Tag: Featured

Heroes and Villains in Copyright Fights

heroes

After Internet Archive (IA) lost its copyright infringement suit with major publishers this week, the organization wasted no time alleging that great harm has been done to society. As if it had the posts ready to go, IA alleged that research itself was in peril and even went so far as to shamelessly post on X that works by Orwell and Bradbury are now “no longer available”—as if its unlicensed repository provided the only access to 1984 or Fahrenheit 451.

If you don’t see the hypocrisy in citing those titles for the purpose of propaganda, you might as well not read the books. Funny, though, that literature is the subject because it is only human nature to consider even complex matters of law and policy through narrative. And because narrative requires heroes and villains, IA presumes to play the Rebel Alliance to the publishers Empire. One problem with this perspective is that if one insists the publishers are “villains,” then one must assume the authors are as well. Because here’s how things work in reality…

Every author owns the copyright rights in her book the moment the manuscript is finished. Whether she signs a deal with Random House or a small, independent imprint, she transfers at least part of her claim of copyright to the publisher in exchange for the publisher’s investment in producing, distributing, and marketing the book. Publishing agreements vary greatly, and sometimes, authors are disappointed. Nevertheless, most authors seek publishing deals rather than self-publish, and nobody commenting on the IA lawsuit should presume to tell authors that they are wrong to work with publishers.

Among the rights owned by the author is the right to “prepare derivative works.” With books, this means derivatives like translations, serials, motion picture adaptations, eBooks, and audiobooks. Typically, the author will transfer the right to prepare eBooks and audiobooks to the same publisher who produces and distributes the hardbound and paperback copies. Consequently, the author’s interest is aligned with the publisher’s interest in selling these electronic versions of the book. And quite often, the author’s share of audio and eBook sales is a higher percentage than her share in the sales of physical copies.

One way in which authors receive compensation from eBooks is through a variety of licensing regimes used by libraries around the country. Although there is no evidence that these licensing models hamper a library’s ability to serve its community, certain individuals, including IA founder Brewster Kahle, object to these licensing regimes as a matter of some principle they invented. That “principle” really comes down to the fact that they simply don’t like copyright rights, and Kahle et al. have made that very clear in public statements.

In fact, despite all the good IA provides with its database of hard-to-find works long in the public domain, Kahle’s fervent anti-copyright ideology seems to drive him to risk that worthy enterprise just to prove a point about which he is entirely wrong. In simple terms, IA et al. were determined to prove that libraries are entitled to prepare derivative works (i.e., make and distribute their own eBooks) instead of the publishers to whom those rights were assigned by the authors.

IA’s legal theories were so unfounded that the district court issued a judgment less than a week after oral arguments. And now that the appeals court has affirmed the obviousness of that judgment, IA is playing the victim on social media, like Icarus blaming the sun and gravity for his fate. In literary terms, we might recognize Kahle’s persistence against reason as that fatal flaw which can turn heroes into anti-heroes or villains. And wouldn’t it be a classic tragedy if the guy who wants to build the “New Library of Alexandria” managed to burn it all down in a grand display of hubris?

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End of the Line for Controlled Digital Lending Theory

controlled digital lending

IA asks this Court to bless the large scale copying and distribution of copyrighted books without permission from or payment to the Publishers or authors.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday affirmed that Internet Archive’s digital book lending model controlled digital lending (CDL) is not permitted by copyright law, including under the fair use exception. The outcome is a big deal and, at the same time, is not really big news. Copyright watchers grounded in what the law is (rather than what they wish it to be) were likely relieved but not surprised that the appeals court upheld a judgment, which the lower court originally issued just four days after oral arguments.

The lawsuit Hachette et al. v. Internet Archive was triggered by IA’s so-called National Emergency Library (NEL), an alleged response to the COVID shutdown whereby it arbitrarily made over one million digital books available without any kind of restriction. Because IA had no basis on which to claim it was responding to an “emergency” need, I maintain the NEL itself was a stunt designed to provoke litigation and take Brewster Kahle and friends’ copyright theories out for a ride. And as of yesterday, that ride is probably over.

