Black History Month in 2023

“Black history is American history.”

There is more than one way to read (or use) that phrase. On its face, it affirms that no honest or thorough narrative about the United States can possibly exclude the Black story. But from there, one might say, as Morgan Freeman suggested in a 2005 interview with Mike Wallace, that to distinguish or compartmentalize Black history as a subject can also perpetuate racial divisions and tensions. Thus, the statement is paradoxical, pitting the moral or intellectual obligation to engage with the uniqueness of the Black experience against the idealism of a color-blind society.

Of course, we are not a color-blind society in the ways we should be (i.e., the playing field is not level), but even if that ambition were achieved, it is a fallacy to think that color blindness as a matter of justice is synonymous with colorlessness in cultural or intellectual pursuits. As I have said many times, I defend copyright rights because, in principle, they empower the individual to express herself as she chooses and then empower the public to make of that expression what it will. And the result is a diversity of works.

Despite critics’ implications to the contrary, copyright rights fundamentally reject state authority to approve or deny the production of creative works—a critical distinction between American copyright law and its common law antecedents in England.[1] Sadly, however, neither copyright nor the First Amendment can entirely prevent state actors from engaging in censorship through other legal mechanisms, which brings us to a more cunning use of that phrase, as when Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis proclaimed to the TV press that “Black history is American history” in defense of his opposition to part of the curriculum in the African American AP Course.

As the putative leader of a culture war determined to make enemies of neighbors, DeSantis and his ilk exploit the opportunity to tell as many Americans who will listen that to confront (or even hear) certain aspects of the Black story is inherently divisive and tantamount to insisting that White Americans should feel a sense of self-loathing. One cannot deny that there are individuals (Black and White) willing to add fuel to that fire or that there is both good and bad scholarship on every topic, including Black history. But these nuanced distinctions are not what DeSantis’s “anti-woke” political tactic is about, and neither could it be.

It is not possible or appropriate for elected officials to concern themselves with every citizen’s social conduct or every teacher/student engagement or to attempt ad hoc review of every scrap of cultural and academic material. Nobody in DeSantis’s Back to Sleep party has the time, let alone the intelligence, to judge the qualities of every book, essay, or curriculum it hopes to mute because the subject matter threatens the colorless myth of American exceptionalism.

In 1965, when James Baldwin famously debated William F. Buckley, Jr. at Cambridge University, the topic presented was “The American Dream is at the expense of the American Negro.” Baldwin received a standing ovation and won the debate 540 votes to 160. But did Buckley swoon like so many of today’s featherweight conservatives and declare the question itself off limits—too offensive to American idealism to confront? Or when he referred in that debate to Baldwin’s essay The Fire Next Time, can we safely assume that Buckley had read the book rather than make a cowardly proposal to ban it?

Nearly sixty years since that historic joust and almost thirty years after the so-called information revolution, and the progress (to which Buckley alluded in his rebuttal) is a mixed report nationally and a catastrophe in some regions. Columnist Stephanie Hayes, writing for The Tampa Bay Times, remarks on the maturity and deftness of high school students in Pinellas County who last week petitioned their school board to reverse its ban of The Bluest Eye, the first novel written by Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison. Kudos to the students, but seriously?

It is hard not to indulge in gallows humor when a novel published in 1970 is swept into a pathetic, rhetorical war against “wokeness” in 2023. Is there a Woke section in the library or bookstore? Not unless the curator of either is being ironic. Is “woke” the latest reason to shun Baldwin’s 1963 novel Giovanni’s Room? Or what about John Irving’s In One Person in which the protagonist’s coming of age as a homosexual is intertwined with literary discovery and, therefore, confronts Giovanni’s Room through that character’s experience? Is the dialog between Baldwin in 1963 and Irving in 2012 a prime example of “wokeness,” or is it just American literature?

Or, finally, returning to the phrase with which I started this post, is the uniqueness of Baldwin’s experience, in contrast to Irving’s, a reason to celebrate Black History Month? I think so. Not because it is popular to think so, but because although it is true that Black history is American history, it is a subtle but important distinction to say that it is also Black American history. And that story is so complex and distinctive in the world that it is little wonder there are so many extraordinary Black American authors of extraordinary works.


