Let’s Stop “Fixing Copyright” for the Sake of our Digital Future

As 2021 winds down, and this blog approaches the mid-point of its tenth year, I ask the following question: Can certain folks stop trying to “fix copyright” in deference to the digital age now that the internet experiment has failed?

For over twenty years, the principal argument underlying the “copyright is broken” narrative has been that the legal framework limits the democratizing power of digital technology to improve the world through unfettered access to everything. That premise was always flawed, but it seems especially absurd today, against the backdrop of evidence that the worst consequences of the digital revolution thus far are attributable to blind faith in that utopian ideal. We can see clearly now that there is no “home of Mind,” as Barlow predicted. There is no global public square where a more enlightened civility transcends the anachronistic laws of “weary nations” through the power of information and an ethics requiring nothing more than the Golden Rule.

Like all utopian visions, tech-utopianism did not account for human nature and human folly—for instance, that emotion is stronger than evidence as a motive for action and that no amount of free access to information is going to alter that principle. It is barely controversial at this point to say that social media has been toxic for certain individuals and for whole democratic societies, specifically because of its power to commend ignorance and for that ignorance to form the nuclei of social subgroups who take harmful action.

Yet, despite the dismaying evidence that science and civility are in retreat in the U.S. and other democratic nations, various organizations and individuals still insist that more access to more content is the antidote and that it is copyright law which stands in the way of salvation. Efforts to weaken the copyright statute, as well as efforts to dilute the efficacy of the law as it is, continue unabated, even while standing in the sticky goo of the failed experiment, which subverted so many principles to that alleged virtue of “openness.”

As discussed in an earlier post, a group of academic librarians met in late March with Brewster Kahle of the Internet Archive and Senator Wyden, and with straight faces, they opined that copyright law needs to change in order to provide better eBook access as an antidote to the disinformation that results in conspiracy theory and violence like the insurrection of January 6. The lack of evidence-based thinking revealed in that conversation alone is an irony that should speak for itself. To imply that making eBook lending cheaper for libraries is any kind of solution to our disinformation problem is magical thinking indistinguishable from the conspiracy theories themselves. And that’s before we address the specific policy flaws in their proposals.

Related to that discussion are the library association-backed eBook licensing bills in New York, Maryland, and Rhode Island, which amount to state compulsory licenses (therefore, likely preempted by federal law); and again, the argument presented for these short-sighted provisions is that communities are “shut out of the marketplace of ideas.” This is rhetoric straight out of the tech-utopian bible—exaggerating the role of the library—valuable as it is—to rescue society from its current perils through more voluminous eBook lending. But as I have previously noted on this topic, the majority of people engaged in some of the most dangerous, idea-free conduct do not suffer from lack of access, and what they do suffer from, librarians surely cannot solve.

Meanwhile, the ALI Restatement of Copyright project presses onward, ignoring criticism from the some of the most respected minds in IP academia, and is another example of an effort to weaken copyright law to serve that chimeric, cultural progress enabled by digital technologies. The 2014 memo articulating the rationale for the Restatement project states, “…it falls to the federal courts to attempt to improve the fit between a mid-20th century copyright law and 21st century digital technologies.” Yes. It falls to the courts. Or to Congress to rewrite the law. But impatient with these core functions of the Republic, a small group of ideologues took it upon themselves to write an alternative copyright law. And in the service of what?

Many of these same ideologues and associated organizations inveighed against passing the CASE Act to provide a small-claim copyright remedy for independent creators. Ironically, this is an amendment to copyright law in response to the digital age—namely, a response to rampant infringement enabled by digital technologies. But the “fixers” of copyright do not support proposals for independent authors to enforce their rights. They will likely continue their opposition as the small claims board begins operating next year, and their attacks will surely reiterate those virtues of digital life which have yet to manifest.

Looking solely at the U.S., it is tough to make the case that the open floodgates on content have, on balance, had a salubrious effect on the quality of discourse. The level of rancor and vitriol, from Capitol Hill to Main Street, has already boiled over in some of the worst spectacles in our history, and it shows no sign of abating. If experiments in copyright “fixing” were a drug trial, and “information” the main ingredient used to fight virulent idiocy, we would have to conclude that the treatment has little or no mitigating effect on the disease. Yet the copyright “fixers” continue to insist that the problem is dosage—that all we need is more.

