DMCA Review Should Be About Copyright, No?

On September 30, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing to discuss the Copyright Office report, published in May, commenting on the efficacy of Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Section 512 provides conditional immunity to online service providers for copyright infringements conducted by users of their services. (For a basic summary of conditions, see page here.)

Reiterating the position that the USCO report fails to consider the interests of the general public in its analysis, Meredith Filak Rose, senior policy counsel at Public Knowledge, urged the committee to proceed with cautious awareness that in the years since 1998, the public has become profoundly dependent upon the internet for a broad range of ordinary and essential needs.

With due respect to Rose personally, and with deference to the many devil’s details implicated by her testimony, I shall, once again, take issue with the over broad context in which digital rights groups like Public Knowledge try to frame discussion about the DMCA. For instance, at the start of her testimony Rose states that, “229 million Americans use the internet each day. That’s 229 million American adults using the internet to work, worship, connect with family and friends, receive healthcare, consume and discuss the news, and organize political action each and every day.”

Aside from the fact that the mosaic of internet uses needs to be more diverse in order to present a clear picture (let’s not forget the mindless scrolling, the clickbait, the misinformation, or the porn), the salient point is that most ordinary internet use does not require the appropriation of copyrighted works. So, framing a conversation about a section of the copyright law by alluding to the scope of everyday internet traffic is both distracting and entirely beside the point. If Congress were discussing CAFE standards, and an oil industry representative testified that 229 million American adults drive to work, church, and the grocery store every day, this would be a meaningless prelude to an argument against mandates for more fuel-efficient cars.

The Fight Over Account Termination

So, let’s stipulate the obvious:  We all use the internet for myriad practical purposes all day long. And if anyone can show me the intersection between copyright infringement and a telemedicine appointment, I’ll take a look. But what Rose is really teeing up is advocacy for the status quo of DMCA §512(i) and the barely implemented requirement that ISPs eventually cancel the accounts of repeat copyright infringers. We cannot reconcile, Public Knowledge argues, a family’s fundamental need for broadband with the possibility that a teenager in the house might repeatedly infringe copyright, and the service provider will be required to terminate access for the entire household.

But the reality is not quite so binary or draconian, even if the statute has proven unclear to the point of futility. Congress’s decision in 1998 not to define “repeat infringer,” or to codify universally applicable guidance for termination policies, left the ISPs (access providers) and the edge providers (web platforms) free to maintain the practice of termination avoidance for repeat infringement by users. The concern of digital rights groups, therefore, is that somehow the service providers will have to comply with a 22-year-old condition they’ve largely evaded.

In the costly litigation COX v. BMG and that provider’s risible 14-strike policy, COX’s users received multiple warnings before not actually losing their accounts. And although copyright owners would certainly like to see more meaningful implementations of 512(i), they neither propose nor endorse a scenario in which a family wakes to find its broadband inexplicably terminated for repeat infringements of which the account holder was somehow unaware. This is not the way account termination happens now or has ever been envisioned to happen.

At the same time, although this is not the post for offering specific legislative recommendations, one policy that would alleviate some of the tension in 512(i) is site blocking, which has proven effective in foreign jurisdictions. If groups like Public Knowledge, EFF, et al were not so adamantly opposed to blocking enterprise-scale, foreign-based piracy sites, a compromise might be more easily found that would mitigate many of the concerns these groups identify with regard to account termination scenarios.

“Red Flag” Knowledge at the Heart of the Matter

This focus on the internet writ large reinforces the major internet companies’ efforts to conflate their commercial interest with the public interest. What many call the “free flow of information,” allegedly for our benefit, often has nothing to do with information. What this erudite sounding expression really means is that because the social sites are engineered to exploit vulnerabilities in human psychology in order to keep users addicted and active, the platform owners like to avoid legal obstacles like copyright, privacy, or anti-trust matters that may create friction between user and interface.

Consequently, today’s major platforms—all founded years after the DMCA was first hammered out between big telco and big media—read certain ambiguities in the statutes to mean that they are free to profit from chronic infringement by users, while doing the bare minimum to comply with the notice-and-takedown provision. Specifically, as discussed in my post about the first Senate-led review of DMCA, rightsholders hope that Congress will more clearly define §512(c), which states that providers will not be liable for infringement if …

(1) its operators do not have actual knowledge of infringement; (2) its operators are not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; and (3) upon obtaining knowledge of infringement, expeditiously removes the relevant material.  

