U.S. Copyright Law, Not Big Tech, Democratized Authorship

copyright law

Many copyright scholars refer to England’s Statute of Anne (1710) as the “first authors’ copyright law,” but I quarrel with that summary. In that year, and for many decades to follow, English “rights” for authors were too intertwined with the Crown’s authority to sanction publication of works for us to think of the Statute of Anne as affirming copyright rights as we understand them today. Although the administrative mechanisms of the Statute of Anne did inform the first U.S. Copyright Act of 1790, the “democratization” of authorship, which tech companies like to claim as incompatible with copyright law, was baked into American copyright as part of a novel Constitution expressing fundamental rights in a context to which no other nation on Earth could claim precedent.

Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 8—the progress clause—is a declaration of hope, to echo a sentiment of Elizabeth Wurtzel’s. While most of the roughly three-million Americans were farmers with little formal education, the progress clause (or IP clause) expressed an ambition that America would eventually produce its own literature, scholarship, and invention. But significant distinctions between the new U.S. and England (and other parts of Europe) established American copyright law as egalitarian and democratic.

First, the government was not granted authority by the Constitution to sanction or deny publication. Second, the speech, press, and establishment clause exerted considerable force upholding the author’s right to express himself. And finally, the European tradition of art and science patronage by the nobility could not become dominant in either the economic or political composition of the young nation. For better or worse, even with its imperfections, professional authorship in the U.S. would be subject to the democracy of the market, and the copyright rights vested in the individual author were, and remain, the sole basis for a fair-trade relationship with that market.

Enter Big Tech and their big bullshit word “democratization.” They love this term because, like so many in its bag of rhetorical tricks, it sounds progressive, egalitarian, and even anti-corporatist, which is funny coming from the most powerful oligarchs since Vanderbilt and Rockefeller. They even claim to have democratized democracy, and indeed, they may well have democratized it all the way to authoritarianism. So, when Big Tech says “democratization,” it is always a grift, but it is still worth understanding how the rhetorical meaning has shifted in reference to authorship and creative work.

Distribution, Derivatives, & Data

Until generative AI changed the dialog in the last few years, the claim that “democratization” was antithetical to copyright tended to focus on attacking distribution rights or the derivative works right. Distribution rights, according to Big Tech, were only administered by “rent-seeking gatekeepers,” thereby rationalizing mass piracy followed by the arrogation of distribution to streaming platforms as new intermediaries. The result was platforms “democratizing” far more revenue out of creators’ pockets than the allegedly outdated models.

The other rhetorical use of “democratization” tended to focus on the alleged injustice of the copyright right of the author to prepare (or authorize) derivative works. This battle was fought in public over the proposed cultural value of “remix,” a pet project of Lawrence Lessig, and which fostered a lot of assumptions and misstatements in the blogosphere about fair use doctrine. That battle was settled, at least as a matter of law, with the outcome in AWF v. Goldsmith, which rescued the derivative works right from being swallowed by overbroad application of fair use.

On a more subtle level, Silicon Valley advocates also argued that digital modes of production are inherently easier and cheaper (neither of which is necessarily true) and, thus, it was argued that digital tech both “democratizes” production and justifies rethinking legal protection of the works produced. Likewise, anti-copyright academics, on behalf of Big Tech, have argued that unprecedented data-driven market analysis lowers the risk of production, which, again, supposedly demands rethinking the purpose and application of copyright law.

These and other variations on the theme that tech “democratizes” now coalesce and mutate around the argument that GAI is important because it “enables everyone to be a creator.” Hence, “gatekeeper” intermediaries like record labels are no longer the only “barriers to progress” because now, the professional creator who spent years perfecting her craft is accused of elitism for trying to protect the exclusivity of her art. This argument is absurd on its face because, of course, typing a few prompts into Suno to produce a guitar riff ain’t gonna make you Mark Knopfler. And in this sense, GAI is to creativity as the “democratization of information” is to expertise. Indeed, everyone using Midjourney can be a visual artist the same way that everyone using Google search can be an epidemiologist.

It is notable that “democratization” is the same con game, whether the subject is creative work or information because the constitutional purpose of copyright law was established to “promote science.” This is not to say that the Framers intended to exclude fiction or poetry or fine art from copyright law, but by any interpretation of the word “science” from the period, it is fair to say that the Framers hoped later generations of Americans would be creative and intelligent. And, yes, it was imagined and hoped that creative and intellectual contributions might one day come from any citizen. That was “democratization” circa 1790 whereas Big Tech’s application of that word, a euphemism for exploitation, has not been wholly beneficial for either democracy or intelligence or creativity.