[1] Copyright critics like to point to the fact that proto-copyright regimes in England were intertwined with first the royal prerogative and then then the government’s authority to license the production of certain works, but the U.S. did not retain the power of censorship in even its earliest copyright laws.

James Baldwin photo: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Carl Van Vechten Collection, [reproduction number, e.g., LC-USZ62-54231]

Rick Allen Files Amended Complaint Against North Carolina

Copyright News

“This lawsuit is about Piracy, Greed, and Revenge” states Line 1 of the complaint filed yesterday in the North Carolina district court where documentary filmmaker Rick Allen is still seeking justice for the reckless, intentional, and frankly mean-spirited manner in which state officials infringed his copyright rights, deprived him of his lawful property interest in his motion picture and photographic work, and even passed a whole law directly targeting Allen’s intellectual property.

I have written extensively about Allen v. Cooper and the subject of state sovereign immunity (11th Amendment), which bars Allen and others (see posts here and here), from remedies to copyright infringement by states and state entities. I have often written about the subject of state immunity academically, but after a quick read of the amended complaint, which is linked below, I am reminded of the extraordinary human cost of infringing copyright rights. There will be more to write and say about this story, but for now, I urge anyone who is interested to read the complaint for themselves . . .

Rick Allen’s Second Amended Complaint

Comparing AI Prompts to Button-Pushing on a Camera

Plenty is being said about AI systems that generate visual works, written works, music, etc. And plenty more will be said, especially now that lawsuits have been filed against some of the AI-generated image companies. In this post, I want to address a misconception about authorship in copyright law that may be warping the AI conversation. As I understand the argument, some AI proponents allege that the act of writing prompts is comparable to the act of pushing the button on a camera and, therefore, vests copyright rights in the proverbial “button pusher.”

Although it is possible to conceive a scenario in which this analogy might apply, it is important to first understand that the underlying premise (i.e., that button pushing establishes authorship in a photograph) is wrong. In fact, when photography emerged as the first machine-made work, it posed a challenge to copyright law that still provides an ideal context for discussing what it means to say that copyright protects creative expression the moment the author causes that expression to be fixed in a tangible medium. Note that the key ingredients are expression, an author, and fixation, and inherent to the process binding all three is an interval of human effort enabling the author’s concept (or vision) of the expression to be manifest as fixation.

With photography, the interval of effort may be stately or a mere fraction of a second, but copyright law does not discriminate between the photographer who carries a vision in her mind for weeks of preparation and arrangement and the photographer who captures a fleeting moment from real life. In both cases, triggering the shutter is the proximate cause of fixation,[1] but vesting copyright rights in the photographer is predicated on an assumption that, even in a fraction of a second, she made creative choices sufficient to find a modicum of original expression in the image.

Various Scenarios in Which It Is Not About the Button

In the case of a studio shoot with a lot of preparation, lighting, props, wardrobe, etc., the photographer may not even touch the camera very often. It may be mounted on a tripod with an assistant triggering the shutter from a computer or remote control while the photographer directs all the creative aspects that comprise the resulting images. Copyright holds unequivocally that this individual is the author of the photographs because it is his expression that is being fixed in each image, but the mechanical “button-pushing” is irrelevant except as a purely mechanical step in fixation.[2]

For the street photographer or photojournalist, the same principles apply, but copyright allows for the arguably metaphysical assumption that even in the tiny interval between seeing the real-life subject and capturing it, the photographer makes subtle choices that imbue the work with sufficient expression to be protected. Again, the button causes fixation but is not the basis of authorship, and this would be evident in the analysis of the content and qualities of the photograph, if it were to become the subject of a copyright infringement lawsuit.