Commonly referred to as the “red flag” knowledge section of the statute, a major point of contention for rightsholders, both in and out of court, is the extent to which service providers allege that they lack any knowledge of infringement sufficient to meet the liability standard. Even in a relatively recent case where plaintiffs presented emails that revealed site operators made affirmative decisions to leave material online they believed to be infringing, courts have misread §512(c) to mean that these operators would need legal and industry expertise to meet the “red flag” bar. This is inconsistent with the reasonable, ordinary person context in which this part of the statute was written, hence the hope by rightsholders that Congress will consider clarifying the language.

Because §512(c) is at the heart of the good-faith/shared responsibility intent of the DMCA, I have to say that I did a little spit-take when Rep. Lofgren raised the “red flag” subject and asked her first question of Meredith Rose, who replied that she is “not terribly familiar” with that part of the statute. This is not intended as a personal gotcha, but it is a rather serious matter when an organization purporting to represent the interests of “everyone who uses the internet” is unprepared to discuss one of the most problematic sections of the DMCA. In fact, the much broader question of what platform operators can know about the material on their servers, and what they should do about some of it, is the vexing challenge of the moment with regard to the effect social media are having on society. The knowledge question goes way beyond copyright.

The Dogeared Speech Argument

Historically, the internet industry’s shell game on the subject of what can and cannot be known is consistent with the kind of site management that has now proven to be the major catalyst in the dissolution of democracies worldwide. The same companies whose algorithms are allegedly so sophisticated that they can predict our choices before we make them, paradoxically claim an inability to parse data that ordinary, non-prescient humans can interpret. The manner in which the industry has exploited vagueness in the knowledge standard in the DMCA runs parallel to its history of shrugging “neutrality” when it comes to the moderation of harmful material like organized hate speech, conspiracy groups, and dangerous misinformation—a “neautrality” no longer acceptable to much of the public.

I cannot fathom how any reasonable person looks across the landscape at the ragged state of American democracy and, with a straight face, continues to exalt Web 2.0’s grand experiment in free speech as though it were not an appalling failure. The evidence is now clear, including testimony from a steady stream of defectors from the social media companies, that Facebook, Google, Twitter, Reddit, et al purposely designed their platforms to be digital crack. And it is no surprise that divisive politics and conspiracy garbage are potent ingredients in the drug cocktail that captures and retains the attention of millions.

Referring back to the 229 million users, it isn’t connecting to family or online banking or worshipping that is systematically destroying the American Republic; it’s the speech-a-palooza that organizations like Public Knowledge earnestly champion that has sown a motley patchwork of customized realities to the extent that we are now clinging to what remains of political common ground with our fingernails. Social media is a toxin coursing through the veins of the body politic with such deleterious effect that the most sober historians and political operatives are sincerely wondering if the Republic can survive another decade. It ain’t copyright enforcement that sends QAnon wackos to Congress.

Yet, to the tech-utopian, any effort to allow copyright owners to better protect their works online will unavoidably, and unacceptably, silence someone’s speech somewhere. In fairness, this is true. It is inevitable at times and must be remedied on a case-by-cases basis. Further, I see no reason why intentional abuse of DMCA to silence speech (e.g. criticism) cannot be more strongly proscribed through statutory reform if need be.

But citing “speech” as a generalized framework for debate is too broad and has little to show for itself as a social benefit to date. Aside from the fact that speech is silenced every minute online through many modes (e.g. bullying or platform moderation), there is no way that anyone can measure how much speech is currently silenced, or how much more or less would be silenced by improving the DMCA for rights holders. It’s counting grains of sand in the desert.

Ironically enough, Twitter announced over the weekend that it would delete tweets by anyone hoping the president dies from COVID-19. And while there are several reasons why this is sound policy for Twitter, it happens to be one of the few occasions when a platform would censor a prime example of protected speech. And, as one commenter rightly pointed out, Twitter has left intact volumes of missives hoping for the sexual assaults and deaths of women who speak out on various issues, including actual threats that transgress any claim to the speech right. So, we should dial down the speech rhetoric until it describes what the world actually looks like, not that Barlowian “home of mind” that never existed.

