Category: Art

Tedious Anti-Copyright Stance of EFF is Not About Protecting Anyone

Welp (as the kids say), it looks like Katherine Trendacosta of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) found an old PowerPoint deck from 2012 and used it to write a new post ominously titled Hollywood’s Insistence on New Draconian Copyright Rules Is Not About Protecting Artists.

Typical of the EFF playbook, Trendacosta devotes an entire post maligning the motion picture industry rather than address the “rule” (the SMART Act), which she does not even mention until the final paragraph. At that point, the reader is meant to take her word for it that the proposed legislation is bad because—believe it or not—there is too much diversity and choice in the streaming market, and because film producers want to make money.

Ms. Trendacosta calls streaming a “hellscape” where consumers cannot find what they want and/or where shows and films are canceled or moved to different platforms. She writes, “It’s disingenuous for Hollywood’s lobbyists to claim that they need harsher copyright laws to protect artists when it’s the studios that are busy disappearing the creations of these artists.”

“Hellscape” is a bit dramatic as critiques go, given that market research indicates that 74% of consumers report being satisfied with streaming and that those numbers are currently trending upward. Of course, the anti-copyright playbook Trendacosta is using tells her to imply that when producers make market decisions to stop producing a given work, or to move a work from one channel to another, this is “disappearing” material that should be available in perpetuity. In fact, she inscrutably cites the “disappearance” of a film which is temporarily being made available in a new 4K cinema format and will return to streaming in a matter of months. Hellish, no?

Perhaps Trendacosta is unaware that we are enjoying a new golden age of filmed entertainment available on—or produced especially for—the private screen market. Streaming models have fostered a diverse range of projects that would never have been made, let alone been sustainable, in the narrower distribution paradigms pre-Netflix. But a reality of all this bounty is that more experimentation and risk-taking means that a higher volume of material will be canceled or redistributed more frequently as audiences respond to what gets made. That’s just the business of making entertainment media, and the EFF always acts as if the business is what makes efforts to mitigate piracy somehow dishonest or sinister.

Here, Trendacosta digs a little deeper into the big box of EFF’s toys and argues that ordinary tensions that arise among studios and talent—including strikes and financial disagreements—are evidence that the parties seeking remedies to piracy “don’t care about artists.” True to form, the folks at EFF pretend to care about artists by erecting a false dichotomy between the creators who work on projects and Hollywood, where “Hollywood” is a generic term to describe a monolith that does not exist.

It’s a very strange argument because the artists to which Trendacosta refers in those strikes, etc., want money, too. In fact, money is often exactly why they have disagreements with certain producers or studios. Yet, Trendacosta elides the fact that piracy hurts everyone in the ecosystem, regardless of their internal disputes and negotiations with one another. That’s why unions like DGA, WGA, and IATSE are members of the Copyright Alliance and work closely with the studios to fight piracy. It is categorically false to suggest that large studios are the only parties with an interest in this issue. As independent filmmakers and other artists have explained repeatedly, it’s the smaller, independent projects that are most vulnerable to the negative effects of piracy.

And let’s be honest. EFF opposes all copyright enforcement measures in the same style as this post—no substance, just uninformed, ad hominem attacks—and it behaves no differently when smaller groups or indie artists seek copyright remedies in Congress.

So, what is the supposedly “harsh” new piracy remedy that EFF is opposing this time?

The Strengthening Measures to Advance Rights Technologies (SMART) Act is a legislative response to the fact that for more than 25 years, Big Tech has refused to fulfil its side of the bargain struck with the adoption of Section 512 of the DMCA. Simply put, Section 512(i) requires online service providers to collaborate with copyright owners to develop standard technical measures (STM) to identify and expeditiously remove infringing content from internet platforms.

But not only did the development of STM never quite happen, the Googles and Facebooks of the world, who came after the OSPs that negotiated the DMCA, benefitted from mass infringement on their platforms because the DMCA shielded them from liability.

SMART seeks to address more than two decades of stonewalling by adding a new Section 514 to the DMCA that would create new remedies to confront Big Tech’s refusal to adopt appropriate and affordable technical measures to reduce online piracy. At the same time, its proposals would protect smaller and less well-resourced service providers by calling for a variety of tailored and practical technical measures to be developed under a multi-stakeholder process overseen by the Librarian of Congress.

