Category: Art

Petitioner Asks SCOTUS to Hear ReDigi Case

A new business called OmniQ has filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant cert in ReDegi v. Capitol Records, alleging that the Second Circuit’s opinion in December 2018 effectively brings an end to the First Sale doctrine.  The company is developing a patent pending model that (presumably) would facilitate an online market for “used” and hard-to-find motion pictures.  Its brief contends that the lower court erred in its plain text reading of “reproduction” under the copyright law and would permanently “outlaw” the kind of technology they propose to introduce.

It is unlikely the Supreme Court will agree to hear ReDigi, not least because, as Hollywood Reporter’sEric Gardner rightly notes, “The issue of whether the First Sale Doctrine has survived the digital age may make for good scholarly articles, but is the Supreme Court really going to devote its limited bandwidth to technology that’s already outdated?”  ReDigi proposed to facilitate trade in “used” digital music files at the same time that subscription streaming was on the rise and may, therefore, be considered obsolete at inception. But in its brief, OmniQ implies that its business model fulfills an unmet need in the market by addressing what it claims is dwindling access to classic motion pictures …

…the public has already lost access to vast libraries of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, simply because modern technological solutions like the one at issue here are lacking.

…the breadth of choice in movies was many times higher 20 years ago than it is today.

I personally find the brief’s argument about the lower court’s interpretation of “reproduction” somewhat persuasive when it states “there is no ‘reproduction’ without the multiplication of copies.” If in fact a file can be moved from my hard drive to your hard drive so that you now have it and I do not, then it there is a plausible argument to be made that “reproduction” has not occurred.  But from there, I think OmniQ’s claims overreach, blaming copyright protections for phenomena fostered solely by the market and technological change.

First Sale Probably Does Not Survive the Digital Age

Even if the Supreme Court were to agree with OmniQ that the Second Circuit misread “reproduction” in ReDigi, this would not rescue the fact that the proposed business model exceeded the purpose of the First Sale doctrine because it would create a “used” market in name only—one that could theoretically become a substitute for the primary market.  In 1908, the Supreme Court held…

“It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it. The purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.”

And for the next century, physical copies of books, records, DVDs, etc. were sold in second-hand stores, garage sales, or rented through outlets like Blockbuster.  But the fact that a “used” digital file is identical to a “new” digital file is a technological reality that reshapes the meaning of “second-hand” material, and this at least alters—if it does not outright extinguish—the First Sale principle.  

Further, the potential for a transaction facilitator (which OmniQ presumably aspires to be) to foster a parallel trade in “used” digital files operating at internet scale is a vastly different consideration from the scope and nature of the secondary market that emerged between 1908 and the digital age. 

Finally, these same technological changes have spawned a primary market that (despite persistent complaints that all media should be free) is both cheaper and more abundant than the primary market of 20 years ago.  For example, The Criterion Collection, while perhaps not wholly satisfying to all film buffs, allows an account-holder to stream a library of motion-picture classics for about 27 cents a day—access that was unthinkable 20 years ago.  

In the still-evolving digital market, therefore, a petitioner like OmniQ should at least be required to demonstrate that its purpose is to facilitate a “second-hand” trade in material that is not likely to become available via licensed distribution systems—whether online or as physical copies.  And in this regard, the brief makes an emotional and cultural plea that fails to present a problem caused by copyright law.  

“1960 Doesn’t Exist on Netflix”

To demonstrate the market need for its business model, OmniQ relies almost entirely on one article written by Zach Schonfeld in 2017 for Newsweek.  It is an engaging piece on the theme that motion pictures from the oeuvres of Hitchcock, Truffaut, Fellini, Kubrick, et al are disappearing from mainstream cultural literacy.  The spirit of the piece which focuses almost exclusively on Netflix, is well captured when Schonfeld quotes blogger Nora Fiore (a.k.a. The Nitrate Diva) …

“If you’re the biggest name in film streaming services, the less you offer in classic movies, the more you imply that classic movies have less to offer.  It’s a terrible message to put out there.”

Perhaps this is a fair observation about contemporary culture and the movies, but the reasons for these changes have little or nothing to do with copyright law and everything to do with the inevitability that Netflix was going to transition to become a producer of new material. 

