Category: Lit/Pub

End of the Line for Controlled Digital Lending Theory

controlled digital lending

IA asks this Court to bless the large scale copying and distribution of copyrighted books without permission from or payment to the Publishers or authors.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals yesterday affirmed that Internet Archive’s digital book lending model controlled digital lending (CDL) is not permitted by copyright law, including under the fair use exception. The outcome is a big deal and, at the same time, is not really big news. Copyright watchers grounded in what the law is (rather than what they wish it to be) were likely relieved but not surprised that the appeals court upheld a judgment, which the lower court originally issued just four days after oral arguments.

The lawsuit Hachette et al. v. Internet Archive was triggered by IA’s so-called National Emergency Library (NEL), an alleged response to the COVID shutdown whereby it arbitrarily made over one million digital books available without any kind of restriction. Because IA had no basis on which to claim it was responding to an “emergency” need, I maintain the NEL itself was a stunt designed to provoke litigation and take Brewster Kahle and friends’ copyright theories out for a ride. And as of yesterday, that ride is probably over.

Specifically, IA and a small group of academics hoped to prove that controlled digital lending is permitted by fair use. CDL is based on the theory that a library is permitted to make its own digital copy of a physical book in its collection and to loan either the digital or the physical copy to one reader at a time—and to then apply the scheme for as many physical copies as the library owns. Further, IA expanded the concept to create its Open Library by “partnering” with various libraries around the country to effectively count the physical copies on all those shelves and increase the number of readers to which the digital copies would be loaned.

The Second Circuit affirmed not only that the Open Library model is not permitted but that the CDL practice is not a fair use—even if it were limited to the physical books in IA’s possession. With the one distinction that the circuit court reversed the lower court’s finding that IA’s purpose is “commercial” under fair use factor one, IA lost resoundingly on all four fair use factors.

In short, CDL is not transformative under factor one because its purpose is no different than the legal eBook lending models offered by publishers. This finding informs factor four. Because the purpose of the use is not transformative, the CDL scheme amounts to a market substitute and is, therefore, a potential market harm. Factors two (nature of the works used) and three (amount of the works copied) barely warrant discussion. The books in suit are expressive in nature, which favors the plaintiff; and IA does not dispute that it copied and made whole books available. Copying whole works may be permissible, but only possibly if the use is transformative.

Since before this suit began, IA has claimed to be a champion for all libraries, even going so far as to assert that CDL is simply doing what all libraries do—i.e., to “buy books and loan books.” But that rhetoric, conveniently facile for the media, obfuscated the more complex truth that IA, its colleagues, and supporting amici were pushing a theory with no foundation in law. CDL is a self-indulgent thought experiment for a handful of academics and activists with no skin in the game of creating literary works. And IA’s claim to be acting like any other library was simply untrue.

To those who believe the law should be different to facilitate IA’s alleged social benefit, I have considered the intent of CDL (and the alleged burden of eBook licensing) and find no evidence to support the claim that CDL fulfils an unmet need. In fact, as stated in past posts, Kahle’s dream of digitizing everything and making it all freely available is not only harmful to future authorship but is a threat to local libraries. Further, it bears repeating that the publishers in this case represent thousands of authors, while IA represents the interests of no authors.

I get why even creators are often persuaded by Internet Archive’s claims. After all, creators tend to love libraries and are instinctively wary of corporations, including publishers. But to put this in contemporary context, IA’s mass digitization and “lending” scheme, which would harm future authorship, is hardly much better than AI’s mass digitization and “training” scheme, which would also harm future authorship. (See what I did with the letters there?) Mass copying and distribution of protected works should always be viewed skeptically because the purpose is rarely transformative and non-threatening to creators. As the court states in yesterday’s judgment:

Within the framework of the Copyright Act, IA’s argument regarding the public interest is shortsighted. True, libraries and consumers may reap some short-term benefits from access to free digital books, but what are the long-term consequences? If authors and creators knew that their original works could be copied and disseminated for free, there would be little motivation to produce new works. And a dearth of creative activity would undoubtedly negatively impact the public. It is this reality that the Copyright Act seeks to avoid.

NYS Assembly Led Down the Primrose Path on eBooks Again

NYS Assembly

In December 2021, New York Governor Hochul recognized that she must veto a bill that would have prescribed the manner in which publishers may provide eBooks to public libraries. It isn’t necessary to rehash the details of that legislation—I wrote several posts about eBook bills—but only to restate the reason for the veto:  the law was unconstitutional. Why? Because state laws proposing to dictate terms for making in-copyright works available, even for libraries, is preempted by federal law.

Nevertheless, Assemblyman Angelo Santabarbara has introduced a new bill (A10544) that, although its mechanisms are different from the 2021 bill, is still unconstitutional. In fact, the operative part of the bill which, for instance, prohibits digital rights management (DRM) technology, would have the effect that a library is free to make eBooks available in any manner it sees fit and without limits of any kind. This plainly violates the Copyright Act. Even if the purpose of the proposal were well-founded in service to the public—and it is not—the states are simply not permitted to pass their own laws governing the terms under which copyright owners may distribute works to the market.

