Category: Intellectual Property

Public Knowledge wants to solve the misinformation problem? That’s adorable.

On Tuesday, Meredith Filak Rose of Public Knowledge posted a blog suggesting that a solution to rampant misinformation is to “bring libraries online.” Not surprisingly, she identifies copyright law as the barrier currently preventing access to quality information that could otherwise help solve the problem …

“High-quality, vetted, peer-reviewed secondary sources are, unfortunately, increasingly hard to come by, online or off. Scientific and medical research is frequently locked behind paywalls and in expensive journals; legal documents are stuck in the pay-per-page hell that is the PACER filing system; and digital-only information can be erased, placing it out of public reach for good (absent some industrious archivists).”

Really?  We’re just a few peer-reviewed papers away from addressing the social cancer of misinformation?  Back to that in a minute.  Because first, there’s a spit-take that needs cleaning up after reading that Public Knowledge??? Is weighing in on misinformation???  This is an organization that has recklessly spread nonsense of Augean proportions about copyright law.  See posts here, here, here, here, here, here, and here; or just read my last post citing PK’s Shiva Stella just plain making stuff up about the CASE Act.

The funny thing is that Rose does a pretty decent job of summing up how misinformation can be effectively deployed online, but her description could easily be the Public Knowledge Primer for Writing About Copyright Law:

Misinformation exploits this basic fact of human nature — that no one can be an expert in everything — by meeting people where they naturally are, and filling in the gaps in their knowledge with assertions that seem “plausible enough.” Sometimes, these assertions are misleading, false, or flatly self-serving.  In aggregate, these gap-fillers add up to construct a totally alternate reality whose politics, science, law, and history bear only a passing resemblance to our own.

Right. Kinda like when Stella alluded to the “secret entertainment industry” behind the development of the CASE legislation? Or when the organization claimed in August of 2018 that the “entertainment industry” was trying to sneak a copyright term extension into the NAFTA renegotiations? Those are indeed plausible tweets for anyone who is not expert in copyright law to believe—especially because it feeds what Alice Marwick calls as a “deep story” that behind every copyright policy initiative is a Hollywood bagman.  

Having said all that, Meredith Rose’s article does not say anything categorically false. It is a sincere editorial whose main flaw is that it is sincerely naïve.  “…in the absence of accessible, high-quality, primary source information, it’s next to impossible to convince people that what they’ve been told isn’t true,” she writes.  

Yeah. That psychological human frailty is not going to be cured by putting even more information online, regardless of how “good” it may be, or how copyright figures in the equation.  On the contrary, more information is exactly why we’re wandering in a landscape of free-range ignorance in the first place.  It’s why anti-vaxxers have grown in numbers and brought back the measles; it’s why climate-change deniers get to hold public office and reject scientific data; it’s why even the President of the United States can make public statements that are demonstrably false and tens of millions of citizens don’t give a damn.  There is more than sufficient freely-available, factual information online right now, all produced by professionals and experts on every subject under the sun, and yet this bounty has not mitigated the steady encroachment of flat-earth lunacy into the mainstream conversation.

Speaking as someone schooled in what we might call traditional liberal academia, I believe Rose reiterates a classically liberal, academic fallacy, which assumes that if just enough horses are led to just enough water, then reason based on empirical evidence will prevail over ignorance.  That’s not even true among the smartest horses who choose to drink. Humans tend to make decisions based on emotion more than information, and it is axiomatic that truthis in the eye of the beholder.

But if galloping bullshit is the disease, the catalyst causing it to spread is not copyright law keeping content off the internet, but the nature of the internet platforms themselves.  By democratizing information with a billion soapboxes it was inevitable that this would foster bespoke realities occupied by warrens of subcultures that inoculate themselves against counter-narratives (i.e. facts) with an assortment of talismanic phrases used to dismiss the peer-reviewed scientist, journalist, doctor, et al, as part of a conspiracy who “don’t want us to know the truth.” 