Into this long and repetitive debate, I think a fair market summary of the DMCA’s status quo is as follows: The major copyright owners enforce their rights through the use of some technological measures and the notice-and-takedown system, albeit with a ceaseless, dynamic, and expensive process that has little effect addressing the volume and rate of infringement. The small rightsholders barely enforce their rights at all through notice-and-takedown and generally give up trying. The user-generated platforms continue to profit substantially from third-party infringements against both small and large creators. And the 229-million of us Americans using the web comprise billions of transactions every day that have nothing to do with copyright.  

HJC is Right to Want Internet Safe Harbors Out of USMCA

Remember the Trans Pacific Partnership?  The twelve-nation trade agreement that became an eleven-nation trade agreement when the U.S. pulled out?   As a general opinion, I will propose that when both a Bernie Sanders and a Donald Trump want to thrash a Fair Trade Agreement (FTA), it’s a pretty good indication that diametrically opposing ideologies have come to the same naïve conclusion.  Whether one’s anti-globalism is steeped in anti-corporatism or ultra-nationalism matters very little when the self-defeating result is not the abandonment of the world’s largest trade deal, but a decision that the United States will not have a seat at the table.  

But the reason I’m trotting out that diplomatic fiasco in this post is to remind readers why “digital rights” groups like the EFF, PublicKnowledge, ReCreate Coalition, et al campaigned so energetically against the TPP:  because they said it would “entrench” the status quo of copyright law, particularly the duration of copyright terms.  “One of the defining battles in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations,” began a typical EFF blog post in 2017,  “is whether its signatory countries will standardize copyright terms lengths to a minimum term of the life of the author plus 70 years.” While this post presents the urgency of six new countries adding 20 years to their copyright terms, I do not believe the duration of copyright in Brunei was the focus of the organization’s agenda.

Regardless of how one feels about term length, it was profoundly disingenuous to imply in that post, and others, that the USTR was working at the behest of major rightsholders to entrench the life-plus-70-year standard through an FTA. Further, in my view, this post was written to suggest that, if the U.S. did not ratify TPP, we just might to roll back our terms to life-plus-50 years. But that regime was already a global standard when the U.S. joined the Berne Treaty a century after it was first created; and the increase from 50 years to 70 in 1996 was the result of the U.S. matching its terms to those adopted by the new European Union.  So, there was never any logic to the implication that by withdrawing from the Pacific trade deal, this would have loosened the bolts on U.S. copyright policies, which are based largely on the history of Euro/American trade in copyrightable works.

With that preamble in mind, be prepared for much wailing and gnashing of teeth from the “digital rights” groups if the U.S. Trade Representative concedes to a request by the House Judiciary Committee to remove language from the USMCA (new NAFTA) mirroring the “safe harbor” provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  

Also referred to as Section 512, these are the provisions under which internet service providers (ISPs) are held immune from liability for hosting copyright infringing material that is uploaded by users; and safe harbor language has been echoed in FTAs since passage of the DMCA in 1998.  Why the change in doctrine?  In its September 17 letter to the USTR, the Committee stated …

“The U.S. Copyright Office is expected to produce a report on Section 512 around the end of this year, the result of a multi-year process that started in 2015.  Moreover, the European Union has recently issued a copyright directive that includes reforms to its analogous safe harbor for online platforms, which may have an impact on the U.S. domestic policy debate.  Without taking a position on that debate in this letter, we find it problematic for the United States to export language mirroring this provision while such serious policy discussions are ongoing.”  

Quite simply, the DMCA has been under review for several years because it is not exactly working as intended.  In fact, neither of the two internet liability shields—neither Section 512 nor Section 230—has resulted in platform operators taking adequate voluntary action to mitigate harm on their platforms.  To the contrary, absolute immunity for web platforms fostered a culture of smug, self-important rationales for irresponsibility.  

Until major Silicon Valley executives had to start answering questions about data breaches and trust violations, they were the self-proclaimed  “fast movers and thing breakers,” insisting that if we all want progress (see innovation), we gotta let them break a few eggs, right?  Except those eggs were privacy; civil liberties; personal safety; decency; the rights of authors and inventors to protect the fruits of their labor; other labor rights while we’re at it; and the foundations of democracy itself.  Small price to pay for Facebook and YouTube, I guess.

In contrast to the ginned-up fears of “entrenching” century-old copyright regimes in trade agreements, the “digital rights” groups will no-doubt recommend entrenching law through FTAs with a much shorter and dodgier pedigree.  It took less than 20 years after passage of the DMCA to recognize that ISPs will use their liability shields to avoid taking adequate voluntary measures to mitigate harmful or illegal conduct on their platforms.

