reversal of an opinion out of the Second Circuit—so prolific on fair use case law—is a bet I wouldn’t make.
Nevertheless, the argument will be presented, and it goes something like this: Gen AI breeds new creative works, in part by breaking down “barriers” for would-be creators, and because this productivity is consistent with the purpose of copyright, ML serves a transformative purpose and is, therefore, fair use. Notwithstanding the fact that a defendant can win on the transformative question and still lose on fair use overall, I suspect the AI developers may find their very expensive machines described by the courts’ precedent language as “slightly transformative.”
But AI is revolutionary! you might say. How can it be only “slightly transformative?” Answer: for the same reason the Internet Archive’s Open Library is “slightly transformative”—because its purpose was a substitute for licensed ebooks. What is different about GAI, of course, is that it is generally a substitute as a mode of production more than as a mode of distribution, and to complicate matters, some professional creators are using AI tools and deriving benefits from those uses. So, if that sounds like the answer is “it depends,” welcome to the fact-intensive nature of the fair use defense, which cannot be broadly “defended” in the sense the CoP proclaims.
CoP et al. will promote the argument that because GAI fosters the production of more “creative works,” this predicted increase in output fulfills the purpose of copyright law. But the reason I put “creative works” in quotes is that for every 100 sound recordings to come out of an AI product like Udio, somewhere between an unknown and zero percent of those sounds will be “creative works” as a matter of law. Copyright only protects human authorship of creative expression, and that doctrine will not—and should not—change. Meanwhile, the question as to what the human creator must do in collaboration with GAI for the human to claim copyright in the resulting work is an evolving doctrine—one that is several years, and several lawsuits, away from becoming guidance.
With a product like Udio or Suno, where the business model depends on consumers generating music with a few simple prompts, it is fair to assume that the vast majority of the music produced will not be “creative expression” as a matter of law. And because “creative works” that are not protected by copyright (i.e., are not human authorship) cannot reasonably be held to serve the purpose of copyright, fair use should be foreclosed as a defense of the generative machine.
In response, we will see CoP and defendants argue that because the product is already being used by professional creators, products like Udio or Suno serve both copyright and non-copyright purposes. While plausible, this defense is where I believe the courts may find the GAI’s purpose to be only “slightly transformative.” This is because the dominant purpose—indeed the only ROI available to the developers—is one that primarily does not fulfill the purpose of copyright and which, in fact, serves as a substitute for works that do serve the purpose of copyright.
Further, the consideration of GAI as a tool for creators in furtherance of copyright’s purpose runs headlong into the nascent doctrine as to how and how much use of GAI results in a protectable work. That question is a case-by-case consideration at a granular level. One musician’s use of Udio may produce a copyrightable composition and/or sound recording, while another’s use of the same product in a slightly different manner may have the opposite result. Considering the uncertainty of these hypotheticals to come, it is hard to imagine how the courts could find today that the product at issue favors a finding of transformativeness strong enough to carry the whole fair use analysis.
Chamber of Progress et al. will flood social media with anecdotal arguments, like disabled persons empowered to create thanks to GAI, or the whimsical notion that “machines learn the way people do.” These and other rationales for GAI’s value deserve specific responses, some of which I shall write. But in general, I predict these stories, like Lessig’s “children of YouTube,” will play well with some segment of the blogosphere but then, as legal arguments, will join the pile of similar fair use defenses lying on the floors of the federal courts.