Before I go on, I have to interject that it is curious that in one moment, copyright is alleged to be a framework for nostalgic fuddy-duddies who don’t understand the future, but in the next moment, it is the nostalgic fuddy-duddies who are blaming copyright for stifling connection to the past.  Or I might also note that one of the complaints about copyright terms is the false allegation that creators will not produce anything new as long as they retain copyrights on older material they can keep reselling.  Maybe there are forces at play that are not really about copyright?

Speaking as one nostalgic fuddy-duddy who would rather watch Day for Night than Game of Thronesany day, the problem (if we agree it is a problem) with the apparent loss in status of classic films in the cultural mainstream is not a licensing issue.  Netflix could make all these films available tomorrow, and I predict that younger audiences will, by and large, think they’re being told to eat their vegetables.  

It isn’t copyright’s fault that a whole generation has been feasting on a steady diet of short-attention-span, handheld video clips for more than a decade.  The young mind does not easily transition from TikTok to Tarkovsky, and availability of the latter alone is not going to fill the apparent gap in cinematic literacy. Piracy statistics bear this out year after year as even illicit access worldwide continues to favor major, contemporary works like blockbuster movies by substantial margins.  

As an observer of culture and a cineaste, I would love to join Schonfeld and the film historians, academics, and buffs he cites for a drink to mourn the apparent loss of interest in the classics, but this was to be expected in a market destined to expand and become more segmented.  It should be little surprise in a world where we can have “liberal news” and “conservative news,” that entertainment is going to be even more distinctly subdivided.  

On the plus side, we get a diverse range of material and subject matter because investors are not restricted to appealing to the safe middle every time.  On the negative side, we no longer share a common film culture as we once did.  But this is a change borne of technological innovation in distribution systems that has nothing to do with copyright per se. 

Further, I think Schonfeld’s article is unduly harsh on allNetflix offerings as being substandard when he writes, “The universal power of boredom guarantees that any piece of Netflix programming will be watched by millions simply by virtue of being plastered across the Netflix homepage.”  This complaint that Netflix does not host a library of classics that Schonfeld et al believe it should is not especially helpful to OmniQ’s purpose.  After all, this is familiar territory. When David Lynch’s Blue Velvet was released in 1986, the box-office winner that year was Top Gun. It was ever thus.

Which Market is OmniQ Really Trying to Serve?

Serious film buffs have long been a niche audience who, by and large, have had to spend extra resources in the pursuit of their passion.  In many ways, I can only imagine that film-buffery is easier today because one can enter a title into various search tools and locate, for instance, a used DVD someone is willing to sell.

Presumably, OmniQ wants to facilitate the same kind of one-to-one transactions in titles that would-be sellers own as digital files on hard drives rather than plastic disks.  And it is not an unreasonable premise to claim that First Sale should apply to this kind of trade so long as the number of copies in circulation remains fixed and never increases.  A problem arises, however, when an enterprise facilitates this trade at scale in works that are available through licensed channels; and it is not clear which market OmniQ proposes to serve.

If OmniQ is focusing on the serious collector looking to obtain a digital file of a hard-to-find title by Ernst Lubtisch, they may have a reasonable legal argument, but possibly not a viable business.  If instead, the company is responding to a declining interest in classics like The Apartmentor Spartacus (both named in the Schonfeld’s introduction), availability is not the underlying cause of this cultural phenomenon.  These and other popular classics are widely available through existing channels, including streaming, and this weighs against OmniQ’s claim that First Sale remains relevant in the digital age.  

As mentioned, it seems highly unlikely the Supreme Court will hear ReDigianyway, but even if it were to overturn the Second Circuit opinion on “reproduction,” I suspect OmniQ would still have a lot of homework to do in order to prove that its business operates within the spirit of First Sale.  I do not think one magazine article, no matter how much I personally agree with the spirit of its commentary, is going to support OmniQ’s argument with regard to copyright law.  

Fourth Circuit in Brammer: A Win for Copyright Sanity. A Guide for Users of Works.

Visual artists should be very relieved by last week’s decision at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, overturning the District Court’s finding of fair use in Brammer v. Violent Hues.  Frankly, fair use advocates should be happy about the ruling, too, because nobody who sincerely cares about copyright should celebrate an error of law.  If a court simply disregards the exclusive rights of authors, as the District Court did in this case, the fair use doctrine becomes a meaningless exception to a non-existent rule. 