This is what the EFF is calling “draconian”—a proposal to restore the intent of the DMCA as it was enacted in 1998. SMART is the first substantive response to Big Tech’s two big lies: 1) We can’t do it; and 2) We shouldn’t do it because it will chill speech. Those arguments have worn paper thin in recent years given the role these same companies have played in fostering the most toxic, Republic-shaking nonsense ever to be “freely spoken.” But credit where it’s due. At least Ms. Trendacosta didn’t say SOPA.

Brief in Defense of CDL Indicts Internet Archive and CDL

Among the amici who filed briefs in Hachette v. Internet Archive is former law professor and library director Michelle Wu, who, as the brief states, “…is recognized by many as the originator of the legal theory underlying controlled digital lending (“CDL”) ….” With her brief, Wu seeks to defend CDL as a doctrine and asks the court to limit its considerations to the facts related solely to IA’s conduct and to reject what she calls the publishers’ overbroad “attack” on CDL itself. She states:

CDL takes many forms. Many libraries around the United States offer works through CDL subject to their own individual platforms and practices. The arguments offered by Plaintiffs in support of their motion for summary judgment are a broad-based attack on all of them, shoehorning the very concept of CDL into a dispute about the Internet Archive’s individual implementation of it.

Before addressing the arguments presented in the brief, it is noteworthy that if Ms. Wu would have CDL inoculated against the conduct of Internet Archive, she and her colleagues have had ample time to distance themselves and the legal theory from IA’s founder and avowed anti-copyright crusader Brewster Kahle. Because one year after IA engaged in the infringing conduct that triggered the publishers’ litigation (March 2020), Wu was a key member in a Public Knowledge-hosted panel with Kahle (March 2021), entitled Burying Information – Big Tech & Access to Information.

Promoted in the wake of the January 6th insurrection as a remedy to misinformation, the panel blamed copyright law for contributing to the perils of widespread ignorance and conspiracy theories threatening democracy. Specifically, Wu et al. touted CDL as a necessary alternative to ebook library licensing on the grounds that this licensing is somehow keeping knowledge away from the very people who need it. Further, nobody on the panel disputed Kahle’s allegations that the publishers’ suit against IA was an attack on CDL and libraries in general.

So, in addition to the fact that it seems hypocritical for Wu to now ask the court to distinguish the underlying theory of CDL from the conduct and agenda of IA, it is no surprise that the arguments she presents echo the same general complaints against copyright rights articulated in that panel discussion. For instance, Wu reprises the theme that libraries are sentinels against the tide of rampant mis- and disinformation in the digital age—and repeats the claim that CDL is integral to that mission. “CDL is an essential pillar of countering misinformation by making library materials accessible, relevant, and competitive,” the brief states.

Even if that premise were not magical thinking (because lack of access is not the cause of the dangerously misinformed), Wu paints with too broad a brush in defense of her theory that CDL is inherently legal. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence that all the access to all the books in the world will disburse the fact-immune hoards from laying siege to reason,[1] Wu’s faith in the contrary belies a general prejudice against copyright law in lieu of articulating a concise argument for the narrow opinion she claims to want from the court.

Moreover, Wu may be blind to the fatal flaw in her central argument when she says that “many libraries” use CDL in different ways to achieve a variety of purposes. The problem with her list of general examples (e.g., CDL for preservation, serving readers with disabilities, etc.) is twofold. First, many of the examples stated or implied are activities exempted for libraries by statute. Second, the possibility that certain activities of several libraries may be allowed by fair use undermines the broad sweep of Wu’s defense by emphasizing that fair use is a fact-intensive, case-by-case consideration.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a fair use defense does not turn on a particular method of copying or making a work available. The CDL theory asserts that it is legal for a library to essentially make its own ebooks from the printed books in its collection, as long as it never loans more electronic copies than it owns physical copies that were legally obtained. Wu’s brief impliedly acknowledges that Internet Archive did not adhere to the “controlled” part of CDL, but in seeking to rescue “real CDL,” the brief is tellingly overstuffed with allegations that, even if true, are not applicable to a question of fair use.

For instance, Wu refers to budgetary constraints of libraries and the supposedly onerous cost of ebook licensing by publishers. But even if this allegation were valid for most libraries—and it does not appear to be—it would say nothing about whether a library’s version of CDL would fall under the fair use exception. On the contrary, Wu’s complaint about existing ebook licensing effectively acknowledges that CDL is a means of bypassing that licensing model and implies that this is justified by cost.