And let us not forget the extent to which the promotion of bullshit is big business.  Sure Cambridge Analytica made headlines.  But what about the friendly-looking spin-off from Open Media called New/Mode with its happy icons and upbeat mission statements about community and transparency? The cognitive dissonance needed to square those values with the deployment of “one-click calling” and “tweetstorms” is at the heart of the problem Rose and her friends at Public Knowledge are not just overlooking, but helping to foster.  

Social-media activism is designed to trigger the most Pavlovian of emotional responses and overwhelm reasoned debate with numbers.  Messages are simple and truth is rare, regardless of source or agenda. Reason cannot defeat such tactics.  We could upload all the well-founded science ever written, and it would barely be noticed in sea of hashtag nonsense many people would prefer to believe.  Public Knowledge knows this quite well, having availed itself of these tools and/or celebrated the efficacy of spreading misinformation—at least about copyright law. 

If Meredith Rose and her colleagues believe there are unreasonable copyright barriers to certain material, they should make that case on those merits alone and let others respond accordingly. Framing the topic as a broad solution to the effects of toxic and misleading content is too ambitious an overstatement for anybody to make, and far beyond the credibility of Public Knowledge to assert any authority.

Photo by cynoclub

CASE Act Introduced. Critics Spin Tales.

Last week, bills to create a new, small-claim copyright process were introduced in both the House and Senate.  Generally referred to by the House name the CASE Act, the proposed changes to Title 17 will establish a Copyright Claims Board (CCB) at the U.S. Copyright Office with the purpose of offering rights holders a path to remedy infringements without the high cost of federal litigation.  Both claimants and respondents may avail themselves of the tribunal procedures with or without counsel; and claimants may also initiate proceedings for alleged infringement of works that are not yet registered, although registration must be obtained prior to the Copyright Claims Board considering a proceeding “active.”

Organizations like Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation reveal their true colors when they criticize CASE, not least because the topic itself is just barely within the purview of either organization’s mission.  It is true that a lot of garden-variety infringement occurs online and that this is a significant motivation for creating a small-claim option, but that does not make the proposal a “digital rights” issue per se.  There is no “right” to infringe copyright on the internet, so it would be refreshingly honest if EFF and PK would simply declare their open hostility to any form of copyright enforcement and stop paying lip-service to “finding better remedies” …

“We acknowledge the very real problems faced by many artists trying to enforce their copyrights online, and are hopeful that collaboration among all stakeholders can create a meaningful solution. However, the current CASE Act is not it.”  – Public Knowledge –

That is a multi-layered lie.  Despite many opportunities to weigh in over the many years CASE has been in development, Public Knowledge declined to do so.  It is not a good-faith negotiator representing stakeholders, and it is frankly hard to imagine who those stakeholders might be other than the staff of Public Knowledge itself.  After all, opposing policy on shaky grounds is usually good for a few fund-raising dollars, which is why my favorite detail in their little missive is this one:  

“The Act further entrenches an already-toxic culture of secrecy within major entertainment industries….”  

I would love to know in what alternate Marvel Universe does anyone think the multi-billion-dollar “entertainment industry” has thrown its “secret” muscle behind a copyright small-claim provision.  The maximum penalty that can be awarded by the CCB would not cover the legal fees for discovery in the kind of cases typically litigated by the entertainment industry.  This bill has nothing to do with that world.  Quite the opposite.  It was proposed so that copyright owners who are not Disney, Sony, and Netflix can restore some meaning to their rights.

If nothing else, I’m personally sick of pavlovian politics, whether it’s a racist dog whistle or an overt use of buzzwords invoked with the aim of misinforming the public about an issue.  Public Knowledge’s attempt to scare people by falsely alleging that this bill is the handiwork of Hollywood lobbyists lurking in the dark corridors of Congress is a classic example of why those who claim to defend the “information age” are so often the best examples of why we should not.  

Meanwhile, any party who genuinely wants a “meaningful solution” to rampant, online copyright infringement should actually applaud the CASE proposal as a mechanism that directly engages rights holders and alleged infringers in a process that will educate both parties about the exclusive rights and limitations of copyright. 