By contrast, if a truly accidental photograph is captured (e.g., by a camera accidentally dropped from the Eiffel Tower), there is no authorship in that image—not because a human did not push the button, but because there is no colorable nexus between the human’s mental conception and the resulting photograph. On the other hand, if a photographer intentionally drops a camera from the Eiffel Tower and triggers the shutter by remote on its way down, copyright attaches to those images—not because a human pushed the button, but because a human conceived of the series of falling photographs and arranged the circumstances by which they could be made.

Although it is important to note that cameras are not machines trained with a corpus of existing photographs, this last example may be the closest analogy to the prompt directing the AI generator (in its current state) to make an image. If the prompt writer has a general sense of the image she wants to produce, but there is still an element of chance about what the machine will make, the prompt writer may argue that she is no less an author than the photographer who intentionally allows some element of chance into the process of making his images.

While this premise sounds reasonable as a general proposition, what it really implies is a case-by-case consideration as to how much human expression exists in the resulting works. Even in the example of the camera tossed intentionally off the Eiffel Tower, the photographer can control certain qualities in the images and may even have a vision for how they are to be used, displayed, or distributed. He knows the characteristics of the camera and lens and can select settings with the intent to control some of the qualitative results in the final photos.

By contrast, the prompter directing the image-generating AI is arguably not in control of enough of the qualitative elements in the final image to claim authorship—at least not at the current state of the technology. Entering the prompt “A mermaid wrestling a sea lion in outer space in the style of Cartier-Bresson” may produce an image that checks each of those boxes, but the prompt writer is not controlling the qualitative choices that comprise the result. Composition, line weight, shading, lighting, texture, scale, proportion, etc. are all “selected” by the AI based on what it has “learned” from the millions of visual works fed into its code, so there is a critical disconnect between the human’s vision of “A mermaid wresting a sea lion in outer space in the style of Cartier-Bresson” and the interval of effort that fixes the image in a tangible medium.

At some future state of the technology, the human may prompt a draft image to be made and then prompt changes to the qualitative elements, at which point it may be tough to deny that there is authorship in the resulting work. If these technologies develop in this way—such that the prompter is essentially painting with words instead of a stylus—this anticipates that, for instance, a disabled individual could truly create visual works with her mind akin to the way Stephen Hawking wrote books. But in this paradigm, the AI does not present a unique challenge to the concept of authorship because the human is in control of sufficient expression in the work.

Dynamic Ethical Standards

Of course, this theoretical discussion assumes integrity among individuals who claim authorship in various works. The guy whose camera accidentally snaps a photo does not have to admit he played no role in its making, and AI currently presents a similar challenge. The issue of integrity is a hot conversation we’re having in response to generative AI—especially in academia where ChatGPT is already “writing” papers for students. Notably, few people would question the judgment that the student who turns in a paper “written” by an AI is a cheat deserving the same sanctions as if he were caught plagiarizing. Yet, somehow, when the material is a “creative” work, AI advocates argue that the prompter is an author of a visual work comparable to a photographer using a camera.

This dichotomy can only be reconciled by confronting the fact that certain uses of AIs are not only not authorship but are needlessly destructive to the very purpose of intellectual and cultural endeavor. The student who shirks writing his own paper learns nothing and so, potentially graduates from a program unqualified. Likewise, the prompter using an image-generating AI is not an artist and contributes nothing to the purpose of art. Thus, while there may be uses for these systems, their potential cultural value depends on more than technological development for its own sake.

Because these technologies are still new and still primitive relative to their expected capabilities, it is hard to predict where the more serious aspects of the narrative will lead. Some of the generative AIs are barely more than toys at the moment (e.g., turning profile pics into oil paintings), but what they will do a year from now, let alone five years, will inform how we address the issues—cultural, legal, and ethical. For now, though, I insist that no, prompting is not equivalent to button-pushing with a camera, even if button-pushing were as significant as many people think it is.


[1] This is true with digital photography. With film, one could argue that the latent image on the negative is not fixation until it is at least developed because it cannot be perceived by either human or machine reader.

[2] And there are likely to be further steps like retouching or printing, which may fix the final version of the image.

Photo by author.