It is only in the last few years that the American public, Congress, and the press have generally soured on the tech-utopian vision. While complaints vary across the political spectrum about, for instance, the conduct of social media companies, it does seem clear that the policy of laissez-faire for all things internet is about to expire. And a major reason for this change in direction is a broad recognition that the original theory—leading to the experiment in letting everything flow and expecting the good to outweigh the bad—has proven to be deeply flawed. So, in light of the fact that the “fix copyright” agenda was largely founded on the presumed success of that experiment, maybe it’s time to put down the toolbox and take a pause.

Apple Class Action Suit Reprises the “Digital First Sale” Conversation

I asked the question in 2014:  are we confused by the “Buy” button when we purchase digital media? And the issue is raised again in the class action suit against Apple earlier this year, which alleges that consumers are unsure enough about what it means to “buy” digital goods that online retailers should be held responsible for misleading us. The foundation of the lawsuit argues that the word Buy implies irrevocable access to the thing (e.g. a movie or game) being purchased and, therefore, Apple is engaged in deceptive practice when its Terms of Service state that the platform reserves the right to terminate accounts.

More broadly, legal scholars like Professor Aaron Perzanowski of Case Western University School of Law look beyond the possibility of deception by a retailer, arguing that the nature of ownership in the digital age has changed so dramatically that legislative action may be required. In a recent podcast inspired by the Apple litigation, Perzanowski told Sonny Bunch that a “soft” remedy to address confusion would be a requirement that online retailers of digital media provide better transparency about the limitations that may apply to buying digital goods.

But a more robust solution, Perzanowski argues, would be to amend the first sale doctrine of the U.S. Copyright Act; and it will surprise exactly no readers that I could not disagree more. The complaint against Apple provokes some interesting discussion but does not recommend even looking at copyright law, let alone changing it. For one thing, the claim may fail on the facts because purchasers of digital media from Apple are able to download those files and store them on their own devices. Hence, the “account revocation” argument may not hold up very well as the trial proceeds.

Digital First Sale

The first sale doctrine, originating as judge-made law in 1908, holds that once a copy of a work has been legally obtained, the copyright owner’s interest in that copy is extinguished. Thus, you may do what you want with your physical copies of books, movies, etc., except, of course, make other copies. Perznowski and other copyright critics allege, however, that digital purchasing is uncertain for consumers and that one remedy is to broaden the first sale doctrine to apply to digital copies.

Perzanowski and others argue that a “digital first sale” doctrine would be a way of, “Restoring genuine ownership,” and allege that the copyright owners “don’t like it because it creates pressure and competition.” Neither statement is quite true. In answer to the second statement, as the courts held in the ReDigi case, allowing a trade at internet scale in “used” digital works would not create a secondary competitive market but rather an alternative primary market in which used-goods prices are exchanged for material that is “used” in name only. (For a deeper dive, see posts here and here.)

But as to the notion of “restoring genuine ownership,” that may seem rational at first blush, but less so when we take a half a step back and consider precedent that would give meaning to the word restore in that statement.

What Does Buy Mean To Us?

While I understand why Perzanowski and others assert that the word buy implies a sense of permanent retention of the items we purchase, this isn’t always true. In fact, it’s hardly ever true.

Most of what we buy is consumed and replenished, and this includes various forms of media. In my lifetime, innovations just in the mechanics of listening to music have produced at least six major changes, rendering at least two forms of media (cassettes & 8-tracks) obsolete and relegated another two (vinyl and CDs) to niche products. For home viewing of filmed entertainment, the average VHS was trashed years ago, while stacks of DVDs are either gathering dust or have been sold for a few quarters at yard sales. And who knows how many paperbacks have been donated or destroyed in the last half century.

In fact, it is only the physical books on our shelves—especially the well-made clothbound books—that remain both intact and unaffected by technological obsolescence, and none of the changes that have occurred indicate that there was any deceit on the part of producers or retailers when we originally bought those older media. Meanwhile, the need to purchase a great deal of media today is obviated by subscription models that allow both streaming and download of large catalogues.