Specifically, IA and a small group of academics hoped to prove that controlled digital lending is permitted by fair use. CDL is based on the theory that a library is permitted to make its own digital copy of a physical book in its collection and to loan either the digital or the physical copy to one reader at a time—and to then apply the scheme for as many physical copies as the library owns. Further, IA expanded the concept to create its Open Library by “partnering” with various libraries around the country to effectively count the physical copies on all those shelves and increase the number of readers to which the digital copies would be loaned.

The Second Circuit affirmed not only that the Open Library model is not permitted but that the CDL practice is not a fair use—even if it were limited to the physical books in IA’s possession. With the one distinction that the circuit court reversed the lower court’s finding that IA’s purpose is “commercial” under fair use factor one, IA lost resoundingly on all four fair use factors.

In short, CDL is not transformative under factor one because its purpose is no different than the legal eBook lending models offered by publishers. This finding informs factor four. Because the purpose of the use is not transformative, the CDL scheme amounts to a market substitute and is, therefore, a potential market harm. Factors two (nature of the works used) and three (amount of the works copied) barely warrant discussion. The books in suit are expressive in nature, which favors the plaintiff; and IA does not dispute that it copied and made whole books available. Copying whole works may be permissible, but only possibly if the use is transformative.

Since before this suit began, IA has claimed to be a champion for all libraries, even going so far as to assert that CDL is simply doing what all libraries do—i.e., to “buy books and loan books.” But that rhetoric, conveniently facile for the media, obfuscated the more complex truth that IA, its colleagues, and supporting amici were pushing a theory with no foundation in law. CDL is a self-indulgent thought experiment for a handful of academics and activists with no skin in the game of creating literary works. And IA’s claim to be acting like any other library was simply untrue.

To those who believe the law should be different to facilitate IA’s alleged social benefit, I have considered the intent of CDL (and the alleged burden of eBook licensing) and find no evidence to support the claim that CDL fulfils an unmet need. In fact, as stated in past posts, Kahle’s dream of digitizing everything and making it all freely available is not only harmful to future authorship but is a threat to local libraries. Further, it bears repeating that the publishers in this case represent thousands of authors, while IA represents the interests of no authors.

I get why even creators are often persuaded by Internet Archive’s claims. After all, creators tend to love libraries and are instinctively wary of corporations, including publishers. But to put this in contemporary context, IA’s mass digitization and “lending” scheme, which would harm future authorship, is hardly much better than AI’s mass digitization and “training” scheme, which would also harm future authorship. (See what I did with the letters there?) Mass copying and distribution of protected works should always be viewed skeptically because the purpose is rarely transformative and non-threatening to creators. As the court states in yesterday’s judgment:

Within the framework of the Copyright Act, IA’s argument regarding the public interest is shortsighted. True, libraries and consumers may reap some short-term benefits from access to free digital books, but what are the long-term consequences? If authors and creators knew that their original works could be copied and disseminated for free, there would be little motivation to produce new works. And a dearth of creative activity would undoubtedly negatively impact the public. It is this reality that the Copyright Act seeks to avoid.

TikTok Inspired Child Suicide Prompts a Sound Reading of Section 230

Section 230

Last week, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion regarding Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. It may be the strongest affirmation to date that the statute does not provide a blanket liability shield for all social platforms regardless of their conduct. Specifically, §230(c)(1) only immunizes platforms for liability that may arise from other parties’ speech, not from the platform’s own speech. And although the platforms have sought to argue that their “recommendation” algorithms, which push content to users, do not constitute speech, the courts aren’t buying it.

In the case Anderson v. TikTok, the appeals court reversed the lower court finding that the platform was automatically immunized against a liability claim involving the death of a child who attempted one of the many dangerous “challenges” that appear on social media. In this case, Nylah Anderson, age 10, died by accidentally hanging herself when she tried the “Blackout Challenge,” which dared people to asphyxiate themselves until they passed out. At issue for TikTok is not the challenge itself, started by an unknown third-party, but the “For You Page” algorithm which “recommended” the challenge to Anderson. Judge Matey, in a strident concurrence with the circuit court opinion, writes the following:

TikTok reads § 230…to permit casual indifference to the death of a ten-year-old girl. It is a position that has become popular among a host of purveyors of pornography, self-mutilation, and exploitation, one that smuggles constitutional conceptions of a “free trade in ideas” into a digital “cauldron of illicit loves” that leap and boil with no oversight, no accountability, no remedy.

