Tag: fair use

EU Copyright Proposal Article 13 Set to Destroy the Internet (Again)

As mentioned in my previous post, Article 13 of the EU Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market is the latest proposal that will “destroy the internet as we know it,” if the statute is ratified in its present form. The #copyright feed on Twitter seems dominated by messages proclaiming the existential toxicity of Article 13, and, as usual, there are a lot of articles agreeing with one another that this proposal is really bad—all of them long on synonyms for bad, but short on substance as to why bad things will actually come to pass. And the reason for this is that Article 13 does not outline any specific practices but rather proposes to adopt certain practices. If that sounds like a distinction without a difference, it isn’t.

The broad goal of the EU Directive is to create a Digital Single Market (DSM), something that consumers, digital rights activists, and even many rightholders have been advocating for years. Harmonizing the disparate copyright laws (as they relate to internet distribution) of the 28 member countries should facilitate better access for users and, in principle, foster more robust trade in digital goods throughout the continent.

But the European Commission simultaneously recognizes various threats posed by the internet industry to the authors of works—especially from major platforms that host vast amounts of user-uploaded, copyrighted material.  In the European Commission, these are called Online Content Sharing Service Providers (OCSSP), a category that excludes non-commercial sites like encyclopedias or sites where “content is uploaded with the authorisation of all concerned rigthholders, such as education or scientific repositories.”

Presently, the Directive’s Article 13 mandates that Member States work with major service providers, user representatives, and rightholders to develop technical measures designed to filter content in order to prevent or mitigate the uploading of infringing material. Here’s the language from the current draft:

“Member States shall facilitate, where appropriate, the cooperation between the online content sharing service providers, users, and rightholders through stakeholder dialogues to define best practices for the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 in a manner that is proportionate and efficient, taking into account, among others, the nature of the services, the availability of technologies and their effectiveness in light of technological developments.”

This is what will supposedly destroy the internet as we know it.  A provision that Member States work with stakeholders to develop technical measures to filter unlicensed content from various platforms.  A process that, if it happens at all, will take several years of negotiating (and bickering) to implement.  I feel compelled to interject that when the DMCA was passed in the U.S. in 1998, it also contained a mandate that rightholders and service providers collaborate to develop technical measures in order to filter for infringing content. In fact, the service providers testified to the availability of such technical measures as part of their rationale for lobbying for the safe harbors in DMCA in the first place.

If America’s past is Europe’s prologue, the major service providers—with ample help from anti-copyright ideologues—will fight the implementation of such measures at every phase, so we’re at least 10-15 years from “destroying the internet we know.”  I find this funny because the “internet we know” (using YouTube as a reference) isn’t 15 years old yet, and I’m not sure why the internet of 2031 should be required to resemble the internet of today in any context whatsoever.

Although the EU Directive is not specific about what technical measures should be developed and implemented, the usual chorus of critics hear the death knell of the internet in the mere suggestion that such technical measures should even be considered. Thus, the main message they’re selling—the one they always sell—is that no technical measure could ever be implemented without fostering censorship of protected speech. Hence, Pirate Party Member of the European Commission Julia Reda’s labeling these provisions “censorship machines.” Then, the anti-copyright voices in academia and “digital rights” groups jump on board with scary-sounding declarations like this one:

Algorithms Can’t Assess Fair Use!

It’s true. They can’t.  And the day they can, I’m going into the bunker because this would indicate the machines have woken up and are about to kill us. Of course, most human users who upload copyrighted works aren’t very good at assessing fair use either—or more to the point, most human users don’t bother thinking about what they’re uploading, period. It is simply assumed at this point that every user is free to upload whatever he wants without considering whether he has any right to make a work available online.

Just because digital activists and copyright haters paint a picture of an internet replete  with fair uses, that doesn’t make it true.  In fact, in my anecdotal experience with friends—including artists who don’t want to infringe—almost nobody has taken the time to understand fair use. So, are social media platforms more richly populated by fair uses or infringing uses? I don’t know. But neither do any of the people currently overstating assumptions about fair use in order to scare users about the provisions in Article 13.

Moreover, as alluded to in my last post, if content filtering systems are too hypersensitive, this will adversely disrupt the use of licensed works. For instance, I pay for the stock photos I use on this blog, but if WordPress deploys a filter that is too robust and rejects every image, that’s bad for me and the rightholders of those images. This is a tiny example as to why Article 13 requires stakeholders to develop technical measures through collaboration.

And on that point, why don’t the digital activists ever seem to want to collaborate on such initiatives rather than invoke Revelations at the mere prospect of having the conversation? Because a) they fundamentally hate copyright and have no intention of finding compromise; or b) because they really are in Silicon Valley’s pocket and seek policies that serve the interests of Google et al.

