Category: Copyright

NYT tech editor Jeong sticking copyright criticism where it doesn’t belong.

Holy whiplash segues, Batman.  There I was reading a perfectly interesting article by Sarah Jeong on the potential hazards of selling one’s personal data, when she took an incomprehensible—if mercifully brief—detour into the realm of copyright law.  She presents a reasonable enough case that the companies now offering to help us “broker” our private data (e.g. health information) may be counting on the fact that, “There’s no legal property right to personal data.  Once personal data is gathered, it’s out there for anyone to buy and sell. At the moment, there are no legal grounds to demand compensation for use,” Jeong writes.

Fair enough.  It is certainly true that the whole prospect of selling private data, even if it were a good idea, does implicate a relatively novel legal framework.  And while I am personally inclined to agree with Jeong that the whole notion is fraught with hazards, I am at a loss to understand where she is going with this interjection …

“In any case, we already know what happens when property rights get slapped on information, because we’ve already done it, to some degree, in copyright law. 

Giving people ownership of their creative expressions means they can buy and sell them on the open market. The risk is that an artist will wind up, like Taylor Swift, alienated from her own work because she no longer possesses the masters of some of her earlier recordings.”

Swift in late June stated publicly that she was very disappointed to learn that mega-star manager Scooter Braun will be acquiring Big Machine Label Group, which still owns her master recordings dating back to the start of her career.  Swift calls the prospect of being under contract to Braun her “worst nightmare,” and for the sake of this post, we will take her word that he is an “incessant manipulative bully” because digging into that backstory could not matter less to Jeong’s ham-fisted allusion to the supposed problem with copyright.  

Even more bizarrely, Jeong happened to pick an artist who has adamantly defended both her own rights and those of much smaller artists, and who told Rolling Stone in 2014, “Important, rare things are valuable. Valuable things should be paid for. It’s my opinion that music should not be free, and my prediction is that individual artists and their labels will someday decide what an album’s price point is. I hope they don’t underestimate themselves or undervalue their art.”  So, I’m just spitballing here, but maybe Swift did not recently do an about-face on the purpose of copyright, or even abandon all prospect of working with labels, so much as she was just saying she really does not like Scooter Braun.  

Turning to Jeong’s implications about the nature of copyright, it is clear that she should refrain from the topic altogether.  For one thing copyright does not “slap property rights onto information.”  Quite the contrary.  There is in fact a long history of statutory development and caselaw that makes it very clear that information is not the subject of copyright.  Expression is the subject of copyright, but the way Jeong slaps these two sentences together makes it seem as though information and expression are the same thing—especially in the context of an editorial that is all about data, which has no resemblance to expression.  

At that point, I guess what Jeong is trying to say is that if we can own and sell our data, then, like Taylor Swift and her masters, we could wind up very unhappy about the party that buys the data.  I think that disappointment is almost a guarantee and that we should be shoring up statutes against privacy-invasion rather than looking for ways to market our DNA profiles and whatnot.  But, that said, what in blazes does the unprecedented challenge of mass data collection and its privacy implications have to do with about three centuries (though I would argue more) constructing a legal framework for authorial rights?  Not a damn thing.

Interestingly enough, the paper written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, which is widely considered the seminal American work articulating a right of privacy, actually turns to copyright law as starting point.  Because there is no constitutional declaration of a right to privacy Warren and Brandeis begin with the already long pedigree of copyright in unpublished works when they write, “From corporeal property arose the incorporeal rights issuing out of it; and then there opened the wide realm of intangible property, in the products and processes of the mind.”  

Not only do most people, and certainly most creators, still feel that the products of the mind are a form of personal property, but this was the exact point of reference chosen by a pair of legal lions to make the case that a right of privacy actually exists.  Consequently, Jeong might want to consider the possibility that copyright law provides guidance for the protection of our personal data rather than a warning of what can happen if we become the “owners” of that data.  Or, if we’re looking for warning signs in historic property rights regimes, my friend Neil Turkewitz observes …

“If property rights are the model, then Silicon Valley’s dismal track record on intellectual property rights is a giant red flag that simply vesting property rights is of little consequence to the extent that such property rights are essentially unenforceable — particularly for individuals. Since the dawn of the internet, notwithstanding their legal rights, creators and innovators have had to endure an avalanche of illegally available copies of their works online.”