“…difference in purpose is not quite the same thing as transformation.”

If I had to pick one takeaway from this case for users of works in the digital age, it would be the citation to this quote from Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood (1998).  As mentioned many times on this blog and elsewhere, the “transformativeness” test, which became part of the fair use analysis after 1990, is a troublemaker.  For a great summary describing how and why it became a troublemaker, I recommend this three-part post written by Scott Alan Burroughs on Above the Law.  

To stress what a pain in the butt this concept can be, I stated in a recent post that simply “placing a work in a new context” is not “transformative.”  But even using the term “context” is nettlesome because courts may use that term to describe “transformative” uses that are non-expressive.  For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Brammer has provided a handy explanation of the distinction between those uses and the infringement committed by Violent Hues.  The opinion states that there are two viable paths for finding fair use when a contextual (i.e. non-creative) change is “transformative”:  technological uses and documentary uses …

Technological

“In the first category, copyrighted works provide raw material for new technological functions. These functions are indifferent to the expressive aspects of the copied works. For example, we have held transformative the total reproduction of student essays for a plagiarism detection service because the database served an “entirely different function” that was unrelated to the expressive content of those essays.”

Documentary

“In the second category, copyrighted works serve documentary purposes and may be important to the accurate representations of historical events. These representations often have scholarly, biographical, or journalistic value, and are frequently accompanied by commentary on the copyrighted work itself.”

Admittedly, even documentary does not easily fit into the non-expressive family of fair uses because documentary is expressive and, perhaps most importantly, scholarship, biography, journalism, and commentary were already stated among the purposes of fair use fourteen years before Judge Pierre Leval wrote the paper, Toward a Fair Use Standard, which added the concept of “transformativeness” to the fair use test.  

We’ll leave that can of worms unopened for now. Suffice to say that Violent Hues’s publishing Brammer’s photograph on a website to promote a film festival does not describe either of the court’s two contextual fair uses. “What Violent Hues did was publish a tourism guide for a commercial event and include the Photo to make the end product more visually interesting,” states the opinion. “Such a use would not constitute fair use when done in print, and it does not constitute fair use on the Internet.”

It is so easy to click, edit, and repost any image that pausing to consider legality is apparently overwritten as a necessary step.  (And the defendant in this case is a professional image-maker who should have known better.) I’ve said it before in posts about fair use.  There are too many messages whirling around in cyberspace, denigrating copyright owners’ rights and disfiguring the nature of fair use, that it is easy to imagine how a gist of these ideas seeps into the mind of a user about to publish a work he has no right to use. 

For users who would prefer not to wander into the tall grass where attorneys, scholars, and jurists debate the meaning (or lack thereof) of “transformativeness,” there is little need to go there.  The Fourth Circuit in Brammer has provided a pretty basic set of rules for the use of works “in new contexts,” which I presume to summarize as follows:

If you are not engaged in a fairly large-scale technology enterprise using the non-expressive aspects of a corpus of works to power a new and useful system, your use is very likely not “transformative.”

If you are not producing a work, in which you comment upon the used work, your use is very likely not “transformative.”  

If you are not producing a new expression that depends upon altering the used work, your use is very likely not “transformative.”

If, you “find”a photograph online that you think would jazz up your web page, no matter what you think it’s communicating, either get permission, make sure it’s free to use, take your own picture, or license a cheaper picture because your attorney is probably going to fail—at least on appeal—in any attempt to TRANSFORM your lapse in judgment into a sound fair use defense.  

Meanwhile, don’t try assessing “transformativeness” at home when even the legal experts are still arguing about what it means.  As Burroughs addresses in his posts, the “transformativeness” test does not have the caselaw-to-statutory history that produced the four-factor test for fair use codified in 1976.  This is unfortunate because a prospective user of a work should be able to conduct at least a preliminary fair use test without an attorney; and the original four-factor test, while subjective, is much easier without the “transformative” filter.  