It is important to keep in mind that almost no proposal—from voluntary to statutory—is ever endorsed by these parties if it implies even a hint of platform responsibility for user-uploaded content. This remains true despite the staggering evidence that our 20-year policy of leaving platforms to their own “merits” resulted in the Facebook/Russia/Cambridge-Analytica scandal. These events have led many citizens to reconsider the need to preserve “the internet as we know it” in favor of adapting to an internet that better serves society. To achieve this, we will have to accept that, in fact, there are laws applicable in physical space which are not rendered obsolete by interacting in cyberspace. Maybe if we describe this approach as disrupting the internet, the digital activists will get it.

Important Win for Rights Holders in TVEyes v. Fox

In Monday’s post (and quite a few others) I stated that certain parties have worked very hard to distort the character of the fair use doctrine until it no longer has any boundaries or meaning, and simply nullifies copyright’s protections. For the last two years, every time I’ve made that accusation, the case foremost in mind has been TVEyes v. Fox News. But yesterday, on Day Two of Fair Use Week, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals handed down an opinion that draws some freshly sharp lines around the traditional limits of fair use in an age when tech ventures consistently try to describe mass copyright infringement as innovation. Rights holders of every flavor should feel relieved by this decision, especially as it upholds the conditional and narrow finding of fair use in the Google Books case.

The court rejected all  the defenses presented by TVEyes, but the most significant part of this story involves the relatively novel doctrine of “transformativeness,” which is weighed when considering the first of the four fair use factors, and has split into two main interpretations. The first interpretation, applied in Campbell (1994), describes the transformation of one expressive work into a new expressive work (i.e. the kind of fair use most creators care about). The second interpretation, most prominently applied in Google Books (2016), describes a much more broad transformation of a useful technology, which necessitates copying protected works in order to function. (See today’s Copyhype post on transformativeness.)

The latter interpretation has made rights holders rather anxious as several tech companies have tried to assert that the “transformative” doctrine—and especially the holding in Google Books—provides a rationale for just about any new tech venture to commit mass infringement on the grounds that the novelty of the enterprise alone can be described as “transformative.” TVEyes, which stored, organized, and made available nearly all of Fox’s programming to its institutional and corporate customers (see a more detailed discussion here), relied substantially on this interpretation of “transformativeness” in its defense. But yesterday, the same court that wrote the opinion in Google Books made a clear distinction between that case and this one, holding that the TVEyes model is not a fair use.

The majority of the panel held that TVEyes’s “Watch” function, which enabled viewing whole programs in 10-minute segments, was “slightly transformative,” but so modest as to be outweighed by the rest of the fair use analysis. In particular, the third and fourth factors were short work for the court because TVEyes made nearly all of Fox’s content available (weighing against them under the third factor) and “usurped a market that properly belongs to the copyright-holder” (weighing against them under the fourth factor) by creating a means of distribution that a creator has the exclusive right to develop for itself.

Interestingly, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan wrote a concurring opinion, dissenting solely on the majority’s analysis of “transformativeness,” holding that the consideration itself was not necessary; that a finding of “slightly transformative” adds further ambiguity to an already ambiguous doctrine; and that, if he were to consider the matter, he sees no evidence that TVEyes is the least bit “transformative” under a fair use analysis. In fact, Kaplan’s opinion may prove especially significant in drawing a distinction between Google Books and other tech ventures hoping to exploit the ambiguity of “transformativeness.” Kaplan writes…

“The facts here…differ from Google Books quite substantially. The snippet function considered there delivered much less copyrighted content than the Watch function at issue here. Nevertheless, we there concluded that the snippet function only ‘adds’ to the transformative purpose of the Search function. Our conclusion with respect to the Google Books snippet feature therefore does not control the proper characterization of the Watch function at issue here. Moreover, we cautioned in Google Books that the case ‘test[ed] the boundaries of fair use.’”

TVEyes may appeal this ruling since it does put an end to their business model; but it’s hard to imagine the Supreme Court granting cert, unless it were exclusively to further clarify the “transformativeness” doctrine. There doesn’t appear to be anything else for the Court to resolve. And given the rationales applied by the Second Circuit here—especially drawing such clear distinctions between its own precedent opinion and this one—it seems like a big stretch for TVEyes to expect an appeal to go their way, even if the Supreme Court did hear the case.

Rights holders should be very pleased with this outcome, as should anyone who believes that legal systems have contours. Fair use is an important exception to copyright’s exclusive protections. But it is simply common-sense to conclude that every tech company that develops another method for exploiting someone else’s work—TVEyes, ReDigi, VidAngel, etc.—cannot call itself “transformative” and get away with it. One can show great ingenuity in hacking, embezzlement, or counterfeiting, too, but that doesn’t make these enterprises legal. Thankfully, the Second Circuit agrees.

Fair Use Isn’t “Dare Use”

LTG YT

Don’t fall for fair-use daredevil tactics. You might get hurt.