This argument is barely distinguishable from familiar rationalizations for large-scale piracy, which any court should find unpersuasive in general and should find meaningless as a fair use question. The amount of a licensing fee demanded for any work is immaterial to the question of whether a user who avoids paying the license is making a fair use. Wu’s attention to the cost of ebook licensing seems meant to distract from the reality that, even with the controls in force as prescribed by the CDL theory, the model displaces the authors’ right to license ebooks on their terms to libraries. And this market substitute consideration should ultimately doom a fair use defense on all four factors.

This consideration would be unaffected, even if ebook licenses were shown to be onerous because such a complaint, if valid, would properly sound in antitrust law or consumer protection or be argued before Congress seeking a new library-based exemption in the Copyright Act.[2] But because allegations of burdensome pricing models are not properly addressed by fair use, this suggests, again, that Wu and her colleagues defending CDL are admitting that the model is a market substitute and believe that it should be based on their own ideological reasoning

Several aspects of Internet Archive’s operation, including the activities at issue in this litigation, disqualify the entity from statutory exemptions accorded to libraries in Section 108 of the Copyright Act. Inasmuch as IA tries to stand in the shoes of real libraries, this is a PR message for social media but one without a foundation in law. And because IA is not a real library, a finding that its conduct is legal would only further embolden any commercial enterprise to engage in mass, unlicensed digitization and distribution of ebooks and other works.

By contrast, Wu’s insinuation of difficulties for legit libraries engaged in “many forms” of CDL are either unfounded or, perhaps, they inadvertently implicate some of those libraries in infringing conduct. Either way, facts pertaining to the operation of some number of unnamed libraries are not before the court in this case, and only a detailed accounting of those facts, library-by-library could have any legal bearing on those activities. As such, we must conclude that Wu and her colleagues simply want the courts to find that CDL is automatically fair use, and this would be doctrinally absurd. Because the courts are well aware that no conduct is automatically fair use. Not even for libraries.

[1] As noted in my post about that panel, the entire Western canon is more widely and freely available than at any time in history.

[2] In fact, the state ebook licensing laws for libraries have largely been premised on consumer protection and still failed, thus far, as unconstitutional state compulsory licenses.

Photo by: nito

Doc Filmmakers Brief in AWF v. Goldsmith is Misguided

In both Andy Warhol Foundation v. Lynn Goldsmith (SCOTUS) and Hachette et al v. Internet Archive (SDNY), the amicus briefs are piling up fast. Not that I have any intention of writing about every argument presented in either case, but rummaging through the briefs in Warhol, one filed by a group of documentary filmmakers on behalf of AWF caught my attention. I support documentary filmmakers as much as any other type of creator, but the arguments presented to find fair use for AWF are inappropriate and ill-advised.

As a general critique, the filmmakers’ brief is too dramatic (and frankly dishonest), claiming that if SCOTUS affirms the Second Circuit’s finding against fair use for Warhol, the decision “could devastate the documentary film genre.” This hyperbole reveals the central flaw in the brief which implies that doc filmmakers have enjoyed a degree of certainty in fair use prior to the current ruling in Warhol and, therefore, argues that upholding the ruling will further disrupt that certainty. This is untrue.

If the filmmakers would have the Court believe that documentarians have thus far relied on the fair use rationale as applied by the district court in this case, history does not support this claim. On the contrary, if the Court were to agree with AWF’s reasoning as presented, it would create a novel presumption of certainty by broadening fair use to encompass almost any use that adds “something” to the world. Such a holding may seem attractive to many users of protected works, but it is incorrect to argue that this reasoning is consistent with fair use doctrine to date, and it is folly for any class of creator to be so eager to weaken their own copyright rights.

Doc Films Do Not Depend on the Question Presented

The filmmakers’ brief relies heavily on an accurate but incomplete portrait of the doc filmmaker as a paradigm among fair users. It is true that a documentary may fulfill several, or all, of the exemplary fair use purposes enumerated in the preamble of Section 107 of the Copyright Act. A film might be simultaneously commentary, criticism, education, and news reporting, which is why documentaries enjoy what the brief describes as a “favored” status in a fair use consideration.