The logical conclusion many constituencies are now coming to with regard to internet service providers—and this is hardly a revelation—is that tech corporations, like any other, will avoid incurring costs, either direct or opportunity, unless the potential liability will be even more expensive.  The House Judiciary Committee is right to put the brakes on safe harbor provisions in FTAs in order avoid calcifying demonstrably flawed policy.  

Internet Association Wants to Encode Safe Harbors in New NAFTA

As debate over renegotiating NAFTA heats up, the copyright interests will be duking it out with the internet industry over the inclusion, or not, of “safe harbor” provisions akin to Section 512 of the DMCA and Section 230 of the CDA.  In a letter dated August 31 to USTR Ambassador Robert Lighthizer, the Internet Association sang its standard refrain on the absolute necessity of these liability shields for the growth of the digital economy and the protection of American jobs that are increasingly dependent on the tech and internet sectors.  No surprise there.  And at least some truth.

More bizarrely, though, the letter claims that the Internet Association represents “the new faces of the American content industry, winning Emmys and Oscars, providing digital distribution for streaming-only Grammy winners, while also creating services that address the challenge of piracy by allowing consumers to legally access content globally.”

Ruth Vitale, CEO of CreativeFuture took exception to this claim in a letter of her own addressed to Ambassador Lighthizer. In her response, Vitale explains the well-documented history of the unintended negative effects of the DMCA on creative producers of every size.  “Why should these provisions be in an updated NAFTA — undermining the protections for American creatives overseas?” writes Vitale. “Please don’t export a system that does nothing but shelter the most powerful internet companies, rather than the start-ups that these trade associations often claim are the beneficiaries of safe harbor.”

The only reason the IA was able to insert this plug about award-winning “content creators” is because its membership includes companies like Netflix and Amazon; but as I addressed in an older post, Netflix-like models are neither truly “internet” businesses, nor a particularly new model for content-production.  Netflix is a motion picture exhibitor and producer—one that has as much interest in the copyrights vested in the products it makes as Sony or MGM.

Moreover, Netflix remains something of an unknown quantity, if we’re looking at big-picture economics.  Presently, we are witnessing a period when the company is spending a fortune in raised debt to produce work at a blistering pace in order to grow fat with content in its bid for global market-share.  But profitability is another question altogether; and there will come a time when the growth flattens. Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Originals, etc. are really just the new HBOs, Showtimes, and FX Networks on the block; and no matter how the landscape looks in five or ten years, there is no reason to believe that the copyright interests of the leading producers, whoever they may be, will be any less relevant than they are today. Even more to the point, the copyright framework is essential for the independent writer currently banging away on a new work that she hopes to sell to one of these entities.

Similarly, for all the talk of growth and vitality—and there is evidence of both—the major internet platforms still imply futures that cannot easily be measured by the metrics of the current market.  It wasn’t all that long ago that we all jumped onto Facebook, which is now considered an essential platform for both individuals and businesses. But if my 15-year-old and her friends are any indication, Facebook’s future is questionable because these teens have abandoned the platform as a place for “old people.” This does not mean Zuckerberg and Co. won’t come up with a way to regain that market as it enters adulthood, but it does suggest that the social media market we have today may not look anything like what we will have in the relatively near future (see MySpace).  And if anybody can claim to know the precise role of safe harbors in this uncertain future, then I suspect a crystal ball is somewhere in the room.

The Crystal Ball in the Room

Speaking of fortune-telling, the most substantial quote from the Internet Association letter may be the one which states that “One recent study found that weakened safe harbors for online intermediaries would eliminate over 425,000 American jobs and lead to an annual loss of $44 billion in US GDP.”  Sounds compelling if nobody reads the study, which the IA can assume will be the case. But I read the study (which was not surprisingly commissioned by the Internet Association) authored by Christian M. Dippon, PhD at the private firm NERA Economic Consulting.

While stipulating that I may be undervaluing some aspect of Dippon’s work, the general approach of the study hopes to provide evidence to support this conclusion:  that altering (i.e. weakening) safe harbors would lead to crippling litigation that would then result in higher prices passed onto consumers.  This would in turn reduce demand for certain services, costing jobs and investment in the otherwise robust tech and internet sectors. Both the premises and the research appear flawed.