I know Fair Use Week is technically over, but when I saw this video produced by Public Knowledge, I couldn’t, y’know…let it go.

Remember how I’ve argued a few times that organizations have a habit of promoting fair use messages that can confuse people and potentially get well-meaning creators into legal trouble? Well, kids, with regard to the snarky video Public Knowledge released last week, all I can say is, don’t try this at home. Because their fair use argument is technically pretty weak, and I wouldn’t follow their lead unless you feel like poking a phalanx of lawyers with a stick.

So, what Public Knowledge did was have a guy named Charles Duan write anti-copyright lyrics on the theme “Let ‘em Go” set to the tune “Let It Go” from Disney’s movie Frozen. Vocalist Courtney Duffy, with all the earnestness she could muster, sings lyrics like “But companies with cash and greed, Choke the public domain these artists need.” Ouch.

Anyway, the video itself is a montage of clips from Disney animated films, home-movie footage of people dressed as Disney characters, and a variety of creative expressions both directly and indirectly trying to make a point about copyright. The message, as usual, is muddled. PK is provoking Disney because of the trope that the company is directly responsible for the last extension of copyright terms—not actually true—but the video is also trying to be a lesson in fair use, presuming to prove its point by brazenly making use of works belonging to one of the most famously protective companies in the world. (Oh, and a shot of Holden, the “dancing baby” in Lenz is thrown in for good measure.)

Never mind that any number of the depicted “uses” would not implicate copyright (or consequently fair use), but on the subject of copyright terms, the message is weakened by the fact that PK depicts a number of works, like clips from Frozen, whose copyrights would not have expired even if terms were dramatically shorter. Of course, the folks at PK never let pesky details get in the way of a well-entrenched conceit.

Personally, I don’t get everyone’s obsession with the Mouse, and it would be nearly impossible to count all of the creative works that have been produced concurrent with Mickey’s long tenure as an IP-protected icon, but whatever. No doubt there’s an artist somewhere, languishing in a lonely garrett, rendered mute because he cannot fulfill his Mickey Mouse vision.

The Song Is Not Fair Use

The big thing that jumped out at me about this video, though, is that PK’s use of the song in this case would likely not do very well under a fair use test if Disney were to sue the organization. The song may be covered by a blanket license for use on YouTube,* which would be an amusing irony, given the posture of “civil disobedience” PK presumes to be striking here. But if that were not the case, and if Disney wanted to take action, I think Public Knowledge would fail in a fair use defense for its use of “Let It Go” in this video.

As mentioned in an older post, a fair use of a song in the way PK used it here protects parody, meaning that the new use must in some way comment on the original work. Fair use as parody does not protect the use of a song with new lyrics written to express something that is entirely separate from the meaning or spirit of the original work. As noted in this post about the Westboro Baptists writing and recording anti-semitic lyrics to McCartney’s “Hey Jude,” such uses can have very negative effects and even infringe the speech rights of the authors. As we saw in regard to the settlement in GoldieBlox’s use of a Beastie Boys song, the fair use defense does not generally support a use like the one PK made for this video.

The song “Let It Go” is about a young woman breaking out of her frozen shell to become her true self, so I think PK would receive a pretty frosty, judicial response if they tried to argue that their anti-copyright lyrics meet the definition of parody. If Disney were to sue Public Knowledge, I believe the use of the song in this case would fail on the first, second, and third factors of the fair use test. Specifically, PK’s desire to comment upon The Disney Company via its use of “Let It Go” would likely invoke a citation of the 2009 case Salinger v Colting in which the defendant’s authorship of an unauthorized sequel to The Catcher in the Rye was not held to be a fair use on the basis that it was expressing a comment upon J.D. Salinger himself. From the opinion:

“While the addition of Salinger as a character in 60 Years is indeed novel, the Court is unconvinced by Defendants’ attempts to shoehorn Defendants’ commentary and criticism of Salinger into the parodic framework of Campbell,** which requires critique or commentary of the work.”

For all their smugness, Public Knowledge is more likely protected either by license between Disney and YouTube or by PR (i.e. Disney may decide it isn’t worth the press fight); but the fair use defense here kinda blows. And that’s why I say these organizations are not doing the public any favors when they produce this kind of propaganda. They can get well-intentioned creators into trouble by evangelizing a general understanding of a legal doctrine that demands a more nuanced consideration. Maybe, Public Knowledge should heed an apropos line by comedian Ron White: “The next time you have a thought, let it go.”

*ADDENDUM:  Thanks to the comment from artandcreativesite, which reminds us that even with such a license to use a song, complete revision of the original lyrics still infringes the rights holder’s exclusive right to create derivative works.

**Campbell v Acuff-Rose, a landmark case in which 2 Live Crew’s use of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman” was held to be  fair use as a parody.