While PK and EFF will continue to try to paint CASE as a damage-award processing unit for claimants alone, nothing could be further from the truth, starting with the fact that although pursuing a claim via the CCB will be much easier than traditional litigation, it will still be a moderate pain in the ass.  There is enough work that needs to be done—either by the copyright owner or an attorney—that no independent rights holder is going to devote time or resources to pursue a nothing claim. 

To the contrary, the most consistent complaints come from photographers whose images are used for commercial purposes without license; and many of these are the archetypal cases worth pursuing in a small-claim venue.  As described in this post, when photographer Jenna Close testified before the House Judiciary Committee in support of CASE, she identified eighteen unlicensed, commercial uses of her works being made at that time.  Depending on the nature of the uses and the licensing fee for each, that could be a photographer’s rent or insurance for a year.    

At the same time, the CCB procedure will also be beneficial for respondents (defendants), including those who infringe works either naively or willfully.  As discussed in this post about Brammer v. Violent Hues, that case looked to me like an ideal circumstance in which both parties would have benefitted by opting for the CCB rather than federal litigation.*  The conclusion would have been the same, but the penalty the infringer would have paid would very likely have been far less than the grand total he now owes after pursuing an ill-advised fair use defense all the way to the appellate court. 

CASE Is NOT a Copyright Troll’s Playground

“The CASE Act would give copyright trolls a faster, cheaper way of coercing Internet users to fork over cash “settlements,” bypassing the safeguards against abuse that federal judges have labored to create.”  – EFF, April 2018 –

That’s more or less the headline EFF et al have been using—alleging that CASE is a gift to copyright trolls.  Trolls are litigators who use false or otherwise improper claims to frighten accused infringers into settling threatened litigation.  They are a problem (albeit often exaggerated), and frankly the internet platforms have provided them with hunting grounds that nobody at EFF or PK is suggesting need to be shut down.  Meanwhile, the proposed Copyright Claims Board will be a terrible venue for copyright trolls.

For one thing, the CASE Act contains about page and half of anti-troll statutes—a safeguard that does not exist in any Article III court.  Parties bringing a claim for “harassing or other improper purpose, or without a reasonable basis in law or fact,” may be subject to a $5,000 penalty and/or barred from using the CCB for a year.  In addition to those barriers, the damages caps, along with the Register’s discretion to limit the number of cases a single party may bring in particular time-period make the small-claim tribunal a money-losing proposition for the would-be troll.  

Moreover, as proponents involved with the development of this bill have stated repeatedly, it is very hard to troll any party through a procedure that is VOLUNTARY.  The CCB is fundamentally an alternative dispute resolution option.  A respondent served with a claim may opt out within 60 days, and the CCB will dismiss the proceeding.  So again, not a very effective club for the troll to wield.    

So, I really don’t understand why organizations like EFF and PK believe this issue belongs in their wheelhouses in the first place.  Much like their dogged opposition to the Music Modernization Act—which had support from rights holders, tech platforms, and nearly all of Congress—it seems these organizations are just culturally opposed to the existence of copyright no matter what.   On the other hand, they make up so much crap about copyright, how would they really know?

*Admittedly, Violent Hues would have done better to just pay the fee originally demanded by Brammer.

Fourth Circuit in Brammer: A Win for Copyright Sanity. A Guide for Users of Works.

Visual artists should be very relieved by last week’s decision at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, overturning the District Court’s finding of fair use in Brammer v. Violent Hues.  Frankly, fair use advocates should be happy about the ruling, too, because nobody who sincerely cares about copyright should celebrate an error of law.  If a court simply disregards the exclusive rights of authors, as the District Court did in this case, the fair use doctrine becomes a meaningless exception to a non-existent rule. 

“…difference in purpose is not quite the same thing as transformation.”

If I had to pick one takeaway from this case for users of works in the digital age, it would be the citation to this quote from Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood (1998).  As mentioned many times on this blog and elsewhere, the “transformativeness” test, which became part of the fair use analysis after 1990, is a troublemaker.  For a great summary describing how and why it became a troublemaker, I recommend this three-part post written by Scott Alan Burroughs on Above the Law.  