So, maybe, as Warren and Brandeis noted, copyright does have something teach us about privacy that is quite different from Jeong’s misguided assumptions. But what do I know?  I’m just spitballing.

Petitioner Asks SCOTUS to Hear ReDigi Case

A new business called OmniQ has filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant cert in ReDegi v. Capitol Records, alleging that the Second Circuit’s opinion in December 2018 effectively brings an end to the First Sale doctrine.  The company is developing a patent pending model that (presumably) would facilitate an online market for “used” and hard-to-find motion pictures.  Its brief contends that the lower court erred in its plain text reading of “reproduction” under the copyright law and would permanently “outlaw” the kind of technology they propose to introduce.

It is unlikely the Supreme Court will agree to hear ReDigi, not least because, as Hollywood Reporter’sEric Gardner rightly notes, “The issue of whether the First Sale Doctrine has survived the digital age may make for good scholarly articles, but is the Supreme Court really going to devote its limited bandwidth to technology that’s already outdated?”  ReDigi proposed to facilitate trade in “used” digital music files at the same time that subscription streaming was on the rise and may, therefore, be considered obsolete at inception. But in its brief, OmniQ implies that its business model fulfills an unmet need in the market by addressing what it claims is dwindling access to classic motion pictures …

…the public has already lost access to vast libraries of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, simply because modern technological solutions like the one at issue here are lacking.

…the breadth of choice in movies was many times higher 20 years ago than it is today.

I personally find the brief’s argument about the lower court’s interpretation of “reproduction” somewhat persuasive when it states “there is no ‘reproduction’ without the multiplication of copies.” If in fact a file can be moved from my hard drive to your hard drive so that you now have it and I do not, then it there is a plausible argument to be made that “reproduction” has not occurred.  But from there, I think OmniQ’s claims overreach, blaming copyright protections for phenomena fostered solely by the market and technological change.

First Sale Probably Does Not Survive the Digital Age

Even if the Supreme Court were to agree with OmniQ that the Second Circuit misread “reproduction” in ReDigi, this would not rescue the fact that the proposed business model exceeded the purpose of the First Sale doctrine because it would create a “used” market in name only—one that could theoretically become a substitute for the primary market.  In 1908, the Supreme Court held…

“It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.”

And for the next century, physical copies of books, records, DVDs, etc. were sold in second-hand stores, garage sales, or rented through outlets like Blockbuster.  But the fact that a “used” digital file is identical to a “new” digital file is a technological reality that reshapes the meaning of “second-hand” material, and this at least alters—if it does not outright extinguish—the First Sale principle.  

Further, the potential for a transaction facilitator (which OmniQ presumably aspires to be) to foster a parallel trade in “used” digital files operating at internet scale is a vastly different consideration from the scope and nature of the secondary market that emerged between 1908 and the digital age. 

Finally, these same technological changes have spawned a primary market that (despite persistent complaints that all media should be free) is both cheaper and more abundant than the primary market of 20 years ago.  For example, The Criterion Collection, while perhaps not wholly satisfying to all film buffs, allows an account-holder to stream a library of motion-picture classics for about 27 cents a day—access that was unthinkable 20 years ago.  

In the still-evolving digital market, therefore, a petitioner like OmniQ should at least be required to demonstrate that its purpose is to facilitate a “second-hand” trade in material that is not likely to become available via licensed distribution systems—whether online or as physical copies.  And in this regard, the brief makes an emotional and cultural plea that fails to present a problem caused by copyright law.  