In addition to Gov. Hochul’s clear-eyed veto in 2021, related eBook bills have been proposed, litigated, and shot down in several states, begging the question as to why lawmakers seem determined to die on this meaningless hill. As discuss in this post examining the mid-sized library system serving my region in New York, there is no evidence suggesting that the public is underserved or that the current licensing regimes are so onerous as to harm the operation of libraries. Frankly, even if licensing were onerous, these laws would still be unconstitutional, but the combination of federal preemption and pointlessness does make one wonder–but not really.

These eBook bills are all variations on the same thematic effort by the same lobbying groups seeking to push an anti-copyright agenda using the Trojan Horse of the public library. Copyright antagonists couldn’t prove DRM, governed under DMCA Section 1201, was unconstitutional, so they try chipping away at the principle through state legislatures, masked beneath the white hats of institutions we all love. And indeed, because I do love libraries, I continue to hope that they will stop running interference for organizations that have neither libraries’ nor readers’ nor certainly authors’ best interests at heart. If nothing else, continuing to introduce bills that run afoul of Article I Section 8 is a waste of everybody’s time.

Photo by: vasiliybudarin

Book bans deserve opposition, but not debate.

book bans

The Authors Guild, of which I am a member, has filed an amicus brief asking the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to affirm a lower court ruling that Iowa’s book ban law is unconstitutional. And of course it is. The subject barely warrants legal examination because it is impossible to draft a content-focused general book ban law that does not violate the First Amendment. And while there is reason to expect that ruling to be upheld on appeal, this cautious optimism does little to resolve the question as to why book ban efforts are more energized than they were 10-20 years ago.

Based on the titles highlighted in the AG brief, it is fair to assume that once again, conservative extremists have their righteous undies in a bunch over the inherent “evil” of sex. Iowa legislators join those in Texas, Florida, Arkansas et al. in the view that both fiction and nonfiction works that in any way confront, describe, or allude to sex, or sexual identity, are so dangerous to American youth (even teenagers who are having sex) that they must be removed from distribution.

Fear of sex is nothing new for the religious right, of course, but the current increase in book banning efforts appears to be animated by a reaction against wider social acceptance of a broader spectrum of sexual identity—i.e., a moralizing backlash against openly gay, nonbinary, and transgender persons. The sweep also includes reactions against subject matter dealing with race, and if (God forbid) any book addresses both race and sex, the earth will shake. As such, the novels of Nobel Laureate Toni Morrison make everybody’s list.

In public statements, politicians advocating book bans will portray these laws as necessary to protect children from age-inappropriate sexual content, but there is no truth to this implication, either in practice or law. Not only is there no evidence that teachers are reading Bukowski to third graders, but laws like Iowa’s are sweeping, content-focused bans for all libraries serving all students regardless of age. As old as the recurring theme of sex in book bans is the axiom that book banners, by their very nature, are illiterate. There is no more sense in arguing constitutional principles with these people than there is in talking cosmology with a gibbon.

Sure, one could explain for the umpteenth time that the five freedoms of the First Amendment very intentionally proscribe all rationales for state censorship. But for whose ears do we repeat this? Do the legislators endorsing these statutes know even a fraction of the history behind the Bill of Rights? Can they so much as theorize why the Constitution rejected the underlying frameworks of England’s censorious laws? Can they trace any portion of the narrative from the 14th century Lollards, through Henry VIII, Milton and Aeropagetica, royal patents entangled with the politics of the Church, the Puritan adventure to North America, and the next 160 years of history to get to the Constitutional Convention?

I ask because the constitutional framers (some who were total horndogs, BTW) knew that history from reading books! As such, the First Amendment, in 45 words, neatly encompasses centuries of lessons learned about successful and failed states to form a critical building block in the Plan for a nation unlike any that existed before or since the U.S. Constitution was ratified. In short, no book banning allowed—not even for allegedly “protecting the kids” from sex, an effort which, like book banning itself, has a history of spectacular failure.

Consider this detail:  the AG brief notes that among the prohibited books is “Laurie Halse Anderson’s Speak, which has helped countless teens work through the trauma of sexual assault.” By what twisted logic does banning such a book “protect” anybody from anything? Legislators with any real moral judgment should be focused on the “countless victims” of sexual assault, not the books that might help them heal. But again, you can’t explain such things to gibbons. This is what happens when alleged principles are unmoored from education—e.g., when one censors books without reading them. Any position taken to extreme will inevitably cross the boundary where the advocate contradicts his own core values, proposing unworkable, unconstitutional laws that can only be sustained by hypocrisy.

And I get it. I sympathize with the emotion. After all, it would be short work to argue that religious exercise has been the cause of more violence and depravity throughout history than all the smuttiest literature ever written. Yet, despite the mountain of evidence one might compile to support that thesis, the First Amendment is clear:  religious exercise may neither be prohibited nor compelled. And so it is with speech. It’s called democracy.

Photo by: mpalis