Though the reference to St. Augustine implies a religious moralizing I might omit, Judge Matey’s accusation that social platforms host a “cauldron” of dangerous, illegal, and depraved material behind a veil of social good and constitutional rhetoric is indisputable. As a legal matter, had Anderson discovered the video challenge (e.g., via search), TikTok would likely be immunized by §230, but because a “recommendation” algorithm factored in the child’s conduct resulting in her death, this is an important distinction that could more clearly articulate a shift in judicial review of the statute and, we should hope, an overdue change in platform governance.

As Judge Matey further states in his concurrence, TikTok’s presumed immunity under §230 in this case is “…a view that has found support in a surprising number of judicial opinions dating from the early days of dial-up to the modern era of algorithms, advertising, and apps.” That view is properly dimming now, and by my reckoning, the Supreme Court will go where the Third Circuit went last week. In a pair of nearly identical cases, Gonzalez v. Google and Twitter v. Taamneh (2022), the plaintiffs, on behalf of victims of two ISIS-related terror attacks, sought to hold the platforms accountable for “recommending” ISIS recruiting videos. But because those claims relied substantially on meeting the standard for “aiding and abetting” under criminal law, the Court found little plausible claim for relief and, therefore, declined to address the question of §230 immunity.

But if Anderson (or a similar case) goes to the Supreme Court, I believe the justices will have little difficulty finding that a “recommendation” algorithm promoting a video challenge that led to a child’s death is a foundation for a liability case to proceed. As the Court stated in Taamneh, “When there is a direct nexus between the defendant’s acts and the tort, courts may more easily infer such culpable assistance.” In Anderson, with no other party acting as the direct cause of the child’s death, the facts are even simpler, revealing a clear nexus between the video challenge “recommended” by the platform and the accidental suicide. Further, this July, the Court held in the unanimous Moody v. NetChoice decision that social platforms “shape other parties’ expression into their own curated speech products.”[1] Under that rule, the Third Circuit finds that TikTok’s “recommendation” of the Blackout Challenge to Niyah Anderson plausibly constitutes the platform’s own speech, for which it may be held liable.

The reason I keep putting “recommended” in quotes is that at the time SCOTUS granted cert in the Taamneh and Gonzalez cases, I wrote a post opining that the courts, policymakers, et al. should take a jaundiced view of this too friendly term to describe an insidious function of social media. It is no longer controversial to say that platform operators manipulate what users see and hear, or that this manipulation can lead to disastrous results from disinformation campaigns in the political arena to drug-related deaths to suicide by little girls.

It is a familiar refrain that it takes a tragedy, or many tragedies, to change policy, and with the story of Nylah Anderson, and the many young victims she represents, we may finally see Big Tech’s hypocrisy on speech collapse under the weight of its own absurdity. The major platforms have played games with the First Amendment and §230 for nearly 20 years—conflating their business interests with users’ speech rights or asserting their own speech rights when necessary or asserting that nothing they do is their own speech—all depending on which potential liability the company seeks to avoid. Further, that confusion has not been helped in recent years by certain politicians who misstate the operation of the speech right to create political theater around allegations of bias.

Out of all that mess, it is notable that Justice Thomas, since at least 2020,[2] has restated the observation that online platforms will avail themselves of constitutional protection to engage in conduct like algorithmic “recommendation” but then invert the argument to shroud itself in the §230 shield. And then, the courts will stop a liability claim from even proceeding. As Congress, the Supreme Court, and now the Third Circuit have all reiterated, no industry in the country enjoys that kind of immunity, and perhaps this claim against TikTok will be the case that finally ends this unfounded and unreasonable privilege for online platforms.

[1] On a side note, this is reminiscent of the “selection and arrangement” doctrine in copyright law, which finds “expression” in the choices made by the author who engages in that conduct. All copyrightable expression is a form of speech.

[2] See dissent on the grant of certiorari in Malwarebytes v. Enigma.

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