Tag: Featured

Internet Association Reverses on SESTA. EFF Cranky.

I can’t say I was surprised when the Internet Association announced on Friday that the major internet companies would be halting their lobbying efforts against the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking (SESTA) bill. While representatives for Google, Facebook, and Twitter were enjoying Day Three of occasionally intense inquiry by the Senate Judiciary Committee over foreign meddling in our politics via social media, one thing became abundantly clear: the generic defense that everything online is free speech isn’t going to fly. Not with lawmakers. And not with the American people, it seems.

The reversal on SESTA did rankle the EFF, though, which announced almost immediately that “the Internet Association does not speak for the web,” leaving us to conclude that, presumably, the EFF speaks for the web. Whatever that quite means. Perhaps what the “digital rights” group is most concerned about is that when SESTA passes, which it almost certainly will, people might notice the lack of chilling effect it will have on free speech and think, “Hey, maybe these guys who speak for the web are prone to exaggeration.”

After all, these organizations have spent a lot of energy telling Americans that the liability shield extended to online providers in Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is the reason the web has thrived at all. And one way to understand the extent to which this is hyperbole is to note that the amended SESTA bill, which the Internet Association now backs, does not include any changes that would make it any less a “censorship bill” if it had ever been one in the first place.

In fact, the substantive amendments now agreed upon primarily provide for changes to Chapter 77 of the U.S. criminal code (Title 18), which addresses both criminal and civil litigation that may stem from acts of slavery and trafficking, including trafficking of minors for the commercial sex trade. One amendment tightens up the definition of “participation in a venture” that facilitates or profits from crimes committed under §1591 (sex-trafficking of children) by describing this as “knowingly assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of…”. The other major amendment to Chapter 77 adds a section to the civil remedies for all slavery and trafficking-related crimes—allowing State Attorneys General to file civil claims in federal court where such remedies may be appropriate.

The EFF insists that SESTA will place smaller entities, which don’t have the financial/legal resources of Google and Facebook, at greater risk of potential litigation by victims of sex trafficking. They further assert that, according to various experts on trafficking, SESTA will not help victims and may even place them in greater jeopardy.

SESTA Doesn’t “Go After” Anyone

It’s important to understand that the purpose of SESTA is not trafficking interdiction itself. All the change to the CDA really does is lower one narrowly-defined barrier for alleged victims of sex trafficking to potentially hold a web business liable, if their owners knowingly profit from their victimization as minors trafficked in the sex trade. That’s a lot of conditions and a fairly high burden to meet in a litigation. Yet, the EFF cites critics like Kristen DiAngelo of the Sex Workers Outreach Project (SWOP), which paints a picture of SESTA driving sex workers off the web and back onto the streets where they are more likely to be preyed upon by traffickers.

Organizations run by former victims should be afforded considerable respect with regard to their views on stemming trafficking; but I think DiAngelo misconstrues the nature of SESTA when she writes in her letter to Senator Thune, “To victims of sex trafficking, the idea of shifting liability to publishers for the actions of actual pimps and traffickers is terrifying.” But that isn’t what SESTA does. While I agree with Ms. DiAngelo that the broader spectrum of criminal justice vis-a-vis prostitution is often hypocritical and too frequently criminalizes victims rather than traffickers or customers, SESTA has nothing to do with criminal prosecution at all. It only slightly amends the landscape for civil action, and it should no more lead to a flood of lawsuits by trafficking victims anymore than we’ve seen mass litigation by victims of child pornography since the CDA became law in 1996.

To put it in practical terms, a group of sex workers could theoretically start their own website tomorrow and maintain that site without concern that SESTA has made them more vulnerable to litigation. As explained in an earlier post, the only issue of criminal or civil liability for Backpage* is whether its owners engaged in willful blindness, or worse, with regard to ads that either explicitly or implicitly promoted minors for sex. What SESTA does is actually limit the liability for the site owners who do take affirmative steps to weed out, mitigate, or report attempts to advertise minors on their platform. If SWOP were interested, for instance, in fostering safer online environments for sex workers, SESTA should actually be conducive to that effort.