“1960 Doesn’t Exist on Netflix”

To demonstrate the market need for its business model, OmniQ relies almost entirely on one article written by Zach Schonfeld in 2017 for Newsweek.  It is an engaging piece on the theme that motion pictures from the oeuvres of Hitchcock, Truffaut, Fellini, Kubrick, et al are disappearing from mainstream cultural literacy.  The spirit of the piece which focuses almost exclusively on Netflix, is well captured when Schonfeld quotes blogger Nora Fiore (a.k.a. The Nitrate Diva) …

“If you’re the biggest name in film streaming services, the less you offer in classic movies, the more you imply that classic movies have less to offer.  It’s a terrible message to put out there.”

Perhaps this is a fair observation about contemporary culture and the movies, but the reasons for these changes have little or nothing to do with copyright law and everything to do with the inevitability that Netflix was going to transition to become a producer of new material. 

Before I go on, I have to interject that it is curious that in one moment, copyright is alleged to be a framework for nostalgic fuddy-duddies who don’t understand the future, but in the next moment, it is the nostalgic fuddy-duddies who are blaming copyright for stifling connection to the past.  Or I might also note that one of the complaints about copyright terms is the false allegation that creators will not produce anything new as long as they retain copyrights on older material they can keep reselling.  Maybe there are forces at play that are not really about copyright?

Speaking as one nostalgic fuddy-duddy who would rather watch Day for Night than Game of Thronesany day, the problem (if we agree it is a problem) with the apparent loss in status of classic films in the cultural mainstream is not a licensing issue.  Netflix could make all these films available tomorrow, and I predict that younger audiences will, by and large, think they’re being told to eat their vegetables.  

It isn’t copyright’s fault that a whole generation has been feasting on a steady diet of short-attention-span, handheld video clips for more than a decade.  The young mind does not easily transition from TikTok to Tarkovsky, and availability of the latter alone is not going to fill the apparent gap in cinematic literacy. Piracy statistics bear this out year after year as even illicit access worldwide continues to favor major, contemporary works like blockbuster movies by substantial margins.  

As an observer of culture and a cineaste, I would love to join Schonfeld and the film historians, academics, and buffs he cites for a drink to mourn the apparent loss of interest in the classics, but this was to be expected in a market destined to expand and become more segmented.  It should be little surprise in a world where we can have “liberal news” and “conservative news,” that entertainment is going to be even more distinctly subdivided.  

On the plus side, we get a diverse range of material and subject matter because investors are not restricted to appealing to the safe middle every time.  On the negative side, we no longer share a common film culture as we once did.  But this is a change borne of technological innovation in distribution systems that has nothing to do with copyright per se. 

Further, I think Schonfeld’s article is unduly harsh on allNetflix offerings as being substandard when he writes, “The universal power of boredom guarantees that any piece of Netflix programming will be watched by millions simply by virtue of being plastered across the Netflix homepage.”  This complaint that Netflix does not host a library of classics that Schonfeld et al believe it should is not especially helpful to OmniQ’s purpose.  After all, this is familiar territory. When David Lynch’s Blue Velvet was released in 1986, the box-office winner that year was Top Gun. It was ever thus.

Which Market is OmniQ Really Trying to Serve?

Serious film buffs have long been a niche audience who, by and large, have had to spend extra resources in the pursuit of their passion.  In many ways, I can only imagine that film-buffery is easier today because one can enter a title into various search tools and locate, for instance, a used DVD someone is willing to sell.

Presumably, OmniQ wants to facilitate the same kind of one-to-one transactions in titles that would-be sellers own as digital files on hard drives rather than plastic disks.  And it is not an unreasonable premise to claim that First Sale should apply to this kind of trade so long as the number of copies in circulation remains fixed and never increases.  A problem arises, however, when an enterprise facilitates this trade at scale in works that are available through licensed channels; and it is not clear which market OmniQ proposes to serve.

If OmniQ is focusing on the serious collector looking to obtain a digital file of a hard-to-find title by Ernst Lubtisch, they may have a reasonable legal argument, but possibly not a viable business.  If instead, the company is responding to a declining interest in classics like The Apartmentor Spartacus (both named in the Schonfeld’s introduction), availability is not the underlying cause of this cultural phenomenon.  These and other popular classics are widely available through existing channels, including streaming, and this weighs against OmniQ’s claim that First Sale remains relevant in the digital age.  