Most simply, a user like Violent Hues should jump straight to Factor Four and ask themselves whether the proposed, unlicensed use, if made repeatedly by other parties, would deprive the copyright owner of a market opportunity that is rightly his to exploit.  The unequivocal answer to that question in this case was yes.  If a photographer does not have the right to license his images, then his exclusive rights in the copyright law do not exist; and if those rights do not exist, then neither does the fair use exception or, for that matter, the entire miscarriage of reason that produced this fiasco of a lawsuit.

Maybe the Internet IS Just a Dumb Pipe

“Content is king” was the catch-phrase of the 1990s and the heady (headless really) days of the Dot Com bubble.  And although that stopped being a slogan with the resurgence of Web 2.0, it was still true.  Content was still king except the would-be tech giants figured out that they didn’t need to create content but instead just make someone else’s content available.  Whether these companies had any right to exploit said content did not matter since the telecom giants who preceded them had conveniently negotiated a liability shield (DMCA §512) for copyright infringement before anyone quite realized how a YouTube could become a massive infringement machine that prints money for its owners.

When rights holders complained that these platforms were infringers (or at least beneficiaries of infringement), the answer was always some variation on the themes …  It’s not us.  Its the users.  We don’t control what gets uploaded. We’re just a neutral platform.  And so on.  Thanks to that liability shield negotiated by Verizon, AT&T, et al in 1998, Google and the other major platforms got away with the circular logic that “the internet” is simultaneously “just a dumb pipe” and also a network of such inestimable value that no cyber-policy may be altered—other than, of course, by Google and the other major platforms.  They are at liberty to alter the internet all they want because they do so many nice things for us—and all for free!

In 2012, concurrent with the not-so-grassroots defeat of SOPA/PIPA, Google’s lobbying expenditures went from negligible to competing among the top five in the nation; and the major platforms also formed the Internet Association to advocate policy in its interests.  That’s business as usual, and industries have every right to form such organizations, but this new coalition of tech giants was also contemporaneous with the anti-SOPA narrative in which the Motion Picture Association of America a) had allegedly tried to force legislation that would “break the internet”; and b) represented “old thinking” about content, copyright, and digital-age piracy. 

Let us now leap over the past seven years to the present—a time when the major internet platforms—most demonstrably Facebook—have revealed many of the darker consequences of their hands-off, disrupt-culture approach to platform moderation.  Amid this still-developing narrative, came the big news last month—though it should not have been the least bit surprising—that Netflix would leave the Internet Association and join the MPAA.  Because content is still king.

As described in my post of October 2015, Netflix is not an internet company; it’s a motion picture studio that happens to distribute via the internet.  New opportunities to measure viewer data notwithstanding, the simple reality is that the more “tech” companies invest in original programming, the more they will naturally find common ground with the policy interests of the MPAA et al. In that regard, a January article in Variety speculates that Amazon—with its slate of multi-award-winning shows—could be next to join the big studios.  Either way, the swing of this pendulum does suggest a new premise:  that perhaps the internet industry does not have (to use the technical term) jack-shit to teach content creators about copyright or piracy—and let’s not even talk about whatever the hell the “economics of abundance” means.

In fact, if one looks at YouTube’s Copyright Match response to the realization that their own creators do not like having their videos infringed by other YouTubers, maybe the “new” industry actually has something to learn from the “old” one about protecting creative works.  Meanwhile, as the traditional media/entertainment companies continue to migrate toward streaming and other contemporary models of distribution, they will surely learn much from a pioneer like Netflix.  But this will not change the raw investments of time, talent, labor, and money required to produce new works, and so it will not diminish any producers’ interest in protecting and enforcing copyrights.  

In this context, I am reminded of a story from January of last year in which songwriter/performer Blake Morgan found himself having to explain to Spotify executives that music was in fact the product they were selling.  One might think this is not a very high mental hurdle to clear, but Morgan describes that some in the meeting became rather heated in their defense that, no, Spotify was the product.  Because, of course, we launch that app just to look at the interface?

Time will tell if there will be any significant future defections from the Internet Association, though its members are not without vested interest in a range of policy areas.  But to the extent that union was formed in response to proposals like SOPA and to advocate against copyright enforcement, the departure of members who are now major rights holders serves as a long-overdue reminder about the difference between creative works and the technological means to access or distribute those works.  As the platform owners love to repeat in their own defense against liability, the internet doesn’t produce anything; it’s just a dumb pipe.