To stress what a pain in the butt this concept can be, I stated in a recent post that simply “placing a work in a new context” is not “transformative.”  But even using the term “context” is nettlesome because courts may use that term to describe “transformative” uses that are non-expressive.  For instance, the Fourth Circuit in Brammer has provided a handy explanation of the distinction between those uses and the infringement committed by Violent Hues.  The opinion states that there are two viable paths for finding fair use when a contextual (i.e. non-creative) change is “transformative”:  technological uses and documentary uses …

Technological

“In the first category, copyrighted works provide raw material for new technological functions. These functions are indifferent to the expressive aspects of the copied works. For example, we have held transformative the total reproduction of student essays for a plagiarism detection service because the database served an “entirely different function” that was unrelated to the expressive content of those essays.”

Documentary

“In the second category, copyrighted works serve documentary purposes and may be important to the accurate representations of historical events. These representations often have scholarly, biographical, or journalistic value, and are frequently accompanied by commentary on the copyrighted work itself.”

Admittedly, even documentary does not easily fit into the non-expressive family of fair uses because documentary is expressive and, perhaps most importantly, scholarship, biography, journalism, and commentary were already stated among the purposes of fair use fourteen years before Judge Pierre Leval wrote the paper, Toward a Fair Use Standard, which added the concept of “transformativeness” to the fair use test.  

We’ll leave that can of worms unopened for now. Suffice to say that Violent Hues’s publishing Brammer’s photograph on a website to promote a film festival does not describe either of the court’s two contextual fair uses. “What Violent Hues did was publish a tourism guide for a commercial event and include the Photo to make the end product more visually interesting,” states the opinion. “Such a use would not constitute fair use when done in print, and it does not constitute fair use on the Internet.”

It is so easy to click, edit, and repost any image that pausing to consider legality is apparently overwritten as a necessary step.  (And the defendant in this case is a professional image-maker who should have known better.) I’ve said it before in posts about fair use.  There are too many messages whirling around in cyberspace, denigrating copyright owners’ rights and disfiguring the nature of fair use, that it is easy to imagine how a gist of these ideas seeps into the mind of a user about to publish a work he has no right to use. 

For users who would prefer not to wander into the tall grass where attorneys, scholars, and jurists debate the meaning (or lack thereof) of “transformativeness,” there is little need to go there.  The Fourth Circuit in Brammer has provided a pretty basic set of rules for the use of works “in new contexts,” which I presume to summarize as follows:

If you are not engaged in a fairly large-scale technology enterprise using the non-expressive aspects of a corpus of works to power a new and useful system, your use is very likely not “transformative.”

If you are not producing a work, in which you comment upon the used work, your use is very likely not “transformative.”  

If you are not producing a new expression that depends upon altering the used work, your use is very likely not “transformative.”

If, you “find”a photograph online that you think would jazz up your web page, no matter what you think it’s communicating, either get permission, make sure it’s free to use, take your own picture, or license a cheaper picture because your attorney is probably going to fail—at least on appeal—in any attempt to TRANSFORM your lapse in judgment into a sound fair use defense.  

Meanwhile, don’t try assessing “transformativeness” at home when even the legal experts are still arguing about what it means.  As Burroughs addresses in his posts, the “transformativeness” test does not have the caselaw-to-statutory history that produced the four-factor test for fair use codified in 1976.  This is unfortunate because a prospective user of a work should be able to conduct at least a preliminary fair use test without an attorney; and the original four-factor test, while subjective, is much easier without the “transformative” filter.  

Most simply, a user like Violent Hues should jump straight to Factor Four and ask themselves whether the proposed, unlicensed use, if made repeatedly by other parties, would deprive the copyright owner of a market opportunity that is rightly his to exploit.  The unequivocal answer to that question in this case was yes.  If a photographer does not have the right to license his images, then his exclusive rights in the copyright law do not exist; and if those rights do not exist, then neither does the fair use exception or, for that matter, the entire miscarriage of reason that produced this fiasco of a lawsuit.