Democratization is Killing Democracy

Burning Male Protesteron Fire Shouts at Riot Act on the Streets.
Photo by stevanovicigor Pond 5.

 

I’m not sure what further evidence we need to finally declare the “information revolution” a fiasco. If the mind-boggling reality of electing a president who normalized hate speech with his campaign is not sufficient evidence that the digital age has failed to produce a more enlightened electorate, it’s hard to imagine what it would take for progressives to accept that the web hasn’t done us any favors. Yet the internet industry will keep insisting that what’s needed is more. If we just digitize more, provide more access, and harvest more data, the promised enlightenment is still within our grasp.

In the age of Less, conservative meant an author and scholar like William F. Buckley. In the age of More conservative means a cult troll like Milo Yiannapoulous. In the age of Less, there were three TV networks whose news divisions were both unprofitable and mandated by law, making them honest brokers of responsible journalism that didn’t have to compete with show business. In the age of More, a meme or a tweet will suffice because the “mainstream media” cannot be trusted. In the age of Less, expertise and dedication to purpose counted for something. In the age of More, anyone can be anything, a mashup video can be filmmaking, a cut-and-paste blog can be news, and a know-nothing thug can be President of the United States.

Donald Trump is—among many other things—the result of caring more about democratization than we do about democratic republicanism. As readers who’ve known this blog from the beginning are aware, it was the anti-SOPA campaign that got me started—less so because of the copyright issue than what that campaign said about our political process in the digital age. People were so convinced they were right about the bill that they didn’t bother to consider the larger implications of how social media and Big Data could so dramatically override the more contemplative and nuanced process of representative government. Now, with the victory of a guy like Trump, it should be clear that democratization does not in any way have to result in a benevolent society. There is no wisdom of crowds.

The utopian pretense of “disrupting the gatekeepers” in order to make the world’s information and culture freely and widely available is—in addition to stealing the work of authors—a complete fallacy as a social good. Every American who voted for the least-qualified and most obnoxious candidate in living memory had ample access to information, but to what end? This is what comes from treating all expression as “content,” as more fuel to run the data harvest for the data industry. The promise of technology has led even progressives to place so much emphasis on tearing down “elites,” that they should not be surprised when fools win the day.

The courts said Google is free to digitize a corpus of literature in order to serve a society that doesn’t read. “Digital rights” groups work to keep copyright weak in the service of the “free flow of information,” which inadvertently equalizes the social value of the poet and the fascist. More “information” is no more the answer to democracy than “more speech” was when SCOTUS ruled in Citizens United. Historically, less—what some call “artificial scarcity”—has produced the benevolently influential outcomes I want to believe most people still hope for. After all, the reason thousands mourn the passing of Leonard Cohen today is because there is only one Leonard Cohen.

Democratization is governed by the economy of trending, and trending is garbage—producing circumscribed experiences, as my colleague Mike Katell rightly points out in his blog. He writes, “While we’re busy pontificating (myself included) on social media about our views and sharing our carefully curated information tidbits with our online followers and friends, remember that this narrowly focused information sharing is a central problem for political discourse.” Trending is glib. Donald Trump just trended his way into the White House with all the intellectual virtue of a mean-girl tweet.

Ironically—perhaps even counter-intuitively—the information age has produced a climate in which American politics is no longer a competition of ideas, and factions on both the right and left are equally guilty of feeding that monster. Not only is the bubble naive, it is also grossly inaccurate. But what now?

It’s true that Trump welcomed hate into his campaign and has yet to say anything to quell that fire. And when we read about high school students already harassing minorities, this conjures legitimate fears of American Brown Shirts—a history that itself seems somehow lost despite the free flow of “information.” Through the filter of social media, it’s hard to avoid the anxiety and very hard to distinguish between being vigilantly informed and hysterically manipulated.

As indicated in a previous post, I know that if my neighbor voted for Donald Trump on Tuesday, it’s not because he’s a KKK member or a neo-Nazi. I want to believe there are more of him than there are of them—that perhaps the litany of horrors populating my Facebook feed this week is not an accurate reflection of the sentiments of half of America. But there is no getting past the sense that democratization has helped make our politics more divisive not less—that the promise of connection through technology hasn’t really panned out as the great campfire many predicted. To the contrary, it’s more like a car fire in the middle of a riot.