As mentioned, it seems highly unlikely the Supreme Court will hear ReDigianyway, but even if it were to overturn the Second Circuit opinion on “reproduction,” I suspect OmniQ would still have a lot of homework to do in order to prove that its business operates within the spirit of First Sale.  I do not think one magazine article, no matter how much I personally agree with the spirit of its commentary, is going to support OmniQ’s argument with regard to copyright law.  

Masnick Calls CASE a Big Media Bill?

From the Techdirt Sycophants Department

In his post of May 28, Mike Masnick dutifully opened his hymnal and joined the chorus in a rendition of “How to Criticize the CASE Act,” lending his bel canto to the refrain that the new law would create a “copyright trolling court.”  As explained here and here, this is an inscrutable criticism because the Copyright Claims Board will actually be a lousy venue for copyright trolls—principally because it is a voluntary resolution option.  But if you don’t believe me about that, Mike’s further implication that CASE is a Big Media proposal and the product of “soft corruption,” is so transparently illogical that you may dismiss the allegation by applying a modicum of common sense.

Wanting readers to believe he speaks truth to power, Mike employs a little misdirection with the following innuendo about two of the bill’s lead sponsors:

“We should note, that the House bill is sponsored by Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, along with Jerry Nadler. You may recall that those two Congressman were recently seen hosting a giant $5k per ticket fundraiser at the Recording Industry’s biggest party of the year, the Grammys. And, right afterwards, they suddenly introduce a bill that will help enable more copyright trolling? Welcome to the world of soft corruption.”

Yes, that’s what happened.  The CASE Act was drafted on the back of a napkin at the Grammys party. (Stand by for Mike to accuse me of straw man because he did not literally say this.)

In Reality Land, I suppose we can ignore the fact that a small claim copyright proposal has been floating around Capitol Hill longer than Rep. Jeffries has been a Member of Congress—and, for that matter, longer than the bill’s other main sponsor Rep. Doug Collins of Georgia.  But I guess Collins wasn’t at the Grammys and so doesn’t fit Masnick’s conspiratorial narrative?  We might also ignore the fact that CASE has solid bi-partisan support, even from Silicon Valley Rep. Zoe Lofgren, and that the only effective (albeit unreasonable) opposition in the last two or so years has come from the Internet Association and the Computer and Communications Industry Association.  But what readers should not ignore is their own basic ability to reason, which ought to sound something like this …

BIG MEDIA COMPANIES DON’T GIVE A DAMN ABOUT COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS.

Mike’s implication that Jeffries and Nadler partied with the RIAA and “suddenly” introduced a bill is just wrong as a matter of public record, but even if nobody wants to bother looking that up, you might then ask what possible interest major record labels or movie studios or any other Big Media companies have in creating a voluntary, small-claim, alternative-dispute provision for copyright infringement?  As Mike himself is very fond of reminding people, these are powerful corporate entities with high-octane attorneys on staff.  There is nothing in the CASE Act for these companies.

I know it’s hard to fathom, but the CASE Act is a rare example of bi-partisan legislation designed for regular people—middle-class creators who have almost no affordable path to remedy unlicensed uses of their works.  And thanks in no small part to tech-evangelists like Techdirt, online infringement is both rampant and misconceived as acceptable, even by commercial users who ought to know better. 

Mike should go back through all the articles and public statements he’s ever made on the theme that he “supports creators” but wants “balanced copyright” and feel obliged to eat every one of those words.  CASE is about balancing copyright.  It proposes to level the playing field for little guys who are getting clobbered by the policies and practices of the tech giants, which only makes Mike’s implication that it’s a Big Media bill all the more offensive.  I know attorneys who think CASE might not work, which is at least thoughtful criticism based on its actual mechanisms, but misrepresenting the Copyright Claims Board as a processing center for invalid damage awards is just mean-spirited considering the kind of people it is designed to help.

At this point, it would be grand if Mike and the legal pundits who write the songbooks from which he so often sings would just admit they don’t like copyright and will vigorously oppose any kind of enforcement no matter what.  That would at least be honest.  Still obnoxious, but not patently absurd.