Category: Intellectual Property

Copyright Scholars Urge Reversal in SAS v. WPL

Fundamental copyright doctrines and procedures are presently on trial in the case of SAS Institute v. World Programming Limited, now on appeal at the Federal Circuit. Suffice to say, U.S. software developer SAS alleges copyright infringement by UK developer WPL, and these entities have been litigating on both sides of the pond for many years. But it almost doesn’t matter, for the purposes of this post, which entity ultimately deserves to prevail on the actual merits. Because according to a brief filed by ten copyright scholars, the district court in the Fifth Circuit bollixed up procedure and doctrine so badly that, if allowed to stand, the ruling would be harmful to copyright creators everywhere. And, as usual, the precedent would be highly prejudicial to small business and independent authors who are always at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the cost of enforcement of their rights.

At issue is one matter of settled copyright doctrine and one matter of settled court procedure, both of which the SAS court in Texas undermined with an unprecedented procedure of its own that it called a “Copyrightability Hearing,” which the scholars’ brief describes as “foreign to copyright law and threatens to impose additional costs and burdens on parties, moving the costs of vindicating their rights further out of reach for many creators and copyright owners.”

Doctrine: Unprotectable Elements Do Not Deprive Whole Works of Protection

It is axiomatic that nearly all copyrightable works contain unprotectable elements. For instance, the scholars’ brief cites nonfiction books as an archetypal subject matter that is unquestionably granted protection as whole works, despite comprising many facts, which are unprotectable. But to further illustrate the point, I would note that the average motion picture or TV series contains hundreds, if not thousands, of protectable elements intermingled with unprotectable elements.

In fact, the motion picture industry thrives on copyright’s limiting doctrines like the idea/expression dichotomy, merger, short phrases, and scènes-à-faire. Consequently, no filmmaker gets an exclusive to produce scenes depicting heroes running with guns or that first kiss as the music swells and the camera adjusts to reveal a romantic setting. But these limitations do not obviate copyright attaching to each motion picture as a whole work, or even segments of each film as original expressions of common ideas, themes, tropes, etc.

Now, imagine a trial in which the filmmaker alleges copyright infringement of a whole movie, or a substantial portion of the movie, but the defendant argues, “Well, the motion picture is full of unprotectable elements and is, therefore, deprived of all protection as a complete work.” Because that is essentially what WPL argued in its lawsuit with SAS, and the district court agreed, thus, upending doctrine by voiding copyright in the entire work. As the amici state:

The Court’s stated basis for rebutting the presumption of validity and holding the SAS copyrights invalid, i.e., that “at least some of the material is not entitled to protection,” is not only wrong, it is exactly the opposite of the correct standard. [Citation omitted]

I use the motion picture example to emphasize the point that if the only response required of a defendant were to recite a litany (as WPL apparently did in this case) of copyright doctrines  under which elements of a work may be unprotected,[1] much as I did a couple of paragraphs ago, in order to shift the burden to the plaintiff to re-prove protectability, that way lies madness. For instance, I happened to watch the new Suicide Squad this weekend and, even as a non-attorney, I could probably do ten pages or so breaking down the protectable and unprotectable elements just in Harley Quinn’s solo fight sequence.

But hypothetically placing the burden on the film’s producers to engage in such an exercise would be anathema to more than a century of legal doctrine and decades of court procedure. Yet, that is precisely what the court did in SAS when it found that, in general, the work at issue contained unprotectable elements and, therefore, the plaintiff bears the burden to re-prove copyrightability in that which is allegedly protectable.

Procedure:  Registration as Proof of a Valid Copyright

So, it is settled law that copyrightable works may comprise even large volumes of non-protectable elements and still meet the standard of originality for protection. Moreover, once a copyright application is approved, a certificate of registration issued by the Copyright Office is considered prima facie evidence of a valid copyright as a matter of law. In fact, the efficiency of this longstanding precedent is one of the key incentives to authors provided by Congress (in §410(c) of the copyright act) to register their works with the USCO. Here, the scholars’ brief argues that by shifting the burden to the plaintiff to re-prove copyright in its work, the district court has disturbed a presumption of copyright validity, stating:

This presumption is of vital importance to copyright owners, and is frequently cited as an inducement to register works although copyright protection attaches automatically upon fixation. The presumption is particularly important to individual authors and small entities who struggle to afford the costs of federal litigation to adjudicate copyright claims. Imposing the costs of a Markman-like evidentiary showing of originality in every litigation would effectively render even their timely-registered works judicially unenforceable.[2]

The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Analysis

A court may certainly write an opinion finding that a registered copyright in a work to be invalid, but not without thorough analysis and clear articulation of its reasoning. Here, the scholars’ brief argues that the district court compounded its errors by engaging in an incomplete and improper analysis of the work at issue and then exacerbated harm, not only shifting the burden to the plaintiff to re-prove copyrightability, but to do so within the context of this court’s erroneous analysis.

Not unlike the analyses for “substantial similarity,” the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison (AFC) test is a judicial review which examines the work by filtering out the unprotectable elements and then comparing the remaining protectable elements to the allegedly infringing work. But here, the scholars’ brief notes examples whereby the court misconstrued features of the SAS work as a foundation for finding non-protection. One example cited is “open source elements,” which tends to confuse a lot of people because “open source” generally refers to software that is made freely available, but this attribute does not alter the copyrightability of the work. Thus, the scholars’ brief states:

…the Court’s attack on the protectability of SAS works is predicated on an alleged characteristic of the works that has nothing to do with copyrightability. Thus, by its own terms, the District Court filtered out what should be presumed to be copyrightable elements of Plaintiff’s work. This alone is reversable error.

As stated above, whether SAS or WPL should ultimately prevail on the true merits of each claim is immaterial to the issues raised in the scholars’ brief. And to be honest, I am not about to crawl through the thicket of facts, allegations, and responses presented in what looks like more than a decade of these two companies duking it out with one another. Some have referred to this case as a Google v. Oracle light, but at least in context to the brief discussed in this post, I would disagree.

In Google, the core copyrightability question (which the Supreme Court failed to adequately answer) was solely based on the merger doctrine, and whichever view one held of that argument, either could find purchase in the law. In SAS, it appears that the district court simply abandoned any foundation in law whatsoever. And for the sake of rightsholders working in all media, the Federal Circuit must reverse.

[1] The amici scholars refer to this litany as “the List” in their brief.

[2] Markman refers to judicial interpretations of specific words used in a patent description pursuant to a patent litigation.

Also see brief co-author Steven Tepp’s piece at IPWatchdog.

Photo by: AndreyPopov

Podcast – The Multi-Billion-Dollar Piracy Industry with Tom Galvin of Digital Citizens Alliance

In this episode, I speak with Tom Galvin, CEO of Digital Citizens Alliance, about piracy of creative works and DCA’s latest report, issued this month in collaboration with the research group White Bullet. The report, entitled Breaking Bad(s): How Advertiser-Supported Piracy Helps Fuel a Booming Multi-Billion Dollar Illegal Market, reveals that piracy is a highly profitable criminal enterprise and is intertwined with other forms of cyber-crime—from personal identity theft to national security

Piracy of creative works like motion pictures, TV shows, music, and live sports is a vast and growing criminal enterprise. In its latest report, Digital Citizens Alliance estimates the combined advertising and subscription revenue generated by piracy is at least $2.34 billion annually. Meanwhile, in addition to its ill-effects on the creators whose works are pirated and the online advertising ecosystem, piracy plays a key role in fostering other forms of cyber crime.

Episode Contents

  • 01:52 – Breaking Bad(s) Report Overview
  • 04:05 – Ad and subscription supported piracy
  • 06:49 – The online advertising ecosystem.
  • 08:49 – Some successful mitigation since 2014.
  • 11:14 – The downsides of piracy for brands.
  • 15:10 – Major brands found were Amazon, Facebook, & Google.
  • 18:01 – It is possible to do something.
  • 19:24 – Advertiser pressure to get ad tech to clean up its act.
  • 21:09 – Dangers to the consumer.
  • 27:13 – Why aren’t the hazards deterrents?
  • 30:30 – Drive-by malware.
  • 32:07 – Piracy is a vertical for broader criminal enterprise.
  • 33:26 – What about solutions.
  • 37:33 – Even if you don’t care about copyright owners…
  • 40:30 – Intersection with disinformation campaigns?