But there is no foundation to argue that this status will be disturbed if the Court rejects AWF’s fair use theory, and the filmmakers’ brief does not present a compelling argument to the contrary. It merely alleges that such an outcome would be harmful, even though documentary filmmakers are in roughly in the same posture vis-à-vis fair use as they have been since 1978, if not earlier.

The filmmakers argue that if their work is subjected to the Second Circuit’s “side-by-side” search for transformativeness, this would expose many documentaries to unprecedented liability for infringement. But this claim is inapt as a matter of law and inconsistent with traditional doc film production in practice. As a legal matter, AWF v. Goldsmith is fundamentally (and frustratingly) about the conflict between transformation as fair use and transformation as protected derivative work, but this doctrinal tension is rarely present in a typical documentarian’s use of protected material, including most, if not all, of the examples cited in the brief.

Because documentaries tend to fulfill one or more of the paradigmatic purposes of fair use, they benefit from a legal pedigree that predates the “transformativeness” doctrine and much of the confusion it has spawned. Most fair uses of protected material in documentary films are relatively easy to identify without addressing the theoretical distinction between a transformative fair use and a derivative work. Consequently, the filmmakers’ concern that they will encounter new liability on the basis that works are often used in films “without alteration” is misplaced and a poor reading of classical fair use doctrine.

For instance, the filmmakers argue somewhat breathlessly that, “Relying on Warhol, at least one trial court has already held that brief uses of a photojournalist’s footage in documentary programming were not transformative as a matter of law because they were not altered and were thus “even less transformative than the use at issue in Andy Warhol.” (Emphasis added). But in fact, the opinion cited (Fioranelli v. CBS) reprises a litany of Second Circuit holdings dating back to 1997 and summarizes the court’s general view thus:

A common thread running through [Second Circuit visual art] cases is that, where a secondary work does not obviously comment on or relate back to the original or use the original for a purpose other than that for which it was created, the bare assertion of a “higher or different artistic use,” is insufficient to render a work transformative.

So, the holding in Fioranelli is not a direct result of Warhol, and the requirement to “comment on…” the original work is longstanding doctrine when considering factor one in a fair use analysis. Moreover, that lawsuit was triggered by multiple uses by sublicensees made in breach of the photojournalist’s original agreement with the network. This detail further weakens the filmmakers’ argument in Warhol because the defendant’s initial obligation to license in that case demonstrates that documentary films usually rely on a combination of licensed and fairly used materials. A finding for Goldsmith will not place an unprecedented burden on filmmakers to consider fair use for each work used in a project, and the filmmakers’ brief is instructive when it undermines its own argument, stating:

… many copyrighted excerpts in documentaries are clearly recognizable, and the new work often does not comment on or directly relate back to them. Rather, the borrowed works are generally presented in combination with other archival sources, original content, and commentary via narration or interviews. This is done to provide viewers with historical, cultural or social context, for the purpose—different from the originals’—of enhancing viewers’ comprehension of the films’ subject matter.

That description encompasses a spectrum of plausible fair uses under the same doctrine that rejects AWF’s theory. It may be that presenting a work “in combination” with other elements “to provide viewers with cultural or social context” meets the classical purpose of the fair use exception, particularly in a nonfiction work like a doc film. And maintaining this paradigm does not rely upon the question presented in this case, let alone a finding for Warhol.

Fair Use Remains a Case-by-Case Consideration

Fair use analyses are standard practice before the release of a documentary film. As the brief notes, producers typically obtain errors and omissions insurance, which may require a fair use assessment of the final film by an attorney. This analysis will not be made more difficult or uncertain by rejecting AWF’s fair use defense, and to the extent the filmmakers hope the Court may foster broader certainty by expanding fair use, I would caution them to be careful what they wish for. Under AWF’s theory, it would be substantially easier to infringe the copyright rights of the documentarian, too.

Documentary filmmakers are essential creators, but they do not require greater latitude in fair use considerations than the creators whose works they might use. If anything, the broad “favored” status enjoyed by documentary filmmakers obliges them to make a good-faith effort to understand which uses are reasonably fair use and which are not. There is ample guidance for the most common uses of works in nonfiction films, and where guidance is uncertain, licensing is available. In those instances where licensing may be unattainable, as alluded to in the brief, fair use is, as ever, a possible exemption but never a certainty.

Photo by: Gorodenkoff