So, it may be true that digital life is changing the nature of ownership, but not because contemporary technologies have added unprecedented transience to our media products. On the contrary, the means by which we experience most digital media today (i.e. via multiple networked devices, rather than with specialized, individually owned physical objects) actually makes the current era the first in which consumers have good reason to expect indefinite access to their media purchases. What has changed, of course, is the nature of potential obsolescence.

For instance, if we download and store music files now, but those same files won’t play on computer devices in ten years, that would be a lack of continuity rather than a true disruption like the CD, which offered experiential changes compared to the formats it replaced. Hence the safer storage option may be to leave purchased titles in the online retailer’s cloud, which places the burden on Apple et al to maintain continuity of access—and they are presumably motivated to do so. In the other instance in which a 2032 device does not play a 2022 file, nothing in copyright law is going to alleviate that potential concern, though it is worth noting that we are still using many “old” file types like MP3.

No Reason to Expand First Sale Doctrine

Those who advocate expanding the first sale doctrine to encompass digital files often allude to hypothetical scenarios that are either too narrow or too off-topic to justify legislative action. For instance, Perzanowski referred in that podcast to the possibility that a copyright owner might one day try to prevent the inheritance of a computer device containing copies of works that were legally acquired by the benefactor. I would describe this hypothetical as an attempt to conjure a narrative that sounds like new legal territory but really isn’t.

The likelihood that such a claim would be attempted by a rightsholder, let alone succeed, is too speculative and uncommon to warrant prophylactic legislation, especially when the law, as it exists, already seems to answer the question presented. State probate law secures the right to bequeath a computer or hard drive to a beneficiary, and copyright’s first sale doctrine, though it does not explicitly encompass digital files, does state “copy.” Hence the transfer of specific “copies” stored on a device is not so exotic that the courts would be unable to imagine how the transfer would fit within the intent and function of the first sale exception.

Meanwhile, if there is any barrier (and there probably is) to inheriting accounts, perhaps that issue is worth addressing, but copyright is only tangentially implicated in that discussion. If a case can be made that our kids should be allowed to inherit our iTunes or Amazon accounts, or perhaps transfer our purchases to their accounts, that debate can be had, and perhaps some party can show enough potential harm to justify a legislative remedy. But again, any legislative response to that question may be very slow in contrast to market changes in which consumers increasingly don’t click on Buy buttons at all.

I cannot say whether millions of consumers feel instinctively misled by the word Buy in these transactions, but I can say that I have owned some of the digital music files purchased through iTunes for over fifteen years, which is already competitive with both my long-discarded cassettes and my rarely-accessed CDs. And none of that ownership means much because, as subscriber, I can stream or download everything in the catalog. So, I suppose we could ask whether buy is a euphemism for “long-term rental”? Perhaps. But in the grand scheme, that is kind of what it means to “own” most things.

Podcast: David Golumbia Talking Facebook & Fascism

In this episode, I speak with David Golumbia, author and associate professor of digital studies, American literature, literary theory, philosophy, and linguistics at Virginia Commonwealth University. I asked Golumbia to join me after reading his blog post published on October 20th in which he asserts that Facebook is not just dropping the ball when it comes to curbing hate on its platform but that, in his words, Facebook Loves Fascism.

Facebook’s “Screw it Let’s Talk Astrology” ad, part of its Groups campaign.

Episode Contents

  • 00:00:55 – David Golumbia background.
  • 00:03:24 – Facebook loves fascism.
  • 00:08:24 – Defining “right” vs. proto-fascism.
  • 00:11:36 – Paths to authoritarianism.
  • 00:13:50 – mysticism and fascism.
  • 00:18:56 – Facebook’s astrology  TV spot.
  • 00:23:48 – More subtle forces driving division.
  • 00:32:02 – Facebook is too good for democracy.
  • 00:36:32 – Better/more information is not a solution.
  • 00:45:11 – “Educate yourself.”
  • 00:48:50 – Considering outcomes.
  • 00:54:05 – Rapidly changing narratives.
  • 00:56:25 – Latent extremism let out of the box.
  • 01:00:35 – What do Facebook et al really want?
  • 01:07:06 – The Big Tobacco analogy.