Perhaps if the EFF would stop calling SESTA a censorship bill and explain in some clear example how this legislation could possibly cause any of the systemic problems they claim, theirs would be a counterpoint worth considering. Meanwhile, they may want to read the moods of both Congress and many citizens, who seem far less receptive to the universal “hands off my web” message that has prevailed up until now. The danger, of course, is that there may yet be an actual threat to free speech in digital space, and if that happens, who will speak for the internet? Surely not the organization that has cried wolf so many times.

The Internet is Not a VCR

That may seem obvious, but if you’re an internet service provider who fails to uphold your end of the DMCA bargain, you’d sure like the courts to think of your service as analogous to the VCR. Certainly, this is fundamental to the appeal filed in the case of BMG v. Cox Communications, for which oral arguments were heard at the 4th Circuit on October 25.

In December of 2015, a jury awarded BMG $25 million in damages after finding Cox guilty of contributory copyright infringement committed by its customers. As a result of evidence demonstrating that Cox had taken affirmative action to avoid implementing a repeat-infringer policy,* the ISP was deemed to have nullified its “safe harbor” under the DMCA, which broadly protects ISPs against liability for copyright infringements committed by their users. Counsel for Cox has argued on appeal that had the jury been instructed to apply what’s known as the Sony-Betamax standard, the outcome might have been different.

Cox asserts that it cannot be held liable for contributory infringement for the same reasons that Sony Corp could not be held liable in 1984 when it was sued by Universal Studios for the production and sale of the Betamax video tape recorder. Specifically, Cox relies on the Supreme Court holding that because the Betamax could be used for “substantial non-infringing purposes,” Sony could not be held liable for contributory infringement even though the company knew that some customers would inevitably use its product to infringe.

Needless to say, internet access is used substantially for non-infringing purposes by millions of consumers, but that’s more or less where the comparison between the Betamax and an ISP ends. Cox is not the first internet service to try to make the Sony argument, and for good reason: because if it worked, no online service provider could ever be held liable for contributory copyright infringement. What’s funny about this, however, is that it was the ISPs themselves (ATT, Verizon, et al) who in the 1990s fought for the liability shield provisions in the DMCA that are at issue in this case. In other words, by Cox’s logic, those ISPs negotiated a statutory “safe harbor” provision against a liability that allegedly did not exist based on a Supreme Court decision in 1984.

The Sony Standard Has Already Been Defined

Unfortunately for Cox, the Supreme Court has largely answered the interpretation of Sony that they hope to apply in their defense. In MGM Studios v. Grokster (2005), the Court, for instance, clarified that the Sony standard does not preclude consideration of any evidence that may indicate knowledge of, or intent to induce or facilitate, infringement—even if the defendant’s product or service may be used for substantially non-infringing purposes.

In other words, the whole “non-infringing use” thing is not a blanket defense. In Sony, the knowledge of infringement was generalized (i.e. somebody somewhere would use VTRs to infringe); whereas in Grokster and other internet-based circumstances, the knowledge can be both specific and actively ignored or facilitated by the service provider. Hence, an important distinction in the Betamax ruling, which does not apply to ISPs, was that Sony’s relationship with its users ended with the purchase of the video recorder. Sony had no way of knowing, controlling, or influencing the infringing or non-infringing uses made by those customers, and so could not reasonably be held liable for contributory infringement.

But an ISP is exactly the opposite. The relationship with customers is continuous and interactive such that the ISP can know precisely how its service is being used by each individual. Were this not the case, the compromise proposals in the DMCA, which include a provision that ISPs maintain a policy for addressing repeat infringers, would not exist. And I repeat, these provisions were largely proposed by the ISPs themselves.

During oral arguments at the 4th Circuit, Judges Wynn and Shedd did grill BMG counsel rather strenuously on the subject of what defines a “repeat infringer.” In truth, this is a flaw with the DMCA, which actually fails to define a number of its terms, and these ambiguities  have inadvertently resulted in both ISPs and edge providers straining the intent of the law. A major reason for the lack of clarity in the statutes is that, constituent to the passage of the DMCA, Congress ordered both the ISPs and the rights holders to collaborate in good faith to develop technical solutions to mass infringement. That was a year before Napster provided a road map for just how lucrative third-party infringement could be for a platform that learned to exploit the imperfections of the DMCA. Enter YouTube.