Second Circuit Soundly Denies Rehearing to Warhol Foundation

Many copyright observers, me included, believe the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Google v. Oracle was deeply flawed because rather than answer the copyrightability question presented (i.e. whether APIs are properly a subject of protection), the Court instead deconstructed that analysis and spread it across the four factors of the fair use test. As a result of that decision, copyright case law was left with a fair use opinion so over-broad in some of its reasoning that it also explicitly stresses that its findings should be read as unique to that case and not interpreted to disturb fair use doctrine in general. Warhol

And rightsholders should be very glad the Court sought to limit that opinion because almost immediately on the heels of the decision, the Andy Warhol Foundation filed a petition for en banc rehearing at the Second Circuit, principally on the basis that Google v. Oracle had altered the fair use analysis in its favor. At issue is Warhol’s use of photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s unpublished photograph of Prince (see background below), and as stated in earlier posts, I would personally find non-infringement in the Warhol screens, but not for most of the reasons presented by AWF, and especially not for the reasons adopted in Google.

What was most concerning for creators about the Google decision was the very broad opinion (mostly discussed in the analysis of fair use factor four on potential market harm) that general social purpose may be served by finding fair use of even verbatim copying of protected works. Thus, AWF argued that, just like software innovation serves social purpose, so too, does fine art serve a social purpose, even where verbatim copying exists.. And while those generalizations are true, one can imagine how a too liberal reading of the “social benefit” premise might find fair use in almost anything.[1] Thus, AWF’s petition for rehearing was the first test of the Court’s stated limitations in Google, and here, the Second Circuit was unequivocal. In a withering 63-page opinion, it responded specifically to the argument that Google v. Oracle had changed the law thus:

In particular, the Supreme Court in Google took pains to emphasize that the unusual context of that case, which involved copyrights in computer code, may well make its conclusions less applicable to contexts such as ours. Thus, while Google did indeed find that the precise copying and incorporation of copyrighted code into a new program could (and did, on the particular facts of the case) constitute fair use, the opinion expressly noted that ‘copyright’s protection may be stronger where the copyrighted material . . . serves an artistic rather than a utilitarian function.’

And to further emphasize that the outcome in Google had not altered fair use doctrine as AWF asserted, the opinion states:

And indeed, the Supreme Court did not leave that conclusion to inference, expressly advising that in addressing fair use in this new arena, it ‘ha[d] not changed the nature of those [traditional copyright] concepts.’

So, this is an odd one to comment upon for me because I believe the fair use reasoning in Google v. Oracle is very bad law, while I find the Second Circuit’s analyses in Goldsmith to be generally good law, albeit arriving at a conclusion with which I disagree. Most importantly for rightsholders, though, is that the first attempt to exploit the Google decision beyond the limits of a certain type of computer code has failed. And that is certainly very good law.

Background on AWF v. Goldsmith (reprinted from earlier post)

Lynn Goldsmith captured the photograph at issue in 1981, during a truncated photo session with the semi-reclusive musical artist Prince Rodgers Nelson, who was then barely known to mainstream audiences as Prince. Goldsmith contends that she made certain creative choices resulting in an image of the “vulnerable human being” behind the persona. The photograph was never published but was licensed in 1984 (unbeknownst to Goldsmith) to Vanity Fair as a “reference photo” to produce an illustration to accompany a story about musician’s rise to stardom. In fact, the photo was used by Andy Warhol make a series of silkscreens similar to those he has made of Marilyn Monroe, Mao Zedong, etc., all using photographs as original sources.

Goldsmith was not aware of the existence of the Warhol screens until 2016 when, after Prince’s death, Vanity Fair published a special edition with one of the Warhol versions on the cover. At that time, Goldsmith communicated to the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) that the works may infringe the copyright on her still unpublished photo, and in response, AWF filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement or, barring that, a finding of fair use. The district court held the Warhol screens to be fair use, primarily by following the Second Circuit ruling in Cariou v. Prince, but on appeal, the court reversed, finding the Warhol screens are not fair uses.

[1] Notably, the Court could have served the same intent by finding APIs to be uncopyrightable, which would have been a cleaner ruling with respect to copyright law in general.