For one thing, it is false to assume that readjusting corporate liability through legislative reform can only lead to “crippling litigation.”  To the contrary, if the statutory provisions of the safe harbors were amended to restore their original intent while mitigating their unintended harm, this would more likely lead to changes in the best practices of those corporations seeking to avoid liability than it would inexorably lead to more litigation.  It is in fact the worst practices of many service providers where rights-holders find fault—practices that have often been obscured by the dysfunctional DMCA as a tool of enforcement.

In fact, the lack of rigor in the study in this regard is revealed by its reference to the BMG v Cox case as exemplary of the kind of litigation that would supposedly run amok under an amended safe harbor regime.  Having acknowledged in the early part of his paper that DMCA is a conditional shield for service providers, Dippon then fails to recognize that Cox lost that case precisely because it failed to meet those statutory conditions.  Given that the internet industry has tried to portray Cox in a similar light, its emphasis in this study suggests that the IA perhaps fed NERA this example and that nobody at NERA did careful research into the case.

Specifically, the study seeks to support its conclusions by means of consumer surveys on the use of search and cloud storage services, determining that a rise in prices for cloud storage would reduce demand for these services; and determining that increased exposure to more intrusive advertising would reduce the demand in search.  These increases in prices and/or intrusive advertising are assumed to result from the aforementioned increase in litigation, which is itself highly speculative.

Perhaps most telling is that in order to calculate the potential price increase for cloud storage, the author references MP3Tunes, which was found guilty of copyright infringement and paid damages of $41.5 million.  Perhaps this case would be a valid baseline if it were not possible for consumers to use a cloud storage service that is not also in the copyright infringement business. But this is not a reality.

For instance, like a lot of consumers, I use Dropbox, which is neither in the infringement business nor presently more vulnerable to litigation as a result of the MP3Tunes outcome.  This legal storage business will also not be more vulnerable to litigation under the kind of amended safe harbor regime rights holders seek domestically; and it especially would not be more vulnerable to litigation if we do not transpose our current safe harbor language into new trade agreements.

There are a number of large leaps, assumptions, and omissions in the NERA study, despite IA’s leaning on it to predict potential economic losses like 425,000 jobs.  For instance, while it is true that a high-paying tech job does support several other jobs in the economy, this is too broad a view to take without also accounting for the ways in which several of the IA member companies simultaneously threaten many jobs in various sectors.

While exporting the safe harbor provisions through FTAs may be of tremendous value to a provider like Google, one cannot take the “job-killer” position seriously without weighing the unprecedented market power of these near monopolies and their capacity to bully the diverse, entrepreneurial middle class on which the economy actually depends.  And that brings us back to the rather insulting notion that these companies represent the “new face of content.”

Inherent Contradiction

Frankly, the Internet Association making this claim is kind of like a state highway department saying it’s the “new face of farming” on the grounds they build and maintain the roads that get food to market. That’s not just me being flip; it’s a comment on the nature of how the safe harbors are meant to function. Remember that the safe harbor provisions are predicated on the assumption that the service provider is not in the content business but is rather in the highway-building business and, therefore, not liable for how people might use the highway.

That’s an analogy the internet industry has employed for years to explain their neutral status vis-a-vis liabilities for copyright infringement and other claims.  And I have to say it takes a deft bit of rhetorical salesmanship to imply to the USTR that these liability shields have substantially contributed to the growth of content-producing platforms like Netflix or the production division of Amazon. The DMCA safe harbors contributed like crazy to the growth of infringe-now-settle-later models like YouTube, but that’s apples-and-oranges relative to a Hulu winning awards for a major production like The Handmaid’s Tale.  Meanwhile, for all the successful YouTubers out there—and they do exist—that’s still not an economy; and the day it becomes the economy, we’re screwed because one company owns the whole damn thing.

So as the rhetoric flies across social media about the absolute necessity of safe harbors to protect free speech, innovation, and jobs, readers should keep in mind that copyright is fundamentally predicated on the right of the individual to exploit his own creative labor, while safe harbors are based on limiting the liability of giant corporations, which has so far enabled them to infringe the rights of many individuals.  So, I agree with the Internet Association that “balance” is key in these provisions, but I disagree with their assertion that the status quo has achieved anything of the kind.


Image sources:

Digital Umbrella by maxkabakov

NAFTA Map by michal812

Crystal Ball by Kzenon