As a matter of plain common sense, it ought to be clear to anyone without the slightest knowledge of copyright law that the internet is not a VCR. The Betamax and its subsequent VHS followers were devices with very limited applications, whether infringing or not. By contrast, nearly everyone uses the internet all day long for everything from checking the weather, conducting business, grocery shopping, streaming the news, and talking with friends and family.

Some have argued that our universal dependence on the internet means that nobody should ever be denied service for any reason, including repeat copyright infiringement. This is technically a separate debate which has been attached to the Cox/BMG case and asserted in other contexts by the EFF and similar “digital rights” organizations. Personally, I would argue that, at least in terms of of the DMCA and BMG’s claim, that the omnipresence of the internet only serves to vitiate Cox’s appeal to the very narrow Sony-Betamax standard, which was predicated on the very narrow purpose of that particular technology.

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* §512(i) of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) requires that ISPs implement policies to address repeat infringement, including account termination in reasonable circumstances.

Senate Hearings:  A Sea Change for Social Media Companies & Users

Yesterday afternoon the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing entitled:  “Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online:  Working with Tech to Find Solutions.” Representing the social media companies were Colin Stretch, General Counsel at Facebook; Sean Edgett, Acting General Counsel at Twitter; and Richard Salgado, Director of Law Enforcement And Information Security at Google.

The news to come out of this hearing will not compete with the blockbuster revelations produced the day before by Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller; but in the long run, it may prove to be more important.  Because regardless of who in the current administration may yet be implicated in Russia’s disinformation campaign aimed at the United States, the matters of greatest significance are that it happened, the ways in which it happened, and that is still happening.  And it’s not all about Russia.

Some Background

Shorthand terms like “Russian hacking” do not properly describe the nature of what’s going on; and the significance of what’s going on should be understood as separate from any collusion that may or may not have existed between Russia’s agents and the Trump campaign.  In a nutshell, what the Russian-based Internet Research Agency engaged in had less to do with backing a particular candidate and far more to do with spreading mass dis-information to exacerbate divisiveness among the American electorate.  And there is no better way to achieve this disruption than by using social media platforms.

The estimates reported state that 126 million Americans were exposed to paid, targeted messaging used to spread false and emotionally-charged rumors, some of which favored one candidate or another, but all of which was designed to foment political discord and volatility. As the opening testimony of Clint Watts of the Foreign Policy Research Institute stated in Part II of these Committee hearings, “Terrorists’ social media use has been acute and violent, but now authoritarians have taken it to the next level using social media more subtly to do something far more dangerous – destroy our democracy from the inside out through information campaigns designed to pit Americans against each other.”

That theme—pitting Americans against each other—cannot be overstated in this story, and I’ll return to it shortly.

A Taste of the Hearing

Coming to terms with the negative effects the “information age” can have on democracy is a reckoning long overdue, and yesterday was the first time in my experience that representatives of Silicon Valley were compelled to stifle their utopian rhetoric and admit that their products yield unintended and poisonous consequences.  In fact, early in the hearing, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) directly asked the three witnesses if they were going drop the “we’re just a neutral platform” posturing and accept that they have an active role to play in addressing the matters before the Committee.  All three answered the senator in the affirmative.

That in itself is big news.  The Committee’s unwillingness to accept the shrug of “neutrality” from these companies has implications for cyberlaw that go beyond addressing the immediate issue of foreign powers meddling in US elections.  For instance, it is worth remembering that while Mr. Salgado was promising that Google will take affirmative action and not hide behind a veil of neutrality regarding issues addressed in this hearing, parent company Alphabet’s juggernaut of lobbyists and PR outlets are presently trying to kill the anti-sex-trafficking bill SESTA on the grounds that it would weaken the neutral position of their platform.

There were a few awkward moments between the Committee and the witnesses regarding broader questions about the capabilities of the platforms.  Those of us who advocate certain legal boundaries online (like copyright enforcement) are used to the shell game in which the platforms boast about their capabilities to advertisers one moment (e.g. the ability to perform granular-level, targeted marketing) and in the next moment, state contradictorily that they cannot weed out toxic or illegal content because they “can’t police the internet.”

Among the highlights on this theme was Senator Al Franken’s (D-MN) entertaining inquiry directed at Facebook’s Mr. Stretch in which he asked how, with the company’s extraordinary computing capacity, it failed to “connect two dots” and consider that “American” political ads paid for with rubles might be a reason to doubt the nature of the advertiser.  In a related exchange with Mr. Salgado on the subject of Google’s capacity to weed out foreign-based political ads, Sen. Franken felt the response was too internal-policy focused and reminded the witness, “You know it’s illegal for any foreign money to be spent in our election process, right?”

These hearings mark the first time that I can remember any representative of the major platforms stating with so little equivocation that they can, will, and should implement steps to mitigate harmful content on their platforms.  Doubts were raised, however, by some members. Senator John Kennedy (R-LA) told Mr. Strech pointedly that he simply doesn’t believe Facebook can effectively vet over five million ads per month; and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) accused all three platforms of responding too slowly, of missing opportunities and warning sings, and of hosting toxic content that is still online right now.

Although some Committee members raised concerns about First Amendment protections—in fact, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) cited incidents of alleged censorship of conservative views by the platforms themselves—neither any Committee Member of either party, nor any of the three witnesses, reiterated the generalization that removing illegal or harmful content from the platforms was fundamentally incompatible with the protection of free speech.  To the contrary, there seemed to be a very clear consensus that the manner in which these tools have been—and may continue to be—manipulated by bad actors is so harmful to democracy itself that, in context, free speech becomes a weapon of self-destruction. And that brings us back to that underlying theme and the real significance of what the Russian “hackers” did:  pit Americans against each other.

A New Kind of Literacy

I opined in a recent post that a new kind of media literacy is needed for the digital age.  Because no matter what Congress can legislate, and no matter what actions the platforms may take, people themselves are going to have to be more vigilant about the content they believe to be true, let alone share.  The mistaken expectation that the internet would be a kind of turbo-booster for democratic values comes from a reasonable, if somewhat elitist, assumption.  The theory was that if people have access to information, unfiltered by the influence of manipulators and monied gatekeepers, the collective wisdom of a fundamentally benevolent society would galvanize core democratic principles.  The manipulators would be powerless in such a fact-rich environment.

These assumptions completely overlooked some fundamental realities:  1) the platforms themselves can be used by a wide range of manipulators to manufacture false information; 2) false information that jibes with pre-conceived bias is almost impossible to recognize as false because; 3) people are driven more by emotion than by information.  The fault of the technologists, whose expertise is data, was to assume that information builds community—or at least to sell that idea.  But the truth is almost always just the opposite, even without propagandists hijacking reality.

The Opposite of Social Media

As an example of the limits of social media, I think about the story of Daryl Davis, who was featured by several news organizations shortly after the riots in Charlottesville.  Davis, a black blues musician, is responsible for over 200 men quitting the Ku Klux Klan—a journey that began, humorously enough, when a white man in a bar complimented him by saying he’d never heard “a black guy who could play piano like Jerry Lee Lewis.”  Davis’s explanation that Lewis learned everything he knew from black musicians led to a cordial conversation and the discovery that the white guy was a member of the KKK.  Thus began Davis’s decision to travel the country, meet other Klan members, and write a book about his experiences.  Along the way, many of the friends he made abandoned the organization and gave Davis their robes as penitential offerings.

Now, imagine if Davis’s first encounter with that first Klan member had been through the cold portals of social media rather than in person and through the shared experience of quintessentially American music. Add to that the trove of “information” the white guy could link to “proving” the genetic inferiority of Davis’s race. Can anyone doubt that the most likely outcome of this online exchange would be a hardening of the white guy’s racism (and perhaps a hardening of Davis’s feelings as well)?

Nothing in such and exchange would have to qualify as hate speech or any other content that would even get on the radar of the issues discussed in yesterday’s Senate hearing. It’s the kind of exchange that happens all the time—just two Americans being driven further apart by the mechanisms of a platform whose corporate mission is to “build community.”  That paradox is something the folks at Facebook et al—and those of us who use these platforms—are going to have to reconcile no matter what Congress does